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Abstract
The dissertation inquires into the biopolitics of development from the 
perspective of conceptualising a ‘beyond’ of such biopolitics. This inquiry is 
informed by the need to re-evaluate both prevailing discourses of development 
and their existing biopolitical critiques. It approaches the idea of develop-
ment in terms of its centrality to Western liberalism, arguing that a critique 
of development needs to account for its embeddedness in the metaphysics of 
modernity. Drawing on the works of Michel Foucault and Giorgio Agamben 
for a critical reading of development studies literature and policy documents 
by the United Nations, the World Bank and other relevant agencies, the dis-
sertation shows the various ways in which policies of development produce 
the kind of depoliticised life that is required by neoliberal capitalism. With 
the purpose of furthering this biopolitical critique, the dissertation argues 
that an engagement with Martin Heidegger’s work enables an interrogation 
of the ontological underpinnings of contemporary biopolitics which are 
generally left unexamined in biopolitical critiques. It is then argued that the 
ontological violence entailed by the enframing of Being forms the conditions 
of possibility for the production and governing of biopoliticised subjects. 
Development is thus part of the processes that sustain what Heidegger calls 
‘the forgetting of Being’. Yet, the dissertation suggests that the ontological 
question of Being also opens the way for a repoliticised conception of beings 
and their worlds; a beyond of biopolitics. The concept of the Augenblick, a 
blink of an eye, is discussed as a moment that opens up the existing order, 
enabling a politics that understands ‘world’ as the openness of Being, which 
nevertheless requires involvement by beings in order for them to overcome 
the limitations that even benevolent and supposedly emancipatory projects 
(re)produce when they lack recognition of their own historico-ontological 
commitments. Finally, the dissertation suggests rethinking development in 
the light of the ‘decoloniality of Being’, which is here conceived as a politics of 
‘pluriverse’. The dissertation’s contribution thus lies in its critical engagement 
with the ontology of contemporary biopolitics of development and in its map-
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ping of the conditions of possibility of a beyond of such biopolitics; a beyond 
conceived in terms of a politics of being as opposed to the biopolitics of life. 
Keywords: biopolitics, development, being, life, world, ontology, decolo-
niality
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1. Introduction: Towards a Beyond of the Biopolitics 
of Development
 
The idea that ‘another world is possible’ entered the contemporary political 
imagination with renewed force at the beginning of the new millennium. Yet 
at the same time it has been argued that currently it is easier to imagine the end 
of life on earth than to imagine the end of the liberal-capitalist order of things. 
The form of life of late-modern neoliberal societies has become naturalised to 
the extent that conceiving of lives or worlds that would be radically different 
to it has become increasingly difficult. But what are we talking about when 
we talk about other worlds? Ideas of worlds different to the one we inhabit 
now involve an understanding of a ‘beyond’. Politics worthy of the name is 
thus always a thought of a beyond. Yet, the nature of the beyond varies greatly 
depending on that which one is aiming to transcend. 
The past decades have seen various ways of conceiving of worlds that 
would be better than the current one. ‘Development’ is a generic term 
arguably denoting the possibility of positive change for those peoples who 
are currently not sufficiently included in the world of liberal-democratic 
market economy. The desirability of development has been at the core of 
international politics for decades, and the interdependency of develop-
ment, security and freedom has become popular parlance. Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs) and Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) 
are contemporary formulations of the human development/sustainable 
development framework that has been the predominant development para-
digm since the 1990s. The notions of human development and sustainable 
development have proliferated in the language of states, intergovernmental 
organisations, financial institutions, development consultants, nongovern-
mental organisations and academics alike. These concepts are presented by 
their proponents as more or less radical departures from conventional ways 
of understanding development, and as such offering pathways to a better 
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world. But are contemporary conceptions of development able to give us 
an account of another world, of a ‘beyond’?
While international politics has become increasingly preoccupied with 
questions of development, contemporary critical thought has been engaging 
with varied questions about the subject, power and the character of politics. 
These critical advances have often been informed by recognition of the need 
to question the assumptions on these issues held by traditional theories of 
International Relations (IR). This is not simply a matter of introducing new 
issues and actors to the field of ‘the international’, nor is it a matter of moving 
‘the level of analysis’ downward towards the individual. Rather, it is a matter 
of bringing International Relations into dialogue with other fields of thought, 
especially with critical political and social theory, and of thus problematising 
the constitution of some of the core questions of International Relations.1
One prominent field of such problematisation is the body of works that 
addresses the relations between politics and life, and the political constitution 
of life. This strand of contemporary thought often finds inspiration from the 
work of Michel Foucault. Foucault’s work on the concepts of biopower and 
biopolitics serves as the basis of much contemporary thinking on how human 
life is invested in processes where power produces subjectification. Following 
Foucault, biopolitics refers to a modern type of government that regulates 
populations through techniques of power that take ‘life itself ’ as their object.2 
Alongside Foucault, the work of Giorgio Agamben has provided one of the 
most popular renditions of the character of biopower and biopolitics in the 
contemporary world, giving rise to critical research deploying these concepts in 
International Relations. Bodies of works have been developing around both of 
these thinkers, thus reworking the concept of biopolitics in different ways. One 
of the areas where such biopolitical critiques have been made is the above men-
tioned conflation of humanity and development now apparent in international 
politics. A growing body of works has thus emerged in International Relations 
that challenges the supposed radical potential of the contemporary develop-
ment paradigm, exposing the biopolitical governance entailed by such policies. 
1  See Edkins and Vaughan-Williams 2009, 1-6. 
2  See Foucault 1990, 133-160. 
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This thesis inquires into the biopolitical character of development from the 
perspective of conceptualising a beyond of such biopolitics. This inquiry is 
informed by the need to re-evaluate both prevailing discourses of development 
and their existing biopolitical critiques. While the former are often unable 
to recognise the ways in which liberal-emancipatory ideas may limit peoples’ 
possibilities, the latter have on the one hand been insufficiently concerned 
with the ontological underpinnings of modern biopolitics, and on the other 
hand with the possibility of conceiving of a beyond of biopolitics. Address-
ing these issues, the contribution of the thesis is thus twofold: firstly, to the 
politics of development and, secondly, to the theory of biopolitics. I begin 
below by outlining the current state of play on the biopolitics of develop-
ment in International Relations. In the second part of this Introduction the 
research question, empirical material and research design will be discussed. 
After detailing these elements I consider the relationship between ontology, 
politics and biopolitics, as well as the relevance of examining the ontology of 
biopolitics. Finally, an outline of the following chapters is presented.   
The Biopolitics of Development in International Relations
Alongside security and war, development is one of the key problems of inter-
national politics, although it has not traditionally received as much attention 
within the discipline of International Relations as the first two notions. While 
‘development’ is often considered to have emerged in the aftermath of the 
Second World War, the idea of helping, bettering, educating and developing 
‘other’ peoples has been present in international politics since the beginning of 
modernity. Nevertheless, development did gain increasing momentum in the 
post-World War II context for reasons that will be elaborated on later in this 
dissertation. There has also been a growing market for different approaches 
to development, while the idea of development itself has achieved the status 
of an almost unquestionable truth in the international political imaginary. 
While there have been significant shifts in dominant development discourses 
in the post-World War II period, since the 1990s human development and 
sustainable development have been widely accepted as the most viable con-
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temporary development paradigms.3 From the United Nations to the World 
Bank to various non-governmental organisations, and from the European 
Union to the United States to many other countries, these concepts form 
the basis of contemporary development policies. Human development and 
sustainable development have together contributed to making international 
development one of the primary biopolitical problematics of the 21st century. 
Arguably challenging earlier conceptions of development that were too 
focused on macro-economic concerns, human development puts the ‘hu-
man’ at the centre of development. ‘Humanising’ development means that 
instead of using a country’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) as the primary, 
or even as the only, indicator of development, policies should focus on ‘hu-
man’ indicators such as health and well-being. Human development is thus 
primarily concerned with the human that is both the end and the means 
of all development. Sustainable development, in turn, puts an emphasis on 
the kind of world that we will leave for future generations. The most often 
cited definition of sustainable development understands it as development 
that ‘meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of 
future generations to meet their own needs.’4 While the intergenerational 
component remains, according to Jeffrey Sachs, more recent definitions of 
sustainable development emphasise the linking of economic development, 
social development and environmental sustainability.5 Human development 
and sustainable development should thus be understood as complementary 
and compatible approaches, the two frameworks supporting rather than 
challenging each other. Both human development and sustainable develop-
ment find expression in the Millennium Development Goals, which have 
formed the core of international development policies from the year 2000 
until 2015, which was the deadline for the goals’ achievement. The MDGs 
included eight aims: 
3 For a discussion of the concept of human development, see Nussbaum 2011; UNDP 2010; 1990; 
Deneulin 2009 and Sen 1999. For a general overview of the notion of sustainable development, see 
Sachs 2015; Roorda 2012; Strange and Bayley 2008; Hopwood et al. 2005; United Nations 1992 
and World Commission on Environment and Development 1987.   
4 World Commission on Environment and Development 1987.
5 Sachs 2015, 5. 
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Goal 1: Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger
Goal 2: Achieve universal primary education
Goal 3: Promote gender equality and empower women
Goal 4: Reduce child mortality
Goal 5: Improve maternal health
Goal 6: Combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases
Goal 7: Ensure environmental sustainability
Goal 8: Develop a global partnership for development.6  
As the deadline for achieving the MDGs was 2015, the international develop-
ment community has formulated a new post-2015 development agenda, the 
aim of which is nothing less than ‘ending poverty, transforming all lives and 
protecting the planet’ by 2030.7 In the post-2015 agenda, the Millennium 
Development Goals are expanded into the Sustainable Development Goals. 
The SDGs include the following:
Goal 1. End poverty in all its forms everywhere
Goal 2. End hunger, achieve food security and improved nutrition and promote 
sustainable agriculture
Goal 3. Ensure healthy lives and promote well-being for all at all ages
Goal 4. Ensure inclusive and equitable quality education and promote lifelong 
learning opportunities for all
Goal 5. Achieve gender equality and empower all women and girls
Goal 6. Ensure availability and sustainable management of water and sanitation 
for all
Goal 7. Ensure access to affordable, reliable, sustainable and modern energy for all
Goal 8. Promote sustained, inclusive and sustainable economic growth, full and 
productive employment and decent work for all
Goal 9. Build resilient infrastructure, promote inclusive and sustainable indus-
trialisation and foster innovation
Goal 10. Reduce inequality within and among countries
6  United Nations General Assembly 2000.
7  United Nations General Assembly 2014.
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Goal 11. Make cities and human settlements inclusive, safe, resilient and sustainable
Goal 12. Ensure sustainable consumption and production patterns
Goal 13. Take urgent action to combat climate change and its impacts
Goal 14. Conserve and sustainably use the oceans, seas, and maritime resources 
for sustainable development
Goal 15. Protect, restore and promote sustainable use of terrestrial ecosystems, 
sustainably manage forests, combat desertification, and halt and reverse land 
degradation and halt biodiversity loss
Goal 16. Promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, 
provide access to justice for all and build effective, accountable and inclusive 
institutions at all levels
Goal 17. Strengthen the means of implementation and revitalise the global 
partnership for sustainable development.8 
While arguably ‘of unprecedented scope and significance’,9 the SDGs do 
not significantly change the existing development paradigm. The UN-led 
Millennium Development Goals/Sustainable Development Goals frame-
work is significant in that it provides the general parameters within which 
other development actors operate as well as the language with which they 
frame their policies. Yet, as will be pointed out in the course of the disserta-
tion, the actual policies and practices of different development actors may 
take quite different forms, even if they are embedded in the language of the 
MDGs/SDGs. Overall, the current development agenda is best understood 
as a contemporary framing of the liberal development project, which will be 
unpacked in the following chapters. 
While the above goals themselves are generally accepted as desirable, and 
although they are widely embraced by states and non-state actors alike, the 
contemporary development framework has also received a considerable 
amount of critique. While much of this critique has been directed at the 
difficulty of operationalising the framework’s core concepts and goals,10 thus 
8 United Nations General Assembly 2014.
9 United Nations General Assembly 2015, 3. 
10 See Walby 2012; Sanga 2011; Moyo 2010; van Zeijl-Rozema et al. 2008; Kemp and Martens 2007; 
Ibrahim 2006; Fukuda-Parr 2003; Robeyns 2000 and van den Bergh and Nijkamp 1991.  
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aiming not to contest the framework as such but to refine its functioning, 
there have also been critiques pointing towards the dominant development 
approaches’ problematic complicity with capitalism.11 Such critiques often 
point out that instead of challenging the structures of the global economy, 
the contemporary development paradigm enables the inclusion of more and 
more countries into the international economic system. 
Mónica Chuji, an indigenous activist from the Ecuadorian Amazon, points 
out that between 2007 and 2009, the G7 allocated nearly $5 trillion to save 
the financial markets, while the total cost of fulfilling all the Millennium 
Development Goals would have been approximately $100 billion.12 Chuji 
argues that this disparity goes some way to show that the discourses of devel-
opment and poverty eradication are mainly mechanisms of ideological and 
epistemological colonisation, rather than genuine attempts to solve problems 
of poverty. The close historical intertwinement of colonialism and develop-
ment has been extensively discussed,13 but in each period developmentalists 
argue that their projects are different from those of the past, and that they 
are not informed by the selfish pursuit of gain but rather by a sincere will to 
help. Yet, as the Martiniquean poet Aimé Césaire wrote in 1950, one should
not seek to know whether personally these gentlemen are in good or bad faith, 
whether personally they have good or bad intentions. Whether personally – that 
is, in the private conscience of Peter or Paul – they are or are not colonialists, 
because the essential thing is that their highly problematical subjective good faith 
is entirely irrelevant to the objective social implications of the evil work they 
perform as watchdogs of colonialism.14 
11 See Pupavac 2010; Dean 2009; Saith 2006; Levitas 2004 and Redclift 2005; 2002.
12 Chuji 2009. Estimates on the cost of achieving the MDGs have varied greatly. In 2002, the UN 
estimated the cost at $50 billion, which would have doubled the then-present level of aid, meaning 
that the costs altogether would have been around $100 billion – the number cited by Chuji. See 
also Annan 2002. According to a 2012 estimate by the OECD, the additional cost of achieving the 
MDGs would have been in the order of $120 billion. See OECD 2012, 12. In any case, it is clear 
that the numbers pale next to the sums that have been spent on rescuing banks and financial markets 
since 2007. 
13 See Ziai 2016; Dossa 2007; Duffield 2007; Goldsmith 2001 and Cowen and Shenton 1996. 
14 Césaire 2000, 55.
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Césaire considered all those working to defend and expand Western bourgeois 
society, ‘progress’ and capitalism as the watchdogs of colonialism. The good 
intentions of those engaged in such projects should not obscure their nega-
tive effects, and one should approach with great caution the claim that ‘old’ 
colonialism has ended and a new period of benevolence has begun.15 Writing 
over half a century ago, Césaire was responding to the emergence of the so-
called Development Age that followed the end of the Second World War. 
However, at the time most African countries were still under formal colonial 
rule and many Asian countries had only recently gained independence. Surely 
now, well into the new millennium, we have moved beyond colonialism. Yet, 
Chuji and others argue that development still operates as a medium of colo-
nisation, even if its mode of operation has changed from the times of formal 
colonialism. As its predecessors, contemporary development is characterised 
by the will to do good and to better the lives of the less fortunate. Likewise, 
it is still often overlooked that the social and political implications of ideas 
and practices that seek to do good may not be unproblematic for those who 
are the objects of those ideas and practices. Instead, developmental practices 
govern the lives of those who are to be developed. Such governing of life is 
the domain of biopolitics. 
Those working in the wake of Foucault’s conceptualisation of biopower 
have begun to problematise the governing of life that development entails.16 
A biopolitical perspective argues that the kinds of policies that focus on the 
promotion of a certain type of life inevitably also entail disallowing other 
types of life. The critique advanced in this dissertation argues that current 
development policies produce life that is compatible with the form of order 
underlying contemporary neoliberalism. The mainstream development 
framework refuses to recognise solutions to problems of human well-being 
that challenge the form of political-economic organisation that is charac-
teristic of liberal-democratic market economies. It also refuses to recognise 
15 Césaire 2000, 77. 
16 See Grove and Pugh 2015; Bakker 2013; Mezzadra et al. 2013; Chandler 2013a; 2012; Gabay 2012; 
Reid 2012a; 2010; Shani 2012; Sörensen 2012; Duffield 2010; 2007; 2005; Kienscherf 2011; Jaeger 
2010; Stern and Öjendal 2010; Parfitt 2009; De Larrinaga and Doucet 2010; 2008; Sylvester 2006 
and DuBois 1991. 
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knowledge and values that are not considered ‘rational’ and ‘well-informed’ 
by the standards of the framework. And it fails to accept lifestyles that devi-
ate from the ‘healthy’ norm. In claiming to offer all-encompassing solutions 
to the problems that people face in their lives, the development framework 
fails to see that it limits possible solutions. Yet, the need for development 
and its basic premises are not questioned in the dominant political discourse. 
Rather, development policies suggest that the major questions regarding life 
and politics have been settled. It is now only a matter of the extension of de-
velopment to all parts of the world. The main contribution of a biopolitical 
critique of such policies is to open up their conceptions of life and politics 
so as to enable alternative ways of being and acting. 
Despite the centrality of ‘life’ to questions of war, security and develop-
ment, the intersections between politics and life remained under-examined 
in International Relations for a long time. Although biopolitical approaches 
have begun to open up this problematic, more often than not, ‘the human’ 
still appears in international politics as an unproblematic term used to ‘hu-
manise’ any given politics. Hence, there remains a need to foreground the 
importance of not taking ‘life’ or ‘the human’ as unproblematic terms that can 
be used without asking what life or what kind of a human it is that is being 
promoted through particular policies; developed through human develop-
ment, for example. An examination of relations and techniques of power in 
the context of a liberal-emancipatory policy such as development is important 
because it is exactly the apparent neutrality and political invisibility of those 
techniques and relations of power that makes them potentially dangerous.17 
Therefore it is relevant to continue to problematise such policies that claim 
to represent life and act on its behalf by examining the ways in which such 
policies produce the life that they claim to represent. 
However, following the recent proliferation of critiques exposing the bi-
opolitical nature of various rationalities and practices that take ‘the human’ 
or ‘life’ as their object, biopolitics has become a catchword also in the field 
of International Relations. Especially the Foucauldian variant of biopolitics 
has received a great deal of attention and it has been applied in a variety of 
17  See Gordon 2002, xv. 
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contexts. While biopolitical critiques have started to problematise the ways 
in which development is embedded in and complicit with (neo)liberal power 
relations, it is relevant to ask in what ways these critiques conceive of a ‘be-
yond’ of such biopolitics. In other words, biopolitical critique ought to no 
longer be limited to an application of the Foucauldian conceptual ‘toolbox’: 
to using ‘biopower’ as a ready-made tool that merely exposes the way in which 
governance operates. The biopolitical problematic of development is therefore 
discussed as the starting point and the impetus of this dissertation, but the 
focus is shifted to considering a ‘beyond’ of such biopolitics. The following 
chapters will suggest that the biopolitical problematic delineates the realm of 
the discussion on contemporary development practice but in itself the biopo-
litical problematic is not sufficient for working out a conception of a beyond. 
Beyond What, Why and How?
It is only that which has no history, which can be defined.18 
In order to engage with the question of a ‘beyond’, one must first examine that 
which one is aiming to get beyond. To this end, the dissertation problematises 
(neo)liberal accounts of development and life. Building on a discussion of 
biopolitics and (neo)liberalism, the dissertation unpacks the conception of 
life which contemporary discourses of development presuppose. However, I 
do not seek to merely repeat the problematisation of the normalising and dis-
ciplining tendencies of development, which is already explicit in a large body 
of biopolitical literature in International Relations. Rather, the dissertation 
aims to move beyond the biopolitical perspective that focuses on analysing 
the negativity embedded in contemporary modes of governance. Thus, its 
contribution to the theory of biopolitics in International Relations lies in 
the engagement with the terms and conditions of possibility of a ‘beyond’ 
of such biopolitics. The problem that this dissertation poses has to do, firstly, 
with the governing of life and the degradation of the political entailed by 
18  Nietzsche 2003, 53.
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contemporary development policies specifically and by neoliberal biopolitics 
more broadly. Secondly, the problem that is posed here has to do with work-
ing out a repoliticised conception of beings and their worlds; a beyond. The 
dissertation problematises the neoliberal biopolitics of development because 
of its depoliticising tendencies, and it makes a case for an ontological and 
practical repoliticisation of development. 
Problematisation refers to the ‘development of a given into a question’.19 
It is understood here as the process of examining how and why some phe-
nomena become problems. However, to problematise an issue or a concept 
is not to deny the existence of the phenomenon to which it refers. Hence, to 
problematise development or poverty does not mean to refute their existence 
in the material world. Explaining his work on the problematisation of crime, 
madness and sexuality, Foucault notes that he ‘tried to show that it was pre-
cisely some real existent in the world which was the target of social regulation 
at a given moment.’20 Yet, the way in which a particular phenomenon comes 
to be understood and taken as a given is a matter of problematisation. Hence, 
‘the problematization is an “answer” to a concrete situation which is real.’21 
Thus, a problematisation of development is not to be taken as a trivialisation 
of the suffering and hardship that are very real to people who live in poverty. 
Instead, to problematise ‘development’ means to challenge the answer that 
it gives to questions of human well-being.
In this dissertation such problematisation is conducted through a critical 
reading of development studies literature and policy documents by the United 
Nations, the World Bank and other relevant agencies. Each of the chapters 
focuses on a different aspect of the development paradigm and therefore 
different materials are used to discuss specific individual issues. The overall 
frame is given by the Human Development Reports of the United Nations 
Development Program (UNDP), which have appeared annually since 1990. 
While these reports provide detailed empirical data and aim at policy imple-
mentation, the rationalisations on which they are based are elaborated on in 
19  Foucault 2000c, 118. 
20  Foucault 1983. 
21  Foucault 1983. 
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the works of such thinkers as Martha Nussbaum and Amartya Sen (on human 
development), and Jeffrey Sachs (on sustainable development). The works 
of these thinkers are thus discussed in order to examine the philosophical 
basis of the contemporary development paradigm. The development policy 
literatures and the academic accounts that support them will be examined 
through critical political philosophy and postcolonial thought. Engaging in 
a meta-theoretical discourse, the dissertation invokes an interdisciplinary 
body of literature, drawing on works from the fields of political theory and 
political philosophy, focusing specifically on the thought of Foucault and 
Agamben, as well as the work of Martin Heidegger. While the dissertation 
is embedded in the tradition of continental political philosophy, it seeks to 
engage that tradition from the perspective of postcolonial and decolonial 
thought, drawing on the work of Césaire, Ashis Nandy and Frantz Fanon, 
but also contemporary thinkers such as Walter Mignolo, Nelson Maldonado-
Torres and Chandra Mohanty. 
Particularly in responding to the second part of the research problem – the 
question of a beyond of the biopolitical – the dissertation relies on a dialogue 
between the latter two bodies of thought. I believe such a dialogue to be fruitful 
for two reasons: Firstly, in order to consider the categories and concepts through 
which political modernity is played out anywhere in the world, it is necessary to 
think through the intellectual traditions of Europe.22 Yet, at the same time, these 
traditions alone are insufficient for reasons that will be discussed in the last part 
of Chapter 2. Secondly, in the words of Nandy, ‘the West is not merely a part of 
an imperial world view; its classical traditions and its critical self are sometimes 
a protest against the modern West.’23 Similarly, Dipesh Chakrabarty notes that 
‘provincializing Europe cannot ever be a project of shunning European thought. 
For at the end of European imperialism, European thought is a gift to us all. 
We can talk of provincializing it only in an anticolonial spirit of gratitude.’24 It 
is in this spirit that I seek to make use of the thought of Heidegger, Foucault 
and Agamben for a critique of contemporary development.
22  Chakrabarty 2008, 4. 
23  Nandy 2014, xiv. 
24  Chakrabarty 2008, 255. 
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In approaching the concept of biopolitics it needs to be recognised that 
the notion is part of different political and theoretical fields that give it vari-
ous meanings.25 In the current dissertation I am interested in the political 
formations constituted by contemporary development policies, and in the 
possibility of thinking beings and their worlds beyond those formations. In 
this context, the concept of biopolitics is not considered primarily as a tool for 
analysis but rather as the object of analysis. The dissertation will therefore not 
make use of a single definition of biopolitics. Neither is it my aim to provide 
definitive content to the concept.26 Instead of defining what biopolitics is, I 
am interested in examining the theoretical implications of the practices of 
defining it as well as in the empirical implications of such policies that take 
‘life’ as given. Hence, ‘biopolitics’ is discussed with an understanding that 
the meaning of a concept is not constituted by a stable referent but by the 
way in which it is used. Examining the ways in which a concept is used and 
the ways in which it functions effectively means examining the conditions 
within which the concept is made rational, intelligible and plausible. Instead 
of aiming to operationalise a concept with a preconceived meaning, the dis-
sertation seeks to examine the presuppositions regarding life and politics 
that make ‘development’ both intelligible and plausible in the contemporary 
world, thus reconfiguring the ways in which biopolitics is to be understood. 
Likewise, my engagement with the notion of a beyond is premised on the 
recognition that there is a necessary ambiguity in the concept of a beyond.27 
Not offering a fixed definition is nevertheless not to be understood as com-
plete arbitrariness but as a deliberate maintaining of the concept’s openness 
in order to enable a reproblematisation of the ways in which politics can 
contemporarily be conceived of. 
The continuing relevance of the Foucauldian biopolitical analytic cannot 
be denied. However, Foucault’s contribution is limited when it comes to 
conceiving of a beyond of biopolitical governance. While Agamben offers a 
more explicit, messianic engagement with a ‘beyond’, his work is often seen 
25 For a short overview, see Lemke 2011. 
26 This should not, however, be understood as a lack of recognition of the differences between various 
conceptions of biopolitics. These differences are discussed in Chapter 2.
27 See Caputo and Scanlon 2007. 
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as offering very little when it comes to practical political engagement. I sug-
gest in this dissertation that a more fruitful engagement with the idea of a 
‘beyond’ becomes possible through reading Foucault and Agamben together 
with the work of Heidegger. Specifically, I am interested in moving in the 
intersections and discontinuities of the works of Foucault and Agamben, 
aiming to discuss a beyond of biopolitics in terms that are reducible neither 
to Foucauldian micropolitics of resistance nor to Agambenite messianism. To 
this end, particularly productive engagements can be found in the works of 
the postcolonial interlocutors of Foucault, Agamben and Heidegger, which 
will be addressed in the coming chapters. Yet, first it is necessary to discuss 
in some more detail the theoretical framework of the thesis.    
Ontology, Politics and Biopolitics
Foucault and Agamben are arguably the most important theorists of biopoli-
tics.28 While each of them draws on a broad range of intellectual tradition, 
both of their works are indebted to Heidegger’s critique of the metaphysics 
of modernity in ways that are often disregarded in biopolitical critiques. 
Although during the past decade there has been an increasing interest in the 
relationship between the works of Foucault and Heidegger29 and while at the 
same time International Relations has seen a surge of biopolitical theorisa-
tion and critique,30 these critiques rarely make any reference to Heidegger. 
28 The work of Antonio Negri and Michael Hardt presents a third often cited formulation of biopower 
and biopolitics. See Hardt and Negri 2004; 2001 as well as Virno 2004. As they draw on a somewhat 
different philosophical tradition – primarily Marx and Spinoza – it is not possible to examine their work 
within the confines of this dissertation. Nevertheless, it should be noted that the critique of globalism and 
unitary ontology presented in Chapter 8 would be applicable also to the work of Hardt and Negri as they 
assume a uniform planetary existence of the empire and the multitude. In the so-called biophilosophical 
tradition, also the work of Gilles Deleuze must be mentioned when discussing the relationship between 
life and the political. See Deleuze 2005. However, my approach differs also from that of Deleuze as he 
puts forward a notion of life as pure becoming, which, from a Heideggerian perspective, still presupposes 
a metaphysical idea of totality. For a further discussion of this point, see Chapter 4.     
29 See Nichols 2014; Joronen 2013; Sinnerbrink 2005; Rayner 2004; Milchman and Rosenberg 2003 
and Elden 2002. 
30 See Debrix and Barber 2013; Dillon and Lobo-Guerrero 2009; 2008; Dillon and Reid 2009; 2001; 
Edkins and Pin-Fat 2005, and for biopolitical critiques in the context of development, see footnote 16. 
1. Introduction: Towards a Beyond of the Biopolitics of Development | 27
Perhaps derivative of the lack of explicit discussions of biopolitics vis-à-vis 
Heidegger is the way in which biopolitical critiques rarely probe the ontologi-
cal constitution governance. 
The core concept of biopolitics is ‘life’, which is also the category through 
which governance within the biopolitical framework is said to primarily op-
erate. Biopower takes as its object the life of the population, and it seeks to 
govern that life through a myriad of techniques. Yet, according to Heidegger, 
‘life itself ’ cannot function alone as the site from which the thinkability of the 
world opens.31 Rather, in order to understand the ways in which life happens, 
we are to examine the ontological conditions of that happening, that is: Being. 
Being is the happening through which all beings become understandable to 
us as the beings that they are. Being can happen and reveal itself in different 
ways, which is expressed in the ways in which we come to understand and 
approach ourselves and others. Heidegger argues that in the Western tradi-
tion of thought the happening of Being has been neglected, and Being (das 
Sein) has been conflated with beings (das Seiende), which has resulted in the 
metaphysical ‘forgetting of Being’ (Seinsvergessenheit). Heidegger calls this 
distinction between beings and Being the ‘ontological difference’.32 Instead 
of merely examining ‘ontic’ beings – such as the particular biological char-
acteristics of entities – Heidegger argues that we should inquire into Being 
as such, that is: ontology.33 
International Relations theory has tended to shy away from such ontologi-
cal considerations as the most recent of the ‘great debates,’ the fourth debate, 
has been focused on epistemological and methodological rather than onto-
logical disagreements.34 When ontology is discussed it often simply refers to 
conceptions about the basic images, units and content of international poli-
31 Heidegger 2001, 62. 
32 Heidegger 1962, 34 [13]. 
33 The lowercase ‘being’ is sometimes preferred in order to fend off the idea that Heidegger means some 
kind of transcendental Supreme Being above and beyond beings. Being is not a subject or a thing, 
and it should not be understood as a transcendental entity. While this is an important point, for the 
purpose of clarity, I will nevertheless use the capitalised form ‘Being’. See translators’ introduction 
in Heidegger 2000, xi.   
34 See Kurki and Wight 2010.
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tics35 rather than to the fundamental grounds on which these categories are 
based. While there have been some sustained examinations of the ontological 
premises of International Relations,36 the growing biopolitical literature in IR 
hardly ever explicitly addresses ontology. Although the Foucauldian critiques 
that examine particular practices and forms of subjectification are absolutely 
crucial for critiquing contemporary global development, they tend to overlook 
the ontological logics that constitute the real wherein those practices become 
both rational and intelligible. 
Engaging with those logics does not mean to ‘ontologise’ biopolitics as if 
it were somehow non-ontological to begin with. Considering the critical and 
poststructuralist suspicion of meta-narratives and, indeed, of ontology as such, 
it should be noted that an engagement with ontology is not an attempt to 
homogenise reality. Nor does it necessarily collapse the multiplicity of ontic 
realities produced by the biopolitics of development into one all-consuming 
whole. – A concern that is generally expressed by those who worry about 
‘ontologisation’.37 – Whereas metaphysics is concerned with understand-
ing what reality consists of, entailing an essentialised understanding of the 
character of the real, ontology, by contrast, examines how reality comes to us; 
it seeks to find out the conditions that ground knowledge claims about the 
world. Keeping this difference in mind, it appears that negative reactions to 
ontological analysis are often the result of a metaphysical understanding of 
ontology which equates ontology with essentialisation. On the contrary, the 
kind of ontological critique that I pursue in this dissertation points towards 
the plurality of ontology. When conceived of in light of Heidegger’s destruc-
tion of metaphysics, ontology is not a status-quo preserving perspective but 
35 Ole Wæver describes the inter-paradigm debate (third debate) as having been chiefly concerned 
with ontology. Yet he, too, admits that this is not ‘real “philosophical” ontology’ but a ‘watered-out 
version of ontology’, which is more like a fashionable label than a philosophical characterisation of 
the debate. See Wæver 1996. 
36 On the ontological premises of the world, otherness and security in IR theories, see, respectively, 
Prozorov 2014a; Odysseos 2007 and Dillon 1996. In International Relations, also Martin Coward’s 
work on the politics of urban destruction must be highlighted as an interesting engagement with 
spatiality, community and ontology. See Coward 2009.   
37 See Coleman and Grove 2009; Geulen 2009; Rasch 2009 and Sharpe 2009.  
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rather a critical activity as such.38 It is not possible to say anything about 
anything without always having already made assumptions about Being and 
without those assumptions carrying an interpretation of the meaning of Being. 
Therefore, an examination of the ontological underpinnings of contemporary 
biopolitics is needed because without an adequate conception of the ways 
in which life is contemporarily governed, it is not possible to conceive of a 
politics that is capable of challenging that governance. 
In the light of this, the dissertation will interrogate the ontological premises 
of the contemporary international development paradigm. By doing so the 
dissertation also seeks to foreground the need for an explicit engagement 
between Heidegger’s work and biopolitics in International Relations. Hei-
degger’s contribution to contemporary engagements with biopolitics follows 
from two aspects of his work. Firstly, Heidegger’s thought can be used to draw 
attention to the ontological grounding of contemporary biopolitical govern-
ance. Nussbaum, one of the key theorists of the human development paradigm, 
argues that the human development approach is ‘without any grounding in 
metaphysical ideas of the sort that divide people along lines of culture and 
religion.’39 According to her, the approach, as a form of political liberalism, 
shows ‘respect for citizens by not asking them to endorse a political doctrine 
built on any particular religious or metaphysical view.’40 Disregarding the 
ontological presuppositions on which the approach is based, Nussbaum fails 
to acknowledge that liberalism, too, is grounded in a certain metaphysical 
tradition. In the following chapters I will unpack development’s embedded-
ness in that metaphysics. This entails exploring the contemporary relevance 
of the idea of ontological difference by distinguishing between biopolitical 
governance on the level of beings and the corresponding enframing of Being. 
By doing so, the dissertation renders Heidegger relevant for contemporary 
critiques of neoliberalism. Ontological difference, then, is not only a matter 
of reviving the question of Being. It is also of primary importance for reviv-
ing the political.41
38  Odysseos 2007, 181. 
39  Nussbaum 2011, 109. 
40  Nussbaum 2011, 79.
41  See Dillon 1996, 32. 
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Thus, secondly, Heidegger’s thought is useful in terms of discussing a be-
yond of biopolitics because his conception of Being is always already beyond 
biologised conceptions of life. The ontological critique that I pursue in this 
dissertation can therefore also be differentiated from those strands of ‘affirma-
tive biopolitics’ that have surfaced in the last couple of years in response to 
the overtly negative engagements with the concept during the past decade 
or so.42 While the intent of this dissertation can be described as ‘affirmative’, 
my approach does not seek the political power of ‘life’ in the same biological 
categories or properties through which biopolitics operates. Whereas Roberto 
Esposito and others seek to ground an affirmative biopolitics precisely on a 
biological conception of life, Heidegger can be fruitful for thinking beyond 
biopolitics because his thought is not limited by such biologised notions of life. 
Heidegger’s perspective engages with a non-biologised conception of Being 
which, nevertheless, does not deny the very real materiality of life, but neither 
does it limit being to that materiality nor, more importantly, seek its political 
power in it. Thus, the dissertation’s contribution lies in its critical engagement 
with the ontology of contemporary biopolitics of development and in its map-
ping of the conditions of possibility of a beyond of such biopolitics; a beyond 
conceived in terms of a politics of being as opposed to the biopolitics of life. 
The ontological problematic of a beyond is approached in this dissertation 
through Heidegger’s concept of Augenblick, which is variably translated into 
English as ‘moment’, ‘moment of vision’, ‘moment of transformation’, ‘decisive 
moment’, ‘instant’, ‘glance of an eye’, ‘twinkling of an eye’, or ‘blink of an eye’.43 
The blink of an eye exhibits a particular kind of moment and site of a beyond 
coming to presence. The Augenblick is a site of transformation that opens one 
to a different Being. It is thus akin to what is known in the thought of various 
continental thinkers as the ‘event’. The Augenblick is a particularly suitable 
concept for the purposes of this dissertation because it does not concern 
42 On affirmative biopolitics, see Vatter 2014a; Esposito 2010; 2008 and Lemm 2009. Judith Butler’s 
work on vulnerability and precariousness can also be read as a project of affirmative biopolitics. See 
Butler 2010; 2006. Affirmative biopolitics is discussed in more detail in Chapter 4. 
43 The various translations of the concept can be traced from interpretations of Søren Kierkegaard’s 
øieblik, Friedrich Nietzsche’s gateway ‘Moment,’ Karl Jaspers’ ‘pure eye’ and Heidegger’s Augenblick. 
See Ward 2008, xi-xv and McNeill 1999, ix.
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‘life’ as far as life is grasped merely as a drive towards self-preservation. What 
is at stake in the blink of an eye is not the continuation of the biological, or 
biologised, life of the population. Although the Augenblick does not concern 
life, engaging with it does not mean arguing that the material needs of biologi-
cal life are somehow unreal or irrelevant – a point worth making especially 
when discussing such a notion in relation to development. Rather, it means 
countering biopolitical governance through a site that is not disconnected 
from ‘life’ but which is nevertheless different: Being. Hence, the Heideggerian 
ontological problematisation of the enframing of the real does not force us to 
abandon the Foucauldian biopolitical analytic that examines the biological 
life of the population as the site through which it is governed. But Heidegger 
does help us in thinking of both beings and Being as something that can never 
be fully grasped by such accounts of life. 
Yet, how is any of this relevant in a world where more than 800 million 
people are hungry, where more than six million children die each year be-
fore their fifth birthday and where entire ecosystems are being destroyed by 
environmental degradation? The Heideggerian ontological problematic may 
seem far removed from the concerns of development policies. According to 
Nussbaum, the human development approach begins with the questions: 
‘What are people actually able to do and to be? What real opportunities for 
activity and choice has society given them?’44 When the object of examination 
arguably deals with the ‘actual possibilities’ and ‘real opportunities’ that people 
have in their lives, what good is it to talk about ontology? The argument that 
I advance in this dissertation holds that the limits of those possibilities and 
opportunities are drawn also on an ontological level. Ontological inquiry 
does not mean a retreat into transcendental categories or abstract generality 
supposedly separate from political praxis.45 By delimiting the real as such, 
ontological grounding also delimits the ways in which beings can become. 
Such a limitation, though it reflects a particular ontological logic, is acces-
sible to beings in the facticity of their existence: for example, in the lack of 
possibilities that proponents of development are also concerned about. 
44  Nussbaum 2011, 59. 
45  Prozorov 2014a, xxviii-xxix.
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Ontology is therefore not to be understood as detached from the life of 
beings, but as always happening in the midst of beings. Through a prob-
lematisation of the contemporary development framework, the dissertation 
traces some of the practical implications of the biopolitical and ontological 
delimitations entailed by neoliberal development. Hence, what is at stake 
in ontological politics is a mode of being. Ontological politics refers to the 
opening up of ontological positions. This is not to say that ontic forms of 
politics require a preceding understanding of these ontological conditions 
of possibility. Ontic forms of politics take place in the world all the time 
irrespective of whether people have knowledge of ontology. Yet, attention 
to the ontological conditions of possibility of a particular practice or idea 
can help us understand how it operates and what is at stake in attempts to 
formulate possible different ways of being. The fact that poverty persists or 
that nature is being destroyed for the pursuit of profit is made possible by 
particular understandings of the nature of being – by a particular revealing of 
Being, in Heideggerian terms. Likewise, we are in a better position to consider 
alternatives to the policies that perpetuate these conditions when recognising 
the presuppositions on which those policies are based. Ontological politics 
is thus to be understood as a historically sensitive approach where there is 
always also an ontico-ontological point of articulation of politics in this world. 
The declaration that another world is possible is inspired by the idea that 
capitalism is in a crisis and that this crisis provides the way to a different way 
of being and a different way of organising social relations. Biopolitics, in turn, 
resonates with the crises of capitalism.46 The ways in which biopolitics func-
tions are influenced by the shape of the capitalist order of things. Yet, crises are 
inherent to the functioning of capitalism and are thus not to be understood 
as necessarily bringing about its end, or the end of biopolitics. Nevertheless, 
the kinds of moments that make people demand a way to ‘another world’ are 
moments for considering also the limits of biopolitics. Arturo Escobar argues 
that the future of development concerns ‘the fate of life itself ’.47 As such, the 
realm of development is exactly that of biopolitics. Yet, the following chapters 
46  Sylvester 2006, 68. 
47  Escobar 2012, xxi. 
1. Introduction: Towards a Beyond of the Biopolitics of Development | 33
will argue that a critique of development also needs to leave the purview of the 
biopolitical. Only then will it be possible to think and practice another world. 
Chapter Outline
Chapter 2 traces a precedent of contemporary renditions of biopolitics in 
Heidegger’s concepts of machination (Machenschaft) and enframing (Gestell), 
arguing that an engagement with Heidegger’s work enables an interrogation 
of the ontological underpinnings of modern biopolitics. The chapter exam-
ines the concept of biopolitics in Foucault’s elaboration of biopower and his 
critique of liberal governmentality. Alongside Foucault, the chapter focuses 
on the work of Agamben, who is arguably Foucault’s most important contem-
porary interlocutor. Within the past decade, biopolitical theorisation has for a 
large part consisted of a debate on the merits and shortcomings of Foucault’s 
and Agamben’s renditions of the term. Due to its so-called ontologisation of 
biopower, Agamben’s account is generally dismissed in favour of Foucault’s 
more nuanced, historical reading. The chapter argues that an ontological 
engagement with biopolitics is needed, but such an engagement should rather 
begin with Heidegger. While recognising the differences between the works 
of Heidegger, Foucault and Agamben, the chapter argues that the ontological 
violence entailed by the enframing of Being forms the conditions of possibility 
for the production and governing of biopoliticised subjects. The chapter also 
indicates the directions for politics arising out of each of their works, but a 
more detailed discussion of these directions is reserved for Chapters 5-8. Fi-
nally, Chapter 2 discusses the ways in which the works of Agamben, Foucault 
and Heidegger have been critiqued and reappropriated by postcolonial and 
decolonial thinkers. The concepts of ‘the coloniality of Being’ and ‘colonial 
difference’ are introduced to draw attention to the role of coloniality in the 
constitution of Western modernity and to the importance of decoloniality 
for a critique of Western metaphysics and for a critique of development.
Development studies literature considers the year 1949 as the birth of 
the ‘Development Age’. In that same year, Heidegger gave a speech argu-
ing that despite all the hunger, suffering and abjection in the world, ‘the 
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essence of poverty’ remains hidden. In order to elaborate on the meaning 
and significance of Heidegger’s argument to contemporary critiques of de-
velopment, Chapter 3 begins by tracing the emergence of the development 
paradigm as a part of liberal Western modernity, thus showing the way in 
which development is part of the processes that sustain what Heidegger calls 
‘the forgetting of Being’. The chapter then delineates a Foucauldian and an 
Agambenite critique of the biopolitics of development. The Foucauldian 
critique focuses on the biopolitical governance implied by the notion of 
population in the context of policies of birth control and HIV/AIDS pre-
vention. The Agambenite critique draws attention to the potentially violent 
(inclusive) exclusion of certain lives. The production of so-called bare life is 
examined in the context of the projects of the World Food Programme and 
The Hunger Site, as well as the sterilisation camps set up in parts of India. In 
different ways these biopolitical critiques show how policies of development 
are complicit with the political-economic organisation of liberal-democratic 
market economies, producing the kind of depoliticised life that is required 
by neoliberal capitalism. 
Chapter 4 moves on to tackling the ontology of neoliberal biopolitics. 
While the proponents of human development argue that, due to its adherence 
to liberal principles, the framework is without any grounding in metaphysi-
cal ideas, the chapter argues that liberalism, too, is grounded in a particular 
metaphysical tradition. As liberalism has morphed into neoliberalism, so 
also the ontology underlying biopolitical governance has undergone change. 
The modern liberal subject has transformed into a late modern neoliberal 
standing-reserve (Bestand). In human development this change is reflected in 
the increasing importance of the discourse of ‘capabilities’. The chapter argues 
that the ontology of neoliberal biopolitics finds its most acute expression in 
the centrality of the notions of potentiality and contingency to contempo-
rary conceptions of life. In the human development discourse these notions 
are expressed through the concepts of capability and choice, which translate 
into policies of human capital, adaptation and resilience. These notions entail 
biologised and economised conceptions of ‘life’. Furthermore, the chapter 
argues that underlying these policies is an ontology that presupposes the total 
makeability of human and other beings, which derives its raison d’être from 
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the enframing of the real that demands contingency of its subjects while at 
the same time concealing its own contingent ground. 
Continuing the previous chapter’s engagement with the concepts of 
contingency and potentiality, Chapter 5 begins by discussing the centrality 
of these notions to contemporary poststructuralist and biopolitical critique. 
The chapter argues that the contemporary broad-based consensus on the un-
decidable and indeterminate nature of life has led to resistance to biopolitics 
being increasingly based on the same ontology through which neoliberal 
biopolitics operates. By differentiating between the neoliberal deployment 
of life’s contingency and the radical contingency of the happening of Being, 
the chapter discusses the contribution of the idea of ontological difference 
to contemporary critiques of neoliberalism. The chapter argues that in order 
to reinvigorate the political in the face of its degradation by neoliberalism, 
biopolitical analysis needs to move beyond merely exposing the contingency 
of subjectivities and power relations, by retheorising, instead of reaffirming, 
the neoliberal regime of truth about life. This means not drawing the political 
power of ‘being’ from the biological properties of ‘life’. Here the chapter turns 
to Agamben’s concept of a ‘form-of-life’, which is a mode of being in which 
biological life cannot be separated from a way of life. While postcolonial 
thought and development studies are sometimes differentiated through the 
former’s concern with the question ‘Can the subaltern speak?’ and the latter’s 
engagement with the question ‘Can the subaltern eat?’, the chapter uses the 
concept of a ‘form-of-life’ as a way of overcoming the separation between 
the two. Finally, the chapter discusses the notion of ‘food sovereignty’ in 
the context of peasant struggles to maintain indigenous seeds as an example 
of the reappropriation of potentiality in a way that challenges mainstream 
development. 
Chapter 6 begins by problematising the notion of ‘choice’ which is at the 
heart of the human development paradigm. Within human development, 
human beings are free to choose anything, except for the fundamental condi-
tions that constitute them as rational, capability-creating, ‘choosing’ beings. 
The chapter then contrasts ‘choice’ as understood in the human development 
paradigm with Heidegger’s notion of decision (Entscheidung), which opens up 
the possibility for Being to happen differently. The decision is concerned with 
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encountering the finitude of the dominant revealing of Being. The multiple 
notions of finitude at play in the biopolitics of development are discussed 
through the case of the farmer suicides which have taken place in India since 
1995 – the largest wave of recorded suicides in human history. Instead of 
functioning as a means of resistance, the suicides have effectively disposed 
of a population that has become surplus while at the same time legitimising 
biopolitical calls to educate those who remain on how to manage the inse-
curities and risks of the contemporary world. As opposed to such ‘factical 
finitude’, the decision is concerned with ontological finitude: the opening up 
of a new revealing of Being. A beyond is thus understood as something that 
is constituted by a disruption in the happening of Being. Heidegger describes 
such a break in the unfolding of Being with the concept of the Augenblick. 
The chapter examines the Augenblick as a moment where the givenness of the 
existing order is questioned out of the occurrence of the essence of truth – the 
openness of Being. The chapter ends with a further discussion of truth by 
elaborating on the notion of food sovereignty through the Haitian peasant 
movement’s ‘truth-telling’. Combining Heidegger and Foucault, truth-telling 
is understood as a practice that brings together the pursuit of another world 
and another life in the facticity of existence. 
Chapter 7 continues the conceptualisation of a beyond in terms of the 
Augenblick, relating it to the concept of ‘darkness’. The history of colonialism 
is thoroughly imbued with imaginaries of light and darkness. More broadly, 
the dualism between light and darkness is the founding metaphor of Western 
metaphysics. The kind of imagery that aspires ‘beyond’ generally associates this 
world with darkness and the beyond with light, envisioning a move from the 
former to the latter. Contesting such colonial and metaphysical understand-
ings of darkness, the chapter discusses both the biopolitics of development 
and the politics of the Augenblick through different notions of darkness. 
Firstly, the chapter examines the production of invisible, disposable life along 
the so-called global ‘colour-line’, then contrasting such invisibility with the 
excessive visibility required by the developmental gaze. Secondly, the chapter 
follows Agamben in discussing darkness as the colour of potentiality, as the 
irreducible that remains in each moment of actualisation. Attention to such 
darkness means problematising and questioning that which is uncritically 
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celebrated in one’s time. Furthermore, the idea of the Augenblick is related to 
Heidegger’s critique of the calculative look of the modern subject. Whereas 
the colonial/developmental gaze and the consequent living ‘under Western 
eyes’ are products of this modern way of looking, the seeing of the Augenblick 
involves a non-possessive relation to that which is not immediately obvious 
within one’s own terms of intelligibility, or which may even be inexplicable. 
The chapter puts forward an onto-poetic notion of darkness as that which 
enables relation not only to other beings but also to Being itself. Thus, the 
problematic created by a politics of the Augenblick is how to inhabit the site 
of the moment and act according to its insight, while recognising that such a 
politics will always be finite, opening as it does onto other beings and Being 
that can no longer be grasped within its order. This means that, rather than 
existing as some discernible telos, the beyond must be thought of in terms 
of nearness to Being, in terms of asking the question of the truth of Being. 
Chapter 8 argues that the critique presented in the course of the disserta-
tion shows development’s inability to conceive of a radically different world. 
Development is premised on the idea of a ‘one world’, which is articulated 
in terms of one humanity, one economy and one ecology. Based on the uni-
versality of these ideas, development promises a thorough transformation 
of the world. However, this transformation means the replacement of the 
multiplicity of real and living worlds with their integration into the dominant 
world-picture. Biopolitical critique, in turn, tends to focus on the subjectivi-
ties produced by power, often disregarding an engagement with the concept 
of world altogether. Chapter 8 argues that the kind of politics formulated 
in the previous chapters understands ‘world’ as the openness of Being. In 
order to counter the depoliticisation of beings and their worlds entailed by 
neoliberal development, ‘world’ nevertheless requires involvement by be-
ings in order for them to overcome the limitations that even benevolent and 
supposedly emancipatory projects (re)produce when they lack recognition 
of their own historico-ontological commitments. Alongside Heidegger, the 
chapter draws on decolonial and postdevelopment literature that understands 
decoloniality in terms of a ‘pluriverse’: the existence of multiple ontologies/
worlds. In a world depoliticised by neoliberalism, exposing the ontological 
finitude of order is as such a political act. Yet, the chapter argues that for our 
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worlds to be properly political, they require involvement in the factical situ-
ations that the decision to see being beyond biopolitical life opens up before 
us. The chapter ends with a discussion of Andean notions of sumak kawsay/
buen vivir as modes of being that cannot be captured by or reduced to the 
life of the neoliberal biopolitics of development. Such notions also capture 
the ontological plurality espoused in Heidegger’s critique of the metaphysics 
of modernity and the sense that the poetic is the basic character of human 
existence in the world. This discussion is carried onto the Conclusion, which 
finally brings together the notions of Being, politics and worlds as the beyond 
of the biopolitics of development. 
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2. Biopolitical Problematics: 
Heidegger, Foucault and Agamben
Biopolitics is a type of government that takes ‘life itself ’ as its object. Despite 
the centrality of ‘life’ to phenomena such as war, security and development, 
the intersections between politics and life remained under-examined in 
International Relations for a long time. Only the past decade has seen a pro-
liferation of critiques exposing the biopolitical nature of various rationalities 
and practices that take ‘the human’ or ‘life’ as their object. The concepts of 
biopolitics and biopower have become important reference points in Interna-
tional Relations theory as well as in contemporary political and social theory. 
Biopolitics has found its way into the discipline of International Relations 
as part of the broader redefinition of power, which has taken shape since the 
1980s and 1990s. After the Cold War it became popular to argue that the 
locus of power and politics has shifted from sovereign states to various other 
actors such as international financial institutions, multinational corporations, 
non-governmental organisations, criminal organisations, terrorist networks 
etc. Whereas these readings often still ascribe to a conception that sees power 
as an entity that can be gathered and collected, various poststructuralist 
thinkers suggest that contemporary international phenomena can more plau-
sibly be examined from a perspective that understands power as dispersed, 
decentralised and relational.
A crucial starting point to this redefinition of power has been the first 
volume of Michel Foucault’s The History of Sexuality, originally published in 
French in 1976. In the final chapter of the book Foucault draws a distinction 
between sovereign power as the ‘right of death’ and discipline and biopower 
as ‘power over life’. This delineation has contributed to various disciplines an 
understanding of different modalities of power. In International Relations, 
where sovereignty has traditionally been understood as sovereign statehood, 
conceptions of sovereignty have begun to shift so as to include various rela-
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tions of sovereign power irrespective of the sites where they are located.48 
Furthermore, sovereignty is increasingly seen as being interlinked with bio-
power, and constellations of different modalities of power are understood 
to be changing in relation to the character of the modern and in relation to 
their location and context.49 Thus, power is not a monolithic entity which is 
simply ‘used’ for the achievement of aims. It functions differently in different 
contexts and has various logics of operation that cannot be reduced to the 
coercive ‘right of death’.
While Foucault acknowledged the continuing significance of sovereignty, 
his work primarily dealt with what he considered to be a distinctly new, mod-
ern type of power that functions according to a completely different logic 
than the archaic right of death. In his influential book Homo Sacer: Sovereign 
Power and Bare Life, published in Italian in 1995, Giorgio Agamben seeks to 
reconsider the relationship between sovereign power and biopower, arguing 
that the two are inseparably interlinked and that life has been the object of 
power since the ancients. As the concept of biopolitics began to gain relevance 
in International Relations in the beginning of the 2000s, those deploying the 
concept often tended to conflate Foucault’s and Agamben’s conceptions of 
the term.50 Little attention was paid to the different conceptions of the nature 
of power, the subject of power and the objectives of power in the works of 
these two thinkers. This inattention has since been addressed by a number of 
writers,51 and biopolitical theorisation has for a large part turned into a debate 
on the merits and shortcomings of Foucault’s and Agamben’s renditions of 
the term. Due to its so-called ontologisation of biopower, Agamben’s account 
is often dismissed in favour of Foucault’s more nuanced, historical reading.
Yet, biopolitical literature tends to disregard the extent to which both 
Foucault’s and Agamben’s conceptions of biopolitics are indebted to Martin 
Heidegger’s critique of the metaphysics of modernity and his ontological elabo-
48 See Edkins, Pin-Fat and Shapiro 2004.
49 Dillon 2004. 
50 For some examples, see De Larrinaga and Doucet 2008; Edkins and Pin-Fat 2005; 2004 and Diken 
and Laustsen 2002. 
51 See Coleman and Grove 2009; Dillon and Lobo-Guerrero 2009; Patton 2007; Prozorov 2007; 
Dillon 2005 and Ojakangas 2005. 
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ration of technology. Although Foucault has made the greatest contribution 
to the way in which biopolitics is contemporarily understood in International 
Relations and cognate disciplines, the politicisation of life as part of techno-
logical modernity was examined already by Heidegger, and his work has been 
vital to both Foucault and Agamben despite the fact that it is rarely referred 
to by those currently engaging with the concept. This chapter develops a read-
ing of the biopolitical in Heidegger, Foucault and Agamben respectively, and 
argues that Heidegger’s work can help not only in understanding the roots 
of contemporary notions of biopolitics but also in conceiving of a different 
plane from which to consider a beyond of the biopolitical. My aim is not to 
offer an exhaustive interpretation of the relationships between the thought of 
Heidegger, Foucault and Agamben. Rather, the purpose is to discuss the aspects 
of their work that immediately relate to ontology and biopolitics. Finally, 
the chapter brings to the fore the need to consider the works of Heidegger, 
Foucault and Agamben in the light of the rearticulations of their conceptual 
frameworks that have been made by postcolonial and decolonial critics. I begin 
below with Heidegger’s examination of life and Being in modernity.  
Machination, Enframing and Technological Modernity
 
Lecturing at the University of Freiburg in the winter of 1921-1922, Heidegger 
noted that ‘the term, “life”, is remarkably vague today. It is used to refer to a 
comprehensive, ultimate, and meaningful reality: “life itself ”’.52 Now, almost 
a hundred years later, ‘life itself ’ is understood to designate the substance 
of what is called biopolitics, and those examining biopolitics consider ‘life 
itself ’ to be that through which contemporary governance primarily operates. 
Heidegger, however, had an ambivalent relationship to the concept of life and 
to its ability to help us understand human existence:
Biological concepts of life are to be set aside from the very outset: unnecessary 
burdens, even if certain motives might spring from these concepts, which is 
52  Heidegger 2001, 62. 
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possible, however, only if the intended grasp of human existence as life remains 
open, preconceptually, to an understanding of life which is essentially older than 
modern biology.53
While the 19th century Lebensphilosophie with its foregrounding of the con-
cept of ‘life’ and its critique of the processes of rationalisation, civilisation and 
mechanisation, is a predecessor of contemporary conceptions of biopolitics, 
in Being and Time, originally published in German in 1927, Heidegger rejects 
such philosophies of life because in them ‘”life” itself as a kind of Being does 
not become ontologically a problem.’54 Refusing to couch his discussion on 
the concepts of ‘life’, ‘the human’ or ‘the subject’, Heidegger chooses the term 
Dasein to refer to human beings insofar as they relate to Being. Dasein is the 
kind of being which has the capacity to reflect on its own existence. ‘Dasein is 
the being who inhabits a Here, a sphere of meaning within which beings can 
reveal themselves as meaningful, as significant’, Gregory Fried and Richard 
Polt explain.55 Yet, according to Heidegger, Dasein should never be defined 
by regarding it as ‘life plus something else’.56 Such an understanding would 
fall back on the idea of the human as a rational animal. That is, as a biological 
body with the added capacity for reason, these two realms – the mind and 
the body – remaining fundamentally separate. 
On the contrary, the existential analytic of Dasein that Heidegger formu-
lates in Being and Time is meant to challenge the centrality of epistemology 
and the Cartesian subject in philosophy. The purpose of the existential 
analytic is to show that epistemological claims always already contain an 
ontological background understanding that directs knowledge claims. In 
Being and Time, Heidegger considers the existential analytic of Dasein to be 
the plane where ‘fundamental ontology’, the ground of all other ontologies, 
is to be sought. The existential analytic intertwines phenomenology and on-
tology, leading Heidegger to ‘a hermeneutics of facticity’, where ontological 
53 Heidegger 2001, 62. 
54 Heidegger 1962, 72-73 [46-47]. For a detailed discussion of Heidegger’s relationship to the concept 
of life, see Farrell Krell 1992. 
55 Fried and Polt in Heidegger 2000, xii.
56 Heidegger 1962, 75 [50]. 
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examination is pursued through phenomenology. Facticity, then, refers to 
the dimensions of existence by which humans understand themselves as liv-
ing beings. Facticity is that which brings together life and Being; existential 
concerns and ontology.57 In ontological phenomenology, an interpretation 
of Being is thus sought in the facticity of Dasein. The social practices in 
which Dasein engages open up an avenue into an understanding of Being. In 
Heidegger’s words, ‘ontology has for its fundamental discipline the analytic 
of Dasein. This implies at the same time that ontology cannot be established 
in a purely ontological manner. Its possibility is referred back to a being, that 
is, to something ontical – the Dasein. Ontology has an ontical foundation.’58 
This means that Being is not the same as a being, but it is nevertheless given 
only in the facticity of Dasein. 
I will introduce some of the central concepts of the existential analytic in 
the course of the dissertation: resoluteness, authenticity and being-toward-
death are discussed in Chapter 6, being-with is examined in Chapter 7 and 
being-in-the-world is the focus of concern in Chapter 8. For now, the most 
important contribution of Being and Time for my purposes is the introduction 
of the notion of ontological difference: the distinction between beings (das 
Seiende) and Being (das Sein).59 Ontological difference is not the difference 
between word and thing, or between concept and reality. The ontological 
difference exists within human life and experience.60 In Being and Time, on-
tological difference has the purpose of uncovering the ground of beings. At 
this point, the notion does not adequately account for the finite character 
of all foundational groundings.61 In his later work, Heidegger abandoned 
the project of fundamental ontology, which in Being and Time was still un-
derstood as transhistorical.62 The historical nature of ontology comes to the 
foreground in Heidegger’s later work, which introduces not only the notion 
of ‘the history of Being’ but also the additional concept of das Seyn, which 
57  Campbell 2012, 2-4.
58  Heidegger 1982, 19. 
59  Heidegger 1962, 34 [13].
60  Nicholson 1996, 362.
61  Joronen 2010, 21. 
62  George 2015, 46. 
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is translated into English as either Be-ing or Beyng.63 The concept of Be-ing 
is meant to emphasise the openness of Being, indeed the non-ground, the 
abyss (Abgrund) of all being. Thus understood, Being is ‘both utterly void 
and most abundant, most universal and most unique.’64 The question of Being 
then comes to concern the happening, the event (Ereignis), or the moment 
(Augenblick) in which things become intelligible to us. While the ontologi-
cal difference of Being and Time seeks to reveal the fundamental ground of 
beings, Heidegger’s later work on Ereignis understands Being as a play of 
revealing-concealing, where the emphasis is on the finitude of each particular 
revealing. I will return to these notions in Chapters 6-8. 
At this stage, the central point is that, for Heidegger, existence is decided 
not through the category of biological life but through Being, which is al-
ways already beyond mere biological existence. Roberto Esposito points out 
that, for Heidegger, ‘the biological category of life isn’t the site from which 
the thinkability of the world opens, but is exactly the contrary.’65 Jacques 
Derrida, in turn, insists that the rejection of every form of biologism is a 
constant gesture of Heidegger’s thought, the political implications of which 
‘are to be taken seriously.’66 According to both Esposito and Agamben, ‘the 
black box of biopolitics remained closed with Heidegger’67 because he was 
not prepared to confront the ‘mystery of the “simply living being”’.68 While 
this is the direction pursued by both Agamben and Esposito, for now, I will 
follow Heidegger’s suggestion and set the concept of ‘life’ aside in order to 
go into his work via another route. Instead of focusing on his early engage-
ments with ‘life philosophy’ or the existential analytic of Dasein in Being and 
Time, an anticipation of the biopolitical can rather be found in Heidegger’s 
1936-1940 Nietzsche lectures, in Contributions to Philosophy (Of the Event) 
63 In the following chapters, I will use the concept of ‘Be-ing’ when directly quoting texts where Heide-
gger uses this term. Otherwise, I will keep to the simpler form ‘Being,’ which should nevertheless 
also be understood as carrying a reference to the openness and non-determined character of being. 
64 Heidegger 1991d, 193.
65 Esposito 2008, 153. 
66 Derrida 2008, 144. 
67 Esposito 2008, 157. 
68 Agamben 2004, 70. 
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written between 1936 and 193869 as well as in the seminal 1953 essay “The 
Question Concerning Technology”.
For the purposes of my discussion, the key concept that arises out of Hei-
degger’s work in the late 1930s is ‘machination’ (Machenschaft). Machination 
is a particular mode in which Being occurs and it refers to an interpretation 
of beings as makeable. The history of machination extends all the way back to 
Plato, but it is in modernity that machination – makeability – becomes the 
essence of beings.70 Heidegger argues that mechanistic and biologistic ways of 
thinking are a consequence of such a machinational interpretation of beings. 
In modernity, machination hides under the supposed objectivity of these ways 
of thinking, and through them it has come to dominate lived experience.71
Machenschaft […] prevails in the realm of purely accessible (ausmachbaren) be-
ing, beings characterised by sheer disposability (Machbarkeit) and malleability 
(Machsamkeit), where everything is “do-able” (machbar) by way of securement 
and calculation.72
Machination entails meaninglessness and the replacement of any inquiry into 
the truth of Being by the mobilisation of life for the achievement of goals, the 
organising principle of which is will to power. In machination, truth is nothing 
but ‘the securing of beings in their perfectly accessible disposability.’73 Machina-
tion gives rise to a nihilistic instrumentalisation of beings, and life becomes 
both the subject and object of calculation and ordering. In Nietzsche’s inverted 
Platonism, Heidegger argues, ‘all that is left is the solitary superficies of a “life” 
that empowers itself to itself for its own sake.’74 Although machination is a 
particular kind of truth of Being, what characterises it, along with calculation, 
is that the question of ‘truth’ is no longer needed. In its essence, calculation 
does not refer to numerical expression or counting, but to this inclusiveness 
69 Although written in the 1930s, Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis) was published in German 
only in 1989 and the first English translation came out in 1999. 
70 Heidegger 2012a, 100. 
71 Heidegger 2012a, 101.  
72 Heidegger 1991c, 175. 
73 Heidegger 1991c, 174; original emphases.
74 Heidegger 1991c, 176. 
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and unquestionableness of the makeability of beings.75 The incalculable, to 
the extent that it exists, is merely something that has not yet been included in 
calculation but will be incorporated in the future. Individual subjects cannot 
control machination because it defines the horizon of intelligibility through 
which the world is disclosed to them.76 
The relationship between machination and power is discussed most 
extensively in Heidegger’s Nietzsche lectures. In a text titled “Overcoming 
Metaphysics”, dating from the same period, he writes:
The struggle between those who are in power and those who want to come to 
power: On every side there is the struggle for power. Everywhere power itself 
is what is determinative. Through this struggle for power, the being of power is 
posited in the being of its unconditional dominance by both sides. At the same 
time, however, one thing is still covered up here: the fact that this struggle is in 
the service of power and is willed by it. Power has overpowered these struggles 
in advance. The will to will alone empowers these struggles. Power, however, 
overpowers various kinds of humanity in such a way that it expropriates from 
man the possibility of ever escaping from the oblivion of Being on such paths. 
This struggle is of necessity planetary and as such undecidable in its being because 
it has nothing to decide, since it remains excluded from all differentiation, from 
the difference (of Being from beings), and thus from truth. Through its own force 
it is driven out into what is without destiny: into the abandonment of Being.77 
For Heidegger, power is problematic not because it is misused by selfish or 
egoist leaders, or because it is used to pursue the wrong kinds of aims. The 
problem with power is that it becomes an all-consuming willing that perme-
ates all being. When the will to will dominates, Being is forgotten and beings 
are reduced to objects of manipulation.
The concept of machination precedes that of enframing (Gestell), which 
in Heidegger’s work in the 1940s comes to refer to a technological concep-
75  Heidegger 2012a, 95-97.
76  Sinnerbrink 2005, 244.
77  Heidegger 2003, 102.
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tion of Being. Heidegger does not understand technology in instrumental 
terms as machines or appliances that humans ‘use’, and ought to perhaps use 
better or less. As Heidegger famously argues, ‘the essence of technology is 
by no means anything technological’.78 Rather, the essence of technology is 
a particular way of revealing beings; the absolutisation of a certain horizon 
of disclosure.79 Technology, therefore, ‘includes all the areas of beings which 
equip the whole of beings: objectified nature, the business of culture, manu-
factured politics, and the gloss of ideals overlying everything.’80 Heidegger calls 
this way of revealing ‘enframing’ and the real that is ordered by it ‘standing-
reserve’ (Bestand). 
The revealing that rules throughout modern technology has the character of a 
setting-upon, in the sense of a challenging-forth. Such challenging happens in 
that the energy concealed in nature is unlocked, what is unlocked is transformed, 
what is transformed is stored up, what is stored up is in turn distributed, and what 
is distributed is switched about ever anew. Unlocking, transforming, storing, 
distributing, and switching about are ways of revealing. But the revealing never 
simply comes to an end. […] The revealing reveals to itself its own manifoldly 
interlocking paths, through regulating their course. This regulating is, for its part, 
everywhere secured.81 
Modernity is characterised by the ever-increasing will to challenge forth the 
energies of nature, transforming nature into a standing energy reserve. While 
human beings have always been technological in the sense of making use of 
nature, in modernity such resource-thinking becomes the dominant way of 
conceiving of all that is. Furthermore, Heidegger asks: ‘Does not man himself 
belong even more originally than nature within the standing-reserve?’82 He 
notes that ‘the current talk of human resources […] gives evidence of this.’83 
78  Heidegger 2011a, 217. 
79  Young 2002, 37.
80  Heidegger 2003, 93.
81  Heidegger 2011a, 224-225.
82  Heidegger 2011a, 226. 
83  Heidegger 2011a, 226. 
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Herein lies the biopolitical nature of enframing. Enframing puts humans ‘in 
position to reveal the actual, in the mode of ordering, as standing-reserve.’84 
Human beings are disclosed to themselves and to others as a resource pool 
that can be calculated, ordered and managed. In modernity such a revealing 
of Being becomes so totalising that it is not even recognised as a particular 
way of understanding beings, but it rather becomes naturalised as ‘the way 
things are’. I will further elaborate on the concepts of machination and 
enframing in the context of development in Chapters 4 and 7. For now it 
suffices to say that enframing forms the ontological conditions of possibility 
for the production of the kinds of biopolitical subjectivities that Foucault’s 
work is concerned with. 
Biopower, Governmentality and Biopolitical Subjectivity 
In 1976, the first volume of The History of Sexuality was published and Fou-
cault gave a series of lectures at the Collège de France that were titled “Society 
Must Be Defended”. The concept of biopower is most clearly spelled out in 
these works. In the lectures Foucault traces the emergence of ‘power’s hold 
over life’ in the mechanisms and techniques that, from the seventeenth century 
onwards, were aimed at the control of bodies. These disciplinary technologies 
became complemented slightly later by a ‘“biopolitics” of the human race’ 
that addresses ‘man-as-species’.85 Neither discipline nor biopolitics erased the 
old, sovereign ‘power of life and death’, which has remained in modernity in a 
relative and limited form. Biopower and sovereign power are thus analytically 
distinct and have different operating logics, but they nevertheless may, and 
often do, coincide in practice. 
Whereas sovereign power is exercised through the sovereign’s right to exert 
death, the power over life works by using continuous regulatory and correc-
tive mechanisms through which it works as a technique for the ‘subjugation 
84  Heidegger 2011a, 229.
85  Foucault 2004, 242-43.
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of bodies and control of populations’.86 Discipline is exhibited most clearly 
in institutions such as the army, the school and the prison where the human 
body is ordered through individualisation.87 Somewhat differently, the tech-
niques of biopower are massifying in that they are applied to the aggregate 
population and the processes, such as birth, death, production and illness 
that characterise it.88 These biopolitical techniques developed through the 
emergence of demography, the analysis of resources vis-à-vis inhabitants and 
the examination of wealth circulation.89 As the optimisation and management 
of life, biopolitics enabled the insertion of bodies into the machinery of pro-
duction and the adjustment of population growth to capital accumulation, 
both of which were necessary conditions for the development of capitalism.90 
Biopolitics thus emerged hand in hand with the socio-economic order of 
capitalism, and responded to its need to govern the life of the population 
towards productive ends. 
With biopower, ‘population’ becomes an economic and a political problem 
that cannot be accounted for through a juridico-discursive representation of 
power. Furthermore, the operation of biopower ‘is not ensured by right but 
by technique, not by law but by normalisation, not by punishment but by 
control, methods that are employed on all levels and in forms that go beyond 
the state and its apparatus.’91 The life of the population becomes the object 
of control in the private as well as in the public realm in ways that concern 
not only the ultimate decision between life and death, but also everything 
that is entailed in living itself. According to Foucault, the development of 
these techniques entailed ‘the entry of life into history’.92 He also argues 
that ‘a society’s “threshold of modernity” has been reached when the life of 
the species is wagered on its own political strategies.’93 Thus, for Foucault, 
biopolitics and modernity are part and parcel of each other. 
86  Foucault 1990, 140.
87  See Foucault 1991. 
88  Foucault 2004, 243.
89  Foucault 1990, 140.
90  Foucault 1990, 141. 
91  Foucault 1990, 89.
92  Foucault 1990, 141. 
93  Foucault 1990, 143.
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Biopolitics is closely related to the concept of ‘governmentality’ which 
was the subject of Foucault’s lectures at the Collège de France two years later, 
in 1978. The lecture course is titled “Security, Territory, Population”, but 
Foucault notes that what he is examining can more accurately be described 
as ‘governmentality’. The term refers to:
the ensemble formed by institutions, procedures, analyses, reflections, calcula-
tions, and tactics that allow the exercise of this very specific, albeit very complex, 
power that has the population as its target, political economy as its major form 
of knowledge, and apparatuses of security as its essential technical instrument.94
Governmentality describes the way in which the state has transformed from 
a legal, territorial entity to one which is mainly defined by the administration 
of its population, that is: the state has been ‘governmentalised’.95 Govern-
mentality manages populations through apparatuses of security, which refer 
not simply to what are generally understood as security actors (the army, the 
police, etc.), but to all institutions and practices that help to ensure the opti-
misation of economic, vital and social processes.96 Thereby governmentality 
is also central to the emergence of neoliberalism, which was the subject of 
Foucault’s lectures in 1979, titled “The Birth of Biopolitics”. Foucault begins 
the lectures by arguing that ‘only when we know what this governmental re-
gime called liberalism was, will we be able to understand what biopolitics is.’97 
The governmental reason and ‘economic truth’ of liberalism are inseparable 
from the emergence of modern biopolitics. Foucault’s analytic of liberalism 
and neoliberalism will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 4, since both 
iterations are central also to the ways in which development as a concept and 
as a policy has transformed and the ways in which it continues to function. 
Crucially, for Foucault, subjects are manufactured through relations of 
subjugation and power and, therefore, a subject cannot escape power. Power 
is omnipresent, though ‘not because it embraces everything but because it 
94  Foucault 2009, 108. 
95  Foucault 2009, 109.
96  Dean 2010, 29. 
97  Foucault 2010, 22. 
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comes from everywhere’.98 An escape from power relations is not even desir-
able because the relation always also entails a possibility of resistance. For 
Foucault, life is never completely integrated into techniques of governance; 
it escapes them constantly. Instead of coercing the subject in an immediate 
way, power ‘operates on the field of possibilities in which the behaviour of 
active subjects is able to inscribe itself.’99 Power incites and induces certain 
forms of behaviour, and it restricts and constrains others. It is the ‘conduct 
of conducts’. Although power understood in this sense may narrow down the 
field of possible action, it does not close it off entirely. A Foucauldian perspec-
tive suggests that the human is the subject of power exercised through both 
technologies of the self and technologies of domination. Foucault understands 
resistance as internal to power and calls for both practical and theoretical 
engagement with the discourses that shape our being as subjects. Relations 
of power create the subject and thus ‘there are no relations of power without 
resistances’.100 However, biopower in Foucault does not appear as something 
that necessarily has to be resisted.101 If there is to be resistance, it is to be a 
‘plurality of resistances’ rather than a single great refusal or revolt.102 
What emerges out of Foucault’s work is a form of examination that deals 
with three poles: forms of knowledge, relations of power and practices of the 
self. Truth, power and subjectivity are constitutive of, yet irreducible to, each 
other.103 Although Foucault insists that his purpose was never to offer a theory 
of power nor a general methodology, but ‘to create a history of the different 
modes by which, in our culture, human beings are made subjects’,104 his mode 
of inquiry has been influential precisely as a methodology for those wishing 
to examine contemporary operations of power. Perhaps the most important 
of those aiming to reformulate our understanding of the biopolitical in the 
wake of Foucault has been Giorgio Agamben.
98  Foucault 1990, 93.
99  Foucault 2002b, 341.
100  Foucault 1980b, 142.
101  Prozorov 2007, 59.
102  Foucault 1990, 96. 
103  Foucault 2011, 9.
104  Foucault 2002a, 326. 
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Bare Life, Abandonment and the Camp
Agamben begins his discussion in Homo Sacer from the same place where 
Heidegger can be argued to have begun his ethico-political considerations: 
Aristotle’s Nichomachean Ethics. Agamben argues that the Greeks had no 
single term to express what is currently referred to by the word ‘life’. Rather, 
the Greeks made a distinction between ‘zoē, which expressed the simple 
fact of living common to all living beings (animals, men, or gods), and 
bios, which indicated the form or way of living proper to an individual or 
a group.’105 Both Plato and Aristotle were concerned not with natural life 
but with a particular, qualified way of life. In the classical world, zoē was 
excluded from the polis, and remained in the sphere of the oikos, ‘home’.106 
This, however, does not mean that biological life would have completely 
escaped politicisation. In fact, Agamben’s main argument is that the inclu-
sion of biological life into the operation of power is an ancient phenom-
enon, and ‘the production of the biopolitical body is the original activity 
of sovereign power’.107 
Agamben centres his argument on a peculiar character called the ‘sacred 
man’, homo sacer, which existed in Roman law and which was excluded from 
the political order in the sense that he was not a political subject. However, 
he was also included in order because anyone could act as a sovereign in 
relation to him. Homo sacer, which Agamben chooses to call ‘bare life’, is life 
that may be killed but cannot be sacrificed.108 Agamben sometimes uses the 
terms zoē and bare life interchangeably, which should not, however, conceal 
the significant difference between the two. Bare life is specifically not zoē, 
and any qualification of life as ‘bare’ or ‘good’ means moving away from zoē, 
as Nick Vaughan-Williams explains.109 Bare life is zoē that has been captured 
 
105 Agamben 1998, 1.
106 Agamben 1998, 2.
107 Agamben 1998, 6. 
108 I follow the most common translation of Agamben’s nuda vita as ‘bare life’. For an alternative trans-
lation, ‘naked life’, see translators’ note in Agamben 2000, 143.  
109 Vaughan-Williams 2009, 738. 
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by sovereign power. In Agamben’s own words, ‘bare life is a product of the 
machine and not something that preexists it.’110 
In explicating the functioning of sovereign power, Agamben follows Carl 
Schmitt’s famous formulation of sovereignty: ‘sovereign is he who decides 
on the exception.’111 According to Agamben, in Schmitt’s discussion of 
sovereignty: 
The decision is not the expression of the will of a subject hierarchically superior 
to all others, but rather represents the inscription within the body of the nomos 
of the exteriority that animates it and gives it meaning. The sovereign decides not 
the licit and illicit but the originary inclusion of the living in the sphere of law.112
The decision on the exception demarcates the space within which order can be 
established. This means that the sovereign exception does not aim to control 
or neutralise an excess, but to create the conditions within which order can 
have validity. Thus, the exception has a crucial ontological function. Agamben 
argues that with modernity it becomes increasingly difficult to distinguish 
exception from law, and the state of exception turns into the fundamental 
political structure. Although this contention is sometimes taken to suggest 
that power, for Agamben, is essentially always the same, Michael Dillon and 
Luis Lobo-Guerrero point out that ‘one has to understand that for Agamben 
sovereign power is a manoeuvre which expresses the logic of sovereign law, 
not a metaphysics of power.’113 Thus, Agamben does not consider sovereign 
power as having a transhistorical, metaphysical essence, even if he is interested 
in identifying the operation of this logic in different historical times. 
Agamben argues, furthermore, that the decision on the exception has 
become a decision on the value or non-value of life. ‘In Western politics, bare 
life has the peculiar privilege of being that whose exclusion founds the city 
of men’, Agamben notes.114 The functioning of order requires a decision on 
110  Agamben 2005a, 87-88. 
111  Schmitt 2005, 5. 
112  Agamben 1998, 26. 
113  Dillon and Lobo-Guerrero 2008, 276. 
114  Agamben 1998, 7. 
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the element which is to be excluded. This is why, for Agamben, the primary 
relation of law to life is not application, as one would generally assume, but 
rather ‘abandonment’. The concept of abandonment is drawn from Jean-Luc 
Nancy who argues that to abandon means to turn over to a sovereign power. 
The abandoned experience the entirety and force of the law while being left 
outside its jurisdiction.115 Bare life is banned from the polis, yet abandoned to 
the sovereign. This means that the banned are not completely excluded but 
remain affected by the often violent consequences of the politics that they 
are excluded from.116 
While Foucault’s analytic of biopolitics suggests that in modernity zoē 
moves from the sphere of the oikos to polis, Agamben argues that:
What characterises modern politics is not so much the inclusion of zoē in the 
polis – which is, in itself, absolutely ancient – nor simply the fact that life as such 
becomes a principal object of the projections and calculations of the State power. 
Instead the decisive fact is that, together with the process by which the excep-
tion everywhere becomes the rule, the realm of bare life – which is originally 
situated at the margins of the political order – gradually begins to coincide with 
the political realm.117 
Agamben uses the term ‘camp’ to refer to ‘the space that opens up when the 
state of exception starts to become the rule’.118 Agamben traces the origin of 
the camp to colonial wars and the camps that were established by the Spanish 
in Cuba and by the English in South Africa at the end of the nineteenth cen-
tury. In both cases a state of emergency related to colonial war was extended 
to large parts of the civilian population through the establishment of camps. 
From the colonies the camp has proliferated into Western societies, not only 
in the form of the Nazi concentration camps, but also by becoming a mode of 
government that operates alongside and through the trinity of the state, the 
 
115  Nancy 1993, 44.
116  Ek 2006, 366.
117  Agamben 1998, 9. 
118  Agamben 1998, 168-169. 
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nation and territory on which international order has arguably been based 
since 1648. The camp – not the city – is the nomos of the modern.119 
This means that the camp is no longer understood as an anomaly on the 
margins of the polis, but instead as the logic of contemporary social and po-
litical space.120 Yet, in International Relations the application of Agamben’s 
thought has often drawn from a rather limited, spatiotemporal understand-
ing of the ‘state of exception’ (e.g. Guantánamo Bay as a state of exception). 
Sometimes Agamben is even criticised for supposedly conceiving of the 
camp as ‘an isolated space, well demarcated and impermeable’.121 Agamben, 
nevertheless, quite explicitly argues that the state of exception has become 
permanent, and that it is even ‘essentially unlocalisable’.122 The camp is an 
expression of a logic that contemporary politics follows. It is paradigmatic 
not on account of being an enclave carved out from juridical order but on 
account of what happens there: the production of bare life.123 Agamben’s 
conception of biopolitics forms a triad where the primary mode of operation 
is abandonment, the fundamental form of subjectivity is bare life and the 
underlying form of order is the camp. 
Due to the intimate relationship that Agamben identifies between sov-
ereign power and the production of bare life, attempting to act politically 
through rights discourse or through one’s status as a citizen is, for Agamben, 
only to play along in sovereignty’s game. ‘The hypocritical dogma of the 
sacredness of human life and the vacuous declarations of human rights’ only 
serve to hide sovereign violence, Agamben claims.124 Rejecting law and rights, 
Agamben argues that the attempt to ground political liberties in the rights of 
the citizen is a pointless pursuit.125 Due to this position and his other argu-
ments that seemingly point towards the monolithic and inescapable character 
of the biopolitical machine, Agamben’s work is often dismissed as being hyper-
119  Agamben 1998, 174. 
120  Diken and Laustsen 2005, 5.
121  Martin 2015, 13.
122  Agamben 1998, 19. 
123  Coleman and Grove 2009, 498.
124  Agamben 1993, 86. 
125  Agamben 1998, 181. 
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bolic and as leaving the subjects of biopower with no possibility of agency.126 
His version of biopolitics is accused of being ‘extreme and absurd’,127 and it 
is said to offer a ‘straightjacket account of biopolitical power’.128 Agamben’s 
biopolitics is generally conceived of as a negative thanatopolitics as opposed 
to, for example, Michael Hardt and Antionio Negri’s positive politics of life.129 
Nina Power suggests that contemporary European thought has become largely 
divided into two camps: one radically pessimistic and the other baselessly op-
timistic. She places Agamben in the former and Hardt and Negri in the latter 
camp.130 Such distinctions nevertheless miss the fundamentally affirmative 
intent of Agamben’s work. Chapter 5 discusses the way in which Agamben’s 
formulation of politics is based on his conceptualisation of potentiality and 
form-of-life which enable a mode of being beyond bare life. A failure to engage 
with the concept of potentiality leads to a simplistic dismissal of Agamben’s 
work as either pessimistic or utopian. 
For now, it suffices to say that there is a significant parallel between Agam-
ben’s conception of potentiality and his discussion of the exception and law, 
where the exception is in relation to the law in the form of its suspension. 
This means that the exception is not completely outside the law – or the 
sovereign. The exception is only abandoned by the sovereign. Or better yet, 
the sovereign is potential with respect to the exception. The decision on the 
exception concerns the space of potentiality where order is to be established. 
The sovereign is in relation to its own incapacity, which is the exception. It 
achieves pure potentiality because it is able to keep its power suspended be-
tween the law and the exception. This would imply that to resist the power 
that captures life, power would need to be deprived of its exclusive access to 
potentiality. But before exploring the notion of potentiality further, it is rel-
evant to look more closely at the relationships between Heidegger, Foucault 
and Agamben’s thought. 
126  See Laclau 2007 and Borislavov 2005.
127  Laclau 2007, 22.
128  Coleman and Grove 2009, 491. 
129  See Lemke 2011. 
130  Power 2010. 
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Metaphysics, Genealogy and Historical Ontology
Both Foucault and Agamben acknowledge the great influence that Hei-
degger’s work has had on them. For Agamben, the impulse to study philoso-
phy came from attending Heidegger’s summer seminars in Provence in 1966 
and 1968. Agamben describes his engagement with Heidegger during those 
seminars as having had a lasting impact on the way in which his own work 
developed henceforth.131 Similarly, in his last interview, given in 1984 only 
a few months before he passed away, Foucault says:
For me Heidegger has always been the essential philosopher. […] I still have 
here the notes that I took when I was reading Heidegger. I’ve got tons of them! 
And they are much more important than the ones I took on Hegel or Marx. My 
entire philosophical development was determined by my reading of Heidegger. 
I nevertheless recognise that Nietzsche outweighed him. […] I had tried to read 
Nietzsche in the fifties but Nietzsche alone did not appeal to me – whereas Ni-
etzsche and Heidegger: that was a philosophical shock!132   
Considering the way in which we can trace an early notion of the biopolitical 
in Heidegger’s Nietzsche lectures and other works dating from that period, 
it is no wonder that it was precisely Nietzsche and Heidegger together that 
became so important for Foucault. Robert Nichols argues that Heidegger’s 
influence can be seen particularly in Foucault’s early and late work on knowl-
edge and truth.133 However, also the mid-period works on biopolitics owe 
a debt to Heidegger. Nevertheless, Foucault wrote very little explicitly on 
Heidegger and those making use of Foucault’s conceptual toolbox very rarely 
refer to Heidegger at all. 
The connection to Heidegger is more often made in Agamben’s case but 
his affinity to Heidegger is mostly seen as the downside of his work.134 Both 
Agamben and Heidegger are criticised for not being able to offer much in 
131  Agamben 2010. 
132  Foucault 1988, 250. 
133  Nichols 2014. 
134  See Power 2010 and Negri 2007. 
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terms of political agency and for assuming the metaphysical sameness of a 
variety of phenomena that they engage with. Agamben appears to collapse 
together Auschwitz, asylum seekers’ detention centres and ultimately the 
entire contemporary international order. Similarly, Heidegger argues in a 
1949 lecture that ‘agriculture is now a mechanised food industry, in essence 
the same as the production of corpses in the gas chambers and extermination 
camps, the same as the blockading and starving of countries, the same as the 
production of hydrogen bombs.’135 The likening of industrial food production 
to the Holocaust was deemed too controversial in the immediate post-war 
context, and the comparison was deleted from the subsequent publication of 
the lecture as the essay “The Question Concerning Technology”.136 Thus, the 
most significant difference between Heidegger, Foucault and Agamben seems 
to pertain to their methodologies. Generally, a distinction is made between on 
the one hand Foucault’s historical method and on the other hand Agamben’s 
ontological method. Agamben’s ‘ontologisation’ of biopolitics is seen, in turn, 
to be derived from Heidegger, and both of them are accused of being ahistori-
cal. Yet, at least in the case of Heidegger, this critique is perhaps too hasty. 
Heidegger’s method can be called ‘historical ontology’, which, accord-
ing to Stuart Elden, is largely the same thing as Foucault’s genealogy.137 In 
Introduction to Metaphysics, a lecture course from 1935, Heidegger argues 
that ‘the asking of the fundamental question of metaphysics is a historical 
questioning through and through.’138 Here, history does not refer simply to 
that which is past in the sense of no longer happening but rather, history is 
a happening that acts in and through the present. ‘Our asking of the funda-
mental metaphysical question is historical because it opens up the happening 
of human Dasein […] opens it up to possibilities not yet asked about, futures 
to come (Zu-künften), and thereby also binds it back to its inception that has 
been, and thus sharpens and burdens it in its present’, Heidegger explains.139 
The centrality of the historical is already present in Heidegger’s 1921-1922 
135  Heidegger 2012b, 27.
136  See Sinnerbrink 2005, 254. 
137  Elden 2003. 
138  Heidegger 2000, 45. 
139  Heidegger 2000, 47. 
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Aristotle lectures, and it only becomes more important later on through his 
engagement with Nietzsche’s thought.
In the above mentioned sense, the historical is vital also to Foucault’s 
genealogical method, outlined in the 1971 essay “Nietzsche, Genealogy, 
History”. It is crucial to genealogy that it rejects the kind of search for origins 
that is based on an assumption of the immutable essence of things. Foucault 
argues that when the genealogist listens to history, he or she will find that 
behind things there is ‘not a timeless and essential secret but the secret that 
they have no essence.’140 Secondly, and following directly from the first point, 
genealogy shows the heterogeneity of what was thought homogenous and 
searches for cracks and fragments in what appears unified.141 As such, it is an 
immediately critical activity. Thirdly, genealogy is concerned with emergence 
(Entstehung) as distinct from origin (Ursprung). Foucault adopts the Ger-
man terms from Nietzsche who opposes ‘Egyptianism’: the dehistoricising 
tendency of traditional history. Emergence refers to a play of forces in a place 
of confrontation. An event, then, is ‘the reversal of a relationship of forces, 
the usurpation of power, the appropriation of a vocabulary turned against 
those who had once used it.’142 Central to any genealogy is an attention to the 
conditions of possibility that shape the mutations and material effects of the 
phenomenon which is under scrutiny. In a lecture in 1976, Foucault explains 
that genealogy establishes a historical knowledge of struggles which can be 
used tactically in the present.143 Arguably, then, Foucault and Heidegger 
converge on the Nietzschean idea of the event as that which brings together 
past, present and future in a new way. 
In the text “What Is Enlightenment?” Foucault describes his work as ‘a 
historical ontology of ourselves’, which is ‘an attitude, an ethos, a philosophi-
cal life in which the critique of what we are is at one and the same time the 
historical analysis of the limits that are imposed on us and an experiment with 
the possibility of going beyond them.’144 The critical, historical ontology of 
140  Foucault 2000a, 371. 
141  Foucault 2000a, 375.
142  Foucault 2000a, 381.
143  Foucault 1980a, 83. 
144  Foucault 2007a, 118. 
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ourselves makes room for the singular, the contingent and the arbitrary within 
what appears to be universal, necessary and obligatory. In order to do so, the 
historical ontology of ourselves needs to answer the following questions: 
‘How are we constituted as subjects of our own knowledge? How are we 
constituted as subjects who exercise or submit to power relations? How are 
we constituted as moral subjects of our own actions?’145 The focus of concern 
is thus the subject in relation to knowledge, power and practices of the self. 
Heidegger, in turn, sets the following principles for examinations that 
engage with the question of the human being:
1. The determination of the essence of the human being is never an answer, but is 
essentially a question. 2. The asking of this question and its decision are histori-
cal – not just in general, but as the essence of history. 3. The question of who 
the human being is must always be posed in an essential connection with the 
question of how it stands with Being. The question of the human being is not an 
anthropological question, but a historically meta-physical question.146 
The human is a historical question with a necessary relation to Being. It is 
relevant to note here that when Heidegger discusses the ‘essence’ (Wesen) of 
human being, of truth, or of freedom, it should be distinguished from the 
Latin essentia, which refers to the essential nature of something. On the con-
trary, Wesen means that what is being discussed is precisely not some fixed and 
static ‘thing’ but a ‘happening’ where a human being appropriates the being, 
truth or freedom, which the term ‘essence’ refers to.147 Foucault and Heidegger 
would therefore agree that human existence is a contingent happening rather 
than something immutable and necessary. Furthermore, this happening is, for 
both of them, entirely historical. It is, however, the third point on Heidegger’s 
list that distinguishes his mode of inquiry from Foucault’s.  
Whereas Heidegger emphasises the ontological difference between beings 
and Being, aiming always to examine both of them, Foucault remains in the 
145  Foucault 2007a, 117.
146  Heidegger 2000, 149; original emphasis.
147  See translator’s foreword in Heidegger 2002a, xiii.
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ontic realm. From a Heideggerian perspective the Foucauldian biopolitical 
analytic overlooks the ontological constitution of Being, which, although by 
no means disconnected from it, is not the same as the constitution of beings. 
Sergei Prozorov points out that Foucault’s approach lacks an explicit ontology 
that would be a correlate to his phenomenological analysis.148 Although Fou-
cault describes his work as ‘historical ontology’, nowhere in his writings does 
he offer a sustained discussion of what he means by ontology.149 Nevertheless, 
Johanna Oksala points out that ‘if Foucault’s thought does not contribute 
anything to ontological questioning, then neither does it ultimately contribute 
anything significant to political philosophy.’150 Here, a lot hinges on how we 
are to understand ontology and the relationship between the ontic and the 
ontological. While Foucault’s work is not incompatible with ontological 
questioning, a more explicit engagement with ontology can more readily be 
pursued through Heidegger. 
While Heidegger rarely enters the discussions on biopolitics in Interna-
tional Relations, the works of Agamben and Foucault have often been used 
together and even conflated. Yet, Foucauldian and Agambenite treatments 
of biopolitics offer very different accounts of the operation of power and of 
life. While for Agamben biopower is an ancient phenomenon, for Foucault 
it is distinctively modern. For Agamben, the ‘originary’ activity of sovereign 
power is the production of bare life. Foucault instead rejects the search for 
origins and focuses on particular configurations of power and their histori-
cally contingent conditions of emergence. There appears to be a significant 
contradiction between Foucauldian and Agambenite biopolitics with regard 
to both the subject of biopower and the objectives of biopower. If Foucault’s 
notion of biopower is aimed at improving the lives lived by its subjects and 
if it is ‘a power bent on generating forces, making them grow, and ordering 
them’,151 then Foucault’s biopower is certainly not a power that is based upon 
‘bare life’. The view of Bülent Diken and Carsten Bagge Laustsen, for exam-
ple, that ‘modern biopolitics as a whole reduces the citizen to bare life (to 
148  Prozorov 2014a, 34. 
149  Nichols 2014, 4.
150  Oksala 2012, 19. 
151  Foucault 1990, 136.
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Foucault’s ‘docile bodies’)’152 disguises the differences between Foucauldian 
and Agambenite biopolitics. 
At its most conceptually specific, ‘bare life’ means the inclusion of natural 
life in politics through its exclusion, thereby abandoning life to sovereign 
violence.153 This kind of life is very different from the lives of Foucauldian 
biopolitics and docile bodies that essentially are bodies ‘that may be subjected, 
used, transformed and improved’.154 Indeed, there are crucial differences as 
to what is deemed most characteristic of biopower. According to Michael 
Hardt and Antonio Negri, ‘when individualized in its extreme form, biopower 
becomes torture.’155 At the opposite end of the line, Mika Ojakangas regards 
the caring middle-class Swedish social democrat as the ultimate figure of 
biopower.156 The reason why these differing accounts, while all illuminating in 
their own right, seem so confusing when looked at simultaneously, is because 
the differences between what is meant by ‘the biopolitical’ have often been 
elided in the works of those who deploy the concept.157 
Compared to Foucault’s and Agamben’s accounts of biopower, Heidegger’s 
notions of machination and enframing concern a more general, wholesale 
instrumentalisation of all beings. Robert Sinnerbrink suggests that whereas 
Foucault’s biopower is concerned with the exercise of power over the biological 
existence of population, Heidegger’s machination refers to a broader reduction 
of beings to calculable resources.158 Biopower would be for Heidegger just 
one particular ontic manifestation of the ontological condition of generalised 
machination in modernity. Likewise, Sinnerbrink notes that, within the Fou-
cauldian framework, various movements concerned with for example abortion, 
AIDS activism, environmentalism, euthanasia and so on may resist the particu-
lar operations of biopower, but it is not possible to challenge the fundamental 
basis of order as such.159 In the context of development, such a Foucauldian 
152  Diken and Laustsen 2002, 293. 
153  Mills 2008, 107. 
154  Foucault 1991, 136.
155  Hardt and Negri 2004, 19. 
156  Ojakangas 2005, 27. 
157  Coleman and Grove 2009, 490. 
158  Sinnerbrink 2005, 247. 
159  Sinnerbrink 2005, 249. 
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position is best expressed by Mark Duffield for whom a politics countering the 
contemporary biopolitics of development takes the form of a ‘solidarity of the 
governed made possible by a radically interconnected world’.160 Duffield draws 
his position from Foucault’s famous contention: ‘we are all members of the 
community of the governed, and thereby obliged to show mutual solidarity.’161 
While such solidarity is undoubtedly needed, this dissertation seeks to make 
the case that more is required. The fundamental basis of order that Foucault’s 
analytic leaves intact is precisely what Heidegger’s ontological critique seeks 
to overcome. The following chapters will argue that both of these modes of 
critique are necessary: challenging the functioning of biopower in particular 
cases and situations and challenging the entire ontological basis of order.
In a 1980 lecture “Subjectivity and Truth”, Foucault compares his project 
to that of Heidegger:
For Heidegger, it was through an increasing obsession with techne as the only 
way to arrive at an understanding of objects, that the West lost touch with Being. 
Let’s turn the question around and ask which techniques and practices constitute 
the Western conception of the subject, giving it its characteristic split of truth 
and error, freedom and constraint. I think that it is here that we will find the real 
possibility of constructing a history of what we have done and, at the same time, 
a diagnosis of what we are. At the same time, this theoretical analysis would have 
a political dimension. By the phrase ‘political dimension’ I mean an analysis that 
relates to what we are willing to accept in our world – to accept, to refuse, and to 
change, both in ourselves and in our circumstances.162 
The following chapters suggest that this political dimension can be further 
elaborated if we turn again from an analysis of the subject to an analysis of 
Being. This does not mean abandoning the analysis of subjectivity but having 
it simultaneously in view with an analysis of Being and of being-in-the-world, 
allowing for a better understanding of politics beyond the biopolitical.
160  Duffield 2007, 232-234. 
161  Foucault 2002b, 474. 
162  Foucault 2007b, 152.
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It can also be said that the ethos of the works of Foucault, Agamben and 
Heidegger is quite different. Although Foucault allows for the possibility 
of resistance, he does not explicitly advocate resistance to power in general. 
Agamben, in contrast, argues for the necessity and the exigency of moving 
beyond the power that captures life. Foucault does not explicitly advocate 
a move beyond biopolitics. In stark contrast, in Heidegger’s and Agamben’s 
works there is a strong sense of the urgency for moving beyond what for 
Heidegger is the forgetting of the question of Being and for Agamben the 
capture of life in the biopolitical machine. The directions that each of them 
take in discussing the possibility of moving beyond contemporary conditions 
will be engaged with in the following chapters. I seek to retain the sense of 
exigency that makes Agamben and Heidegger’s works so appealing, while 
also keeping in view the particular practices through which power operates, 
which Foucault’s work is so adept at identifying. Exploring these differences 
is important with regard to both the theoretical discussion surrounding bio-
power and biopolitics in International Relations as well as to the practice of 
development policy and the lives lived by its subjects. The different kinds of 
subjectivities entailed by Foucault and Agamben’s biopolitics are examined in 
relation to development policies in the next chapter. The ontological under-
pinnings of contemporary development are illuminated through Heidegger’s 
work in Chapter 4. However, there is a constitutive aspect of modernity that is 
not explicitly covered by Heidegger’s critique of metaphysics or by Foucault’s 
and Agamben’s notions of biopolitics. I turn to this aspect next. 
The Coloniality of Being and Power
For decades, postcolonial thinkers have worked on exposing Western thought’s 
blindness to colonialism and the politics of knowledge production sustaining 
that blindness. The modernity that is the target of the critiques presented by 
Heidegger, Foucault and Agamben is also a colonial modernity. Enrique Dussel 
argues that while modernity is a European phenomenon, it was from the very be-
ginning constituted in a dialectical relation with non-European alterity, this being 
generally ignored even by those Western thinkers who are critical of modernity. 
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The possibility of modernity originated in the free cities of medieval Europe, 
which were centers of enormous creativity. But modernity as such was “born” 
when Europe was in a position to pose itself against an other, when, in other words, 
Europe could constitute itself as a unified ego exploring, conquering, colonising 
an alterity that gave back its image of itself.163
European modernity emerged at the same time as European colonial domina-
tion was consolidated. Yet, European colonialism is connected to modernity 
not only on the level of historical coincidence but also on the level of the dis-
courses and knowledges that emerged out of the European colonial encounter 
with the rest of the world.164 Achille Mbembe argues that the perception of the 
other as a threat and a danger whose elimination would strengthen ‘our’ life 
and security is characteristic of both early and late modernity.165 Dussel points 
out that if our genealogy of modernity is partial and provincial, it leads us to a 
critique of modernity that is likewise partial and unilateral.166 Especially in the 
context of an analysis of a phenomenon such as development, it is therefore 
necessary to subject Heidegger, Foucault and Agamben’s engagements with 
modernity and biopolitics to a postcolonial reading.
Of the three of them, it is Foucault who has received the most critique for 
ignoring the role of colonialism in modernity, though Heidegger and Agamben 
are no less eligible for the same critique. The fact that Foucault has been taken 
up by a number of postcolonial thinkers is, however, also a sign that his work 
has been useful for postcolonial critique and his concepts have become a crucial 
theoretical reference point in postcolonial analysis, much more so than the 
work of Heidegger or Agamben. Foucault has nevertheless been critiqued for 
neglecting colonialism in his analyses of power, appearing to be scrupulously 
Eurocentric167 and failing to account for both the modes of governance and 
practices of resistance that colonialism engendered. Although examining the 
governmental practices and techniques that emerged with modernity, Foucault 
163  Dussel 1993, 66. 
164  Venn 2006, 13. 
165  Mbembe 2003, 18. 
166  Dussel 1993, 65. 
167  Young 2001, 395. 
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is relatively silent on the role that colonialism played in their development. 
Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak notes that Foucault did not acknowledge that the 
emergence of biopower in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries was secured 
by imperialism.168 Ann Stoler criticises Foucault for dismissing colonial bodies 
as sites of the articulation of European sexuality, and thus for his ‘categorical 
effacement of colonialism’.169 Barry Hindess extends this critique to Foucault’s 
treatment of liberal governmentality in general.170 
In the “Society Must Be Defended” lectures, Foucault makes a brief 
reference to the way in which colonisation exported European models and 
techniques of power and, conversely, the way in which colonial models were 
brought back to Europe, resulting in an ‘internal colonialism’.171 Yet, he does 
not offer a sustained examination of these processes and therefore it has been 
argued that Foucault ignored both the constitutive role of colonialism in 
the institution of Western modernity and the ways in which imperial gov-
ernmentality implanted the administrative, legal, pedagogical, medical and 
scientific features of modernity in the colonies.172 Couze Venn calls this ‘the 
“forgetting” of the moment of colonialism’.173 It is then not only Being that 
has been forgotten, but also the colonial constitution of modernity. Spivak 
admits that Foucault might murmur in response: ‘One can perfectly well not 
talk about something because one doesn’t know about it.’174 Yet, increasingly 
the sense is that Foucault ought to have known better. In a recent book The 
Darker Side of Western Modernity, Walter D. Mignolo argues that ‘coloniality 
was (and still is) the missing complementary half of bio-politics.’175
Furthermore, postcolonial analysis is crucially concerned with questions of 
resistance, and the Foucauldian privileging of the individual subject and the 
technologies of the self has not been seen to provide for collective political 
agency or for the emergence of such a collective political subject as envisioned 
168  Spivak 1999, 279. 
169  Stoler 1995, vii-viii. 
170  Hindess 2001. 
171  Foucault 2004, 103. 
172  Venn 2006, 64 and Doty 1996, 62.
173  Venn 2006, 63. 
174  Spivak 1999, 279 and Foucault 1980c, 66. 
175  Mignolo 2011, 14. 
2. Biopolitical Problematics:Heidegger, Foucault and Agamben  | 67
by Frantz Fanon, for example.176 Edward Said argues that Foucault writes 
always from the point of view of power; there is never any doubt in your 
mind when you pick up one of his books that power is going to win out in 
the end. The whole idea of resistance is therefore essentially defeated from the 
start.177 Yet, even if Foucault does not explicitly explore the specific forms that 
a political subjectivity may take – far from closing off the possibility of politics 
– he provides us with the conditions of possibility for political subjectivity. 
Robert Young argues that even though Foucault did not explicitly address 
colonialism in his academic work, his residence in postcolonial Tunisia in the 
late 1960s was crucial both for his development of an account of alterity that 
does not reduce the other to silence or separated existence and for his more 
politically engaged writings that were to follow.178 Also Foucault’s involve-
ment in the Iranian Revolution, during which he enthusiastically supported 
its Islamist wing, can be read as an engagement with postcolonial thematics. 
He visited Iran twice in 1978 and wrote for Corriere della sera, Le Monde and 
Le Nouvel Observateur. Foucault saw in the Iranian Revolution a new form 
of political spirituality that echoed his interest in the political spirituality of 
the ancient world and of the early Christian church. Engagement with the 
Iranian Revolution was arguably the most significant political commitment of 
Foucault’s life. Interestingly, Janet Afary and Kevin Anderson also consider it 
to be the moment where Heidegger’s influence on Foucault’s thought is most 
apparent.179 According to Melinda Cooper, it was the messianic and spiritual 
dimension of the Iranian Revolution that attracted Foucault and created for 
him a sense of the possibility of a political experience radically different from 
that of the modern West.180 
176 See Fanon 2001. 
177 Said 2002, 9. 
178 Young 2001, 397. 
179 See Afary and Anderson 2005, 17-21. Vivienne Jabri, in turn, interprets the Iranian Revolution as 
‘Foucault’s Fanon moment, the moment wherein Foucault conceives of rebellion as bringing the 
subject into being, into history.’ See Jabri 2007, 78.  
180 Cooper 2014, 34. Yet, the problems involved in this attraction are outlined well by both Cooper and 
Afary and Anderson. In the words of an Iranian feminist Atoussa H., ‘the Left should not let itself 
be seduced by a cure which is perhaps worse than the disease.’ See, particularly, Afary and Anderson 
2005, 5-21 and Atoussa H. cited in Afary and Anderson 2005, 209-210. 
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While briefly tracing the origin of the camp to colonial wars, Agamben 
is also fairly silent on colonialism. He touches upon the topic in a short 
text titled “Metropolis”, where he treats the metropolis, understood as the 
‘Mother City’ in relation to the colonies, as designating the form of political 
and spatial organisation that is characteristic of biopolitics.181 Yet, the essay 
does not elaborate on the implications of this relationship on the colonies 
nor does it explicate the significance of the colonial relation on the constitu-
tion of modern biopolitics. Furthermore, in his discussion of zoē and bios in 
ancient Greece, Agamben does not reflect on the fact that the functioning of 
the polis was sustained through a system of slavery.182 Neither does he discuss 
the ways in which ‘the West’ – a notion that is extremely central to his critique 
– was constituted in relation to colonised others. Also, his formulations of 
the possibility of political action appear to be couched within the purview 
of ‘Western politics’. Although not referring to Agamben directly, Mbembe 
situates his argument in the colonial context: ‘in modern philosophical 
thought and European political practice and imaginary, the colony represents 
the site where sovereignty consists fundamentally in the exercise of a power 
outside the law (ab legibus solutus) and where “peace” is more likely to take 
on the face of a “war without end.”’183 Thus it turns out that it is the colony, 
rather than the camp (let alone the polis), which is the nomos of modernity.  
In historical terms, decolonisation began with the 1955 Bandung confer-
ence, followed by the 1961 meeting of the non-aligned countries, which 
gave rise to the idea of the ‘Third World’. Although the historical period 
of colonialism thus came to its end, what has been termed ‘coloniality’ 
still largely defines culture, labour, intersubjective relations and knowledge 
production. The concept of coloniality was introduced in the late 1980s by 
Aníbal Quijano. Broadly speaking, coloniality can be understood as the pat-
terns of power that emerged with colonialism. Quijano argues that although 
coloniality does not exhaust all the forms of exploitation in the world today, 
it still continues to be, as for the past 500 years, the most general existing 
181  Agamben 2005b. 
182  Bignall and Svirsky 2012, 1.
183  Mbembe 2003, 23. 
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framework of domination.184 In addition to locating coloniality in the specific 
fields of culture, labour and knowledge production, Mignolo and Nelson 
Maldonado-Torres have formulated the concept of ‘the coloniality of Being’, 
which draws on Heidegger’s ontology but argues that Heidegger disregards 
that Being in modernity is constituted by colonialism.185 
According to Dussel, the process of discovery and conquest which was 
initiated in 1492 with Columbus’ ‘discovery’ of America is an integral part 
of the constitution of modern subjectivity.186 Similarly, Maldonado-Torres 
argues that the Cartesian distinction between consciousness (res cogitans) 
and matter (res extensa) – Heidegger’s critique of which is discussed in the 
next chapter – is preceded by a distinction between ego conquistador and ego 
conquistado.187 ‘The certainty of the self as a conqueror, of its tasks and mis-
sions, preceded Descartes’s certainty about the self as a thinking substance 
(res cogitans) and provided a way to interpret it’, Maldonado-Torres argues.188 
For him, the practical conquering self and the theoretical thinking substance 
are part and parcel of each other. The relationship between ego conquistador 
and ego conquistado provided a way to understand the relationship between 
the mind and the body, the former gaining superiority over the latter. Ac-
cording to Maldonado-Torres, a more accurate formulation of the Cartesian 
cogito ergo sum would be: ‘I think (others do not think, or do not think 
properly), therefore I am (others are-not, lack being, should not exist or are 
dispensable)’.189 The Cartesian subject thus presupposed from the beginning 
an other who does not think and is therefore dispensable. 
Just as the question of Being is illuminated by attention to ontological 
difference, so also the coloniality of Being is brought into view through 
recognition of ‘colonial difference’. Mignolo understands colonial differ-
ence as a connector that refers to ‘the changing faces of colonial differences 
throughout the history of the modern/colonial world-system and brings to 
184  Quijano 2007, 170. 
185  Mignolo 2011 and Maldonado-Torres 2008; 2007.  
186  Dussel 1993, 67. 
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the foreground the planetary dimension of human history silenced by dis-
courses centering on modernity, postmodernity, and Western civilisation.’190 
Maldonado-Torres prefers to emphasise ontological colonial difference, which 
refers to the distinction between Being and ‘that which is negatively marked 
as dispensable’.191 While I agree with the purpose of Maldonado-Torres’ con-
cept, such a distinction between Being and the dispensable is problematic for 
reasons that will be addressed in Chapter 7. In any case, central to the idea of 
ontological colonial difference is that coloniality marks not only the specific 
areas of, for example, knowledge, sexuality and the economy, but also the 
general understanding of Being. 
Maldonado-Torres argues that without recognition of ontological co-
lonial difference, reflection on Dasein and Being involves an erasure of the 
coloniality of Being and of those whom he calls the damné, the condemned 
of the earth.192 The life of the damné is characterised by the naturalisation 
of relations of war, which are justified by the ontological constitution of the 
people. Crucial to the ontological colonial difference is the production of 
certain lives as dispensable. It is this paradigm of war where certain lives are 
less worthy of living that marks modernity.193 Maldonado-Torres draws mainly 
on Heidegger’s existential analytic, but if we look further to Heidegger’s later 
work – as I have done in this chapter – we see that Heidegger was very much 
concerned with the production of disposable life. His critique of machination 
is precisely directed at the way in which beings are made accessible, replace-
able and disposable. Nevertheless, Heidegger did not concern himself with 
the colonial and racist ways in which particular lives are produced as more 
disposable than others. 
The Eurocentrism of Heidegger’s thought is embedded in his appreciation 
of the Greek origins of the tradition that he sought to rethink. As Nandy 
notes, it is a central part of colonialism that ‘the only legitimate past […] is 
190 Mignolo 2002, 61. 
191 Maldonado-Torres 2007, 254. 
192 Maldonado-Torres borrows the concept of the damné, the condemned, from Frantz Fanon’s 1961 
book Les Damnés de la Terre. The more common English translation is ‘the wretched of the earth’. 
193 Maldonado-Torres 2007, 248.
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the Hellenic past.’194 Indeed, also for Heidegger, this was the past most worth 
considering. Nevertheless, Heidegger was also deeply interested in Asian 
thought and the affinity of his thinking to Taoism and Zen Buddhism has 
been the object of considerable interpretation.195 Fred Dallmayr notes that 
in the course of his life, Heidegger was ‘progressively attuned or attentive to 
non-Western life-forms’.196 Heidegger’s work has also been made use of in 
the Indian context, most notably by Jarava Lal Mehta. In 1977 Mehta wrote:
For all non-Western civilizations, however decrepit or wounded, Heidegger’s 
thinking brings hope, at this moment of word history, by making them see that, 
though in one sense (and precisely in what sense) they are inextricably involved 
in Western metaphysical history in the form of “world civilization” (as Heidegger 
called it), in another sense they are now free to think for themselves, in their 
own fashion.197 
More recently, Siby K. George has sought to understand contemporary India 
through Heidegger’s work, also suggesting that he is ‘a necessary thinker for all 
those concerned with the spirit of the times (Zeitgeist) of the global south’, and 
this despite him being ‘a confessed conservative and a more or less Eurocentric 
thinker’.198 When it comes to Heidegger’s own politics, his membership of the 
Nazi party and his antisemitism cannot go without mention. Indeed, there is 
a decades long debate on the topic, ranging between calls for banning Hei-
degger’s work from philosophy classes and filing it under ‘Nazism’ in libraries 
to claiming that his party membership was a mistake that had nothing to do 
with his thought and philosophical work.199 I follow here those who argue that 
while Heidegger’s politics cannot be neatly separated from his philosophy, it 
194 Nandy 2014, 117. 
195 See May 1996 and the essays in the collection Parkes 1990. 
196 Dallmayr 1996, xiii. 
197 Mehta cited in Dallmayr 1996, 92. For a discussion of Heidegger’s account of ‘the Europeanisation 
of the earth’ vis-à-vis Indian thought, see Mehta 1971, 244-254. 
198 George 2015, ix; 2. 
199 For some of the most polemical readings, see Faye 2009 and Farías 1991. For more considered 
interpretations, see Young 2008; Ott 1993 and Derrida 1991. For an argument against a simple 
separation between the political and the philosophical in Heidegger, see Bourdieu 1991, 1-6.  
72 | Suvi Alt: Beyond the Biopolitics of Development
is possible to make use of his thought for more progressive political purposes 
than those of his own.200 Furthermore, Michael Dillon notes that Heidegger
 
is a good guide because he seems to have proved fatefully fallible in his commit-
ment to his own project at the very point in which he directly encountered the 
question of the political. Ordinarily taken to be the decisive reason for dismissing 
Heidegger, I think that this fallibility has a crucial value in the recovery of politi-
cal thought, precisely because in the pursuit of the question of the political one 
can never rest easy with Heidegger’s thinking, or adopt him as a political mentor. 
In addition, then, to his model of questioning, his very conduct keeps political 
questioning alive within you.201 
More specifically, Heidegger failed in his commitment to his own project by 
betraying and losing sight of what according to himself is own-most to Be-
ing: its openness.202 He failed to see that Nazism was an extreme expression 
of the kind of machinational rationality that he was otherwise so critical of, 
thus failing to follow through with his own thinking precisely in the event of 
what Hannah Arendt called ‘the rare moments when the chips are down’.203 
Returning to colonialism and coloniality, despite Heidegger, Foucault 
and Agamben’s relative amnesias regarding these phenomena, their works 
are nevertheless generally regarded by their postcolonial critics as offering 
important means with which to challenge contemporary power relations. 
Out of the three, Foucault’s thought has been most extensively mined by 
postcolonial thinkers. Agamben’s work has mainly been used to highlight 
states of exception and bare life in (post)colonial contexts. Yet, as Simone 
Bignall and Marcelo Svirsky point out, the resistant and transformative re-
sources of Agamben’s work are largely yet to be employed in theorising the 
200 On engaging with Heidegger’s thought in the light of his Nazism, see Elden 2005, 170-180 and 
Nancy 2002, 65-86. Following the recent German publication of Heidegger’s Schwarze Hefte (Black 
Notebooks), the diaries that he kept from 1931 to 1941, the relationship between his philosophy 
and involvement in Nazi politics has again become a subject of debate. On the Schwarze Hefte, see 
Joronen and Imre 2015; Trawny 2015; Gordon 2014 and Fried 2014. 
201 Dillon 1996, 33. 
202 Joronen and Imre 2015. 
203 Arendt 1971, 37. 
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postcolonial.204 The engagement with Agamben’s concepts of potentiality 
and form-of-life in Chapter 5 will hopefully contribute to this discussion. 
Furthermore, I will argue in Chapter 8 that Heidegger’s critique of modernity 
shares interesting ontological commonality with contemporary decolonial 
and indigenous thought. Finally, it should be noted that the prefix ‘post’ in 
postcolonialism and postcoloniality that is used throughout the dissertation 
does not suggest that coloniality has ended, but is meant to stand as a sign of 
an ongoing project.205 Similarly, the notion of ‘postdevelopment’ does not 
mean that the era of development has come to its end. For Escobar, the ‘post’ 
in postdevelopment means ‘a decentering of capitalism in the definition of 
the economy, of liberalism in the definition of society, and of state forms of 
power as the defining matrix of social organisation.’206 The current disserta-
tion adds to these the decentering of the metaphysics of modernity in the 
definition of Being. The following chapters’ engagement with the question 
of a beyond of the biopolitics of development will hopefully contribute to 
the projects of both postdevelopment and postcolonialism. 
204  Bignall and Svirsky 2012, 6. 
205  Venn 2006, 4. 
206  Escobar 2012, xxix-xxx. 
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3. Problematising the Biopolitics of Development
The Danger of the Development Age and  
the Essence of Poverty 
In the aftermath of the Second World War, in January 1949, the US Presi-
dent Harry S. Truman gave an inaugural address that has come to be known 
for the four-point programme that he envisaged not only for the future 
of the United States but for that of the entire world. Truman’s four points 
included support for the newly created United Nations, programmes for 
world economic recovery, the formation of a collective defence arrangement 
and, finally, ‘a bold new programme for making the benefits of our scientific 
advances and industrial progress available for the improvement and growth 
of underdeveloped areas.’207 Although Truman’s speech is well-known, it is 
worth quoting at length because it summarises the development perspective 
that came to dominate the following decades:
More than half the people of the world are living in conditions approaching 
misery. Their food is inadequate. They are victims of disease. Their economic 
life is primitive and stagnant. Their poverty is a handicap and a threat both to 
them and to more prosperous areas. For the first time in history, humanity pos-
sesses the knowledge and the skill to relieve the suffering of these people. The 
United States is pre-eminent among nations in the development of industrial 
and scientific techniques. The material resources which we can afford to use for 
the assistance of other peoples are limited. But our imponderable resources in 
technical knowledge are constantly growing and are inexhaustible. I believe that 
we should make available to peace-loving peoples the benefits of our store of 
207  Truman 1949. 
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technical knowledge in order to help them realise their aspirations for a better 
life. […] Greater production is the key to prosperity and peace. And the key to 
greater production is a wider and more vigorous application of modern scientific 
and technical knowledge. Only by helping the least fortunate of its members to 
help themselves can the human family achieve the decent, satisfying life that is 
the right of all people.208
Truman interprets the poverty of far-away peoples not only as a problem for 
themselves but also as a threat to more well-off parts of the world. It is only by 
developing the least fortunate that everyone, including the already prosperous, 
can feel secure about their well-being. The destiny of advanced and affluent 
peoples is thus tied to that of the poor and the ‘backward’. Economic growth 
and technical knowledge are the primary means through which poor countries 
ought to develop. Instead of receiving direct material support, the people in 
poor countries ought to learn how to help themselves. The US is willing to 
help poor countries in the application of modern scientific and technical 
knowledge, provided that those countries are ‘peace-loving’, that is, complying 
with liberal political principles. These are the basic tenets of the development 
doctrine that was operationalised in the following decades, and thus Truman’s 
speech is generally considered to have launched the ‘Development Age’.209 
In December that very same year, Heidegger delivered four public lectures 
titled “The Thing”, “The Enframing”, “The Danger” and “The Turn”. The ideas 
presented in these Bremen lectures form the core of the 1953 essay “The 
Question Concerning Technology”, and they can be considered to inaugurate 
the late period of Heidegger’s thinking.210 Giving his lectures in the same 
post-war context, Heidegger’s entry into the topic of his talks is similar to 
that of President Truman: ‘Immeasurable suffering creeps and rages over the 
earth. The flood of suffering rises ever higher. […] A grizzly abjection makes 
the rounds. The army of the poor grows and grows’, Heidegger laments.211 
208  Truman 1949. 
209  See Escobar 2012, 3-4; Esteva 2010, 1; Rist 2008, 72-74; Easterly 2006, 24 and Sachs 1993, 3-5.
210  See translator’s foreword in Heidegger 2012b, vii.
211  Heidegger 2012b, 54. 
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Yet, he crucially adds: ‘But the essence of poverty is concealed.’212 What is 
the essence of poverty, if not suffering, abjection and hunger? 
A few years earlier, in 1945, when the war was just coming to an end, Hei-
degger wrote an essay that was titled “Poverty”. In the essay Heidegger sets 
himself against the tradition that opposes spirit to matter. Spirit is understood 
since Descartes as the self-consciousness, subject or intellect that is superordi-
nate to ‘life’ as that which is merely alive. Heidegger rejects such metaphysical 
ways of thinking about the relationship between spirit and matter, and argues 
that it is in being in relation with that which surrounds him or her that the 
human experiences the spiritual. The spiritual cannot, therefore, be separated 
into a different realm, but must always be understood in an integral relation 
with the material. Yet, for Heidegger, this is not the relation of a subject to 
objects, but an open gathering where the human being exists in relation to 
Being. According to Heidegger, this understanding of spirit and life is closely 
connected to the question of poverty:
What does “poor” mean? In what does the ownmost of poverty consist? […] 
According to the ordinary meaning, “poor” and “rich” pertain to possession, 
to having wealth. Poverty means not having and being specifically deprived of 
what is needed. Wealth means not being deprived of what is needed; it means 
a having that surpasses what is needed. The ownmost of poverty, however, lies 
in the singular be-ing (beruht in einem Seyn). To be truly poor means to be so 
that one is deprived of nothing except what is not needed. To be truly deprived 
means not being able to be without what is not needed and thus immediately 
and exclusively belonging to what is not needed.213 
Whereas poverty generally refers to quite specific needs concerning, for 
example, food, water and shelter, Heidegger argues that true poverty means 
being deprived of that which does not arise out of compulsion. ‘Be-ing poor 
(Armseyn) means […] being deprived of the liberating free and open’, Hei-
212  Heidegger 2012b, 54. 
213  Heidegger 2011b, 6.
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degger says.214 With this discussion, Heidegger continues the engagement 
with the notion of poverty that he began in the 1929-30 lecture course “The 
Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics: World, Finitude and Solitude”. Also 
in these lectures Heidegger distinguishes the everyday, ‘weak’ sense of the 
notion of poverty from its ‘proper’ sense. The latter
is meant to indicate that poverty is not merely a characteristic property, but the 
very way in which man comports and bears himself. Poverty in this proper sense 
of human existence is also a kind of deprivation and necessarily so. Yet from such 
deprivation we can draw our own peculiar power of procuring transparency and 
inner freedom for Dasein.215 
The crucial point here is that deprivation always also means belonging to that 
which one is deprived of. – Being deprived of food relegates one to hunger. 
– This is why Heidegger thinks that (as opposed to all kinds of specific dep-
rivations) the ownmost of poverty is simultaneously the overflowing of Being 
and, thus, freedom. While his point may seem obscure here, it becomes clearer 
in the final parts of the essay where he argues that ‘the danger of famine for 
example and of the years of scarcity consists, not only in the fact that perhaps 
many human beings perish, but in the manner in which those who survive 
live only in order to eat so that they may live.’216 Being is thereby reduced to 
survival. Heidegger perhaps too easily sets aside the reality of the problem 
of poverty for those who perish, and we might question his conception of 
‘everyday’ poverty as somehow ‘weak’ and secondary. In any case, for him, 
poverty as it is conventionally understood is problematic not only because of 
its direct effects on ‘life’, but also because it prevents the human from having 
a free relationship to Being. Still more clearly put: poverty restrains humans 
from the possibility of pursuing different modes of being because their lives 
are concentrated on fulfilling basic needs. In being deprived of that which 
guarantees basic survival, humans belong to hunger and scarcity. If instead 
214  Heidegger 2011b, 7. 
215  Heidegger 1995, 195; original emphases. 
216  Heidegger 2011b, 8.
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they were able to be deprived only of that which they do not need, and conse-
quently also belonging to it, they would dwell in freedom. Yet, this ‘essence 
of poverty’ – the overflowing of Being – remains hidden. Hence, although 
in principle dealing with the same problematic – life within technological 
modernity – the conclusions that President Truman and Heidegger come to 
could not be more different. Whereas the former sees the extension of sci-
entific modernisation to all parts of the world as the solution to problems of 
poverty, the latter considers technological modernity to be that which hides 
the underlying essence of poverty and, thus, the question of Being. However, 
these positions express only partly the perspectives that are relevant for the 
thesis that is about to follow. A third voice is therefore needed. 
In 1950, a year after President Truman and Heidegger gave the above-
mentioned talks, Aimé Césaire wrote the essay Discourse on Colonialism, in 
which he denounces the so-called Western civilisation in general and French 
colonialism in particular. Césaire makes clear the continuation of the colonial 
problem and offers a word of warning for his contemporaries:
And indeed, do you not see how ostentatiously these gentlemen have just unfurled 
the banner of anti-colonialism?
“Aid to the disinherited countries,” says Truman. “The time of the old colonialism 
has passed.” That’s also Truman. 
Which means that American high finance considers that the time has come 
to raid every colony in the world. So, dear friends, here you have to be careful!
I know that some of you, disgusted with Europe, with all that hideous mess which 
you did not witness by choice, are turning […] toward America and getting used 
to looking upon that country as a possible liberator.
“What a godsend!” you think. 
“The bulldozers! The massive investments in capital! The roads! The ports!”
“But American racism!”
“So what? European racism in the colonies has inured us to it!”
And there we are, ready to run the great Yankee risk.
So, once again, be careful! […]
And since you are talking about factories and industries, do you not see the tre-
mendous factory hysterically spitting out its cinders in the heart of our forests 
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or deep in the bush, the factory for the production of lackeys; do you not see the 
prodigious mechanization, the mechanization of man; […] the machine, yes, have 
you never seen it, the machine for crushing, for grinding, for degrading peoples?
So that the danger is immense.217
Like Heidegger, Césaire saw the danger of modernity, of the mechanisation 
of everything and of the advent of the American domination of the world. 
But unlike Heidegger, he also saw the colonial and racist history for which the 
post-war world order provided direct continuation, and to which the so-called 
Development Age is an immediate complement. The machine which grinds 
and disposes of people is, for Césaire, most of all, a colonial machine. And the 
danger which, for Heidegger, is the danger of an all-encompassing metaphysi-
cal reduction of beings into a standing-reserve is, for Césaire, primarily the 
danger of the continuation of colonial and racist relations between peoples. 
More than sixty years have now passed since President Truman and 
Heidegger gave their talks and since Césaire wrote the above-cited essay. 
Modernity has morphed into late modernity and liberalism into neoliber-
alism. During this time, development has become one of the most central 
concepts in international politics. Conceptions of development have trans-
formed and its focus has shifted, yet many of the basic principles remain the 
same. Heidegger’s problematisation of technology and Being is, likewise, no 
less relevant now than it was then. In many ways the positions of President 
Truman and Heidegger delineate the emergence of two different trajectories 
of thought: development discourse on the one hand and late 20th century 
continental philosophy on the other. Césaire’s warnings were also not left 
unheard. Discourse on Colonialism became one of the foundational texts of 
postcolonialism, and Césaire’s student Frantz Fanon one of its most important 
theorists. In the course of this dissertation, I will examine some of the ways 
in which the latter two bodies of thought can function to illuminate some 
of the problems implicit in the former. I begin below with a brief genealogy 
of modern development.   
217  Césaire 2000, 76-77; original emphases. 
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A Short Genealogy of Modern Development 
Development was not born out of nowhere at the end of the Second World 
War. The history of development goes hand in hand with the history of 
modernisation. Whereas in the classical world development was understood 
as a natural, cyclical process inherent to all living beings, modernity brought 
with it the idea that development can be fabricated and directed, and that it 
is not necessarily recurrent or finite. The distinguishing feature of modernity 
is that it understands itself as a project, as an idea to be realised.218 It is this 
core notion that development shares with modernity. 
Although development studies literature generally begins its discussion 
from the post-World-War II context, notions of development had been 
debated for a long time before that. In the 1825-26 course Lectures on the 
Philosophy of History, G.W.F. Hegel presents ‘the principle of development’ 
as the unfolding of reason, understood as spirit, which has ‘the history of the 
world for its theater’.219 Understanding world history as the gradual advance 
of the spirit, Hegel considers the peoples whose lives he sees as being based 
on the order of nature as having wild and arbitrary social relations ‘without 
any end-goal of advancement or development’.220 After spending some pages 
on describing ‘the negro life’ as ‘the natural man in his completely wild and 
untamed state’, Hegel concludes: 
At this point we leave Africa, not to mention it again. For it is no historical part of 
the world; it has no movement or development to exhibit. […] What we properly 
understand by Africa, is the unhistorical, undeveloped spirit, still caught in the 
conditions of mere nature, and which had to be presented here only as on the 
threshold of world history.221 
For Hegel, Africa can thus be disregarded in the discussion of world history 
as its spirit is still wholly undeveloped. Dussel pointedly notes that:
218  Venn 2006, 8.
219  Hegel 2011, 50. 
220  Hegel 2011, 57. 
221  Hegel 2011, 91-92. 
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Hegel has a number of pages on Africa that deserve to be read, although one needs 
to approach the task with a sense of humour, since they are a kind of fantastic 
apotheosis of racist ideology, full of superficial prejudices and received opinions 
and a seemingly infinite sense of superiority that illustrate well the European state 
of mind at the beginning of the nineteenth century.222
In France Hegel’s contemporaries, the early nineteenth century Saint-Simo-
nians, sought to understand development as the production of order. The 
Saint-Simonians were concerned with the question of establishing order in a 
society undergoing transformation, pointing out the misery and destruction 
which had come with early capitalism. Their solution was a combination of 
industrialism, intellect and sympathy, exemplified in the principle ‘Progress 
is the development of Order under the influence of Love’.223 Development 
was meant to make progress orderly, and it was considered to be a matter of 
positivist science, which should draw its principles from the laws of nature. 
Capitalists, informed by positivism, were meant to act as ‘trustees for the 
wealth of humanity’.224 In The Course in Positive Philosophy, written between 
1830 and 1842, the most famous of the Saint-Simonians, Auguste Comte, 
argues that:
It is only when we have determined what belongs to the élite of humanity that 
we can regulate our intervention in the development of more or less backward 
peoples, by reason of the necessary universality of the fundamental evolution, 
with due appreciation of the characteristic circumstances of each case. Renewing 
in this way the spirit of international relations, positive politics will tend to substi-
tute for action which has too often been disturbing or even oppressive, wise and 
benevolent protection, and the mutual advantage of this cannot be doubted.225
222 Dussel 1993, 70. 
223 Cowen and Shenton 1996, 27.
224 Cowen and Shenton 1996, 33. For a discussion of the influence of Comte and positivism on political 
thought in the early 19th century newly independent Latin American countries, see Cowen and 
Shenton 1996, 63-74. 
225 Comte 2014. 
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At the same time in England, John Stuart Mill also sought ways of reconcil-
ing progress and order. An employee of the East India Company, Mill was 
of the opinion that places such as India require authoritarian rule through 
trusteeship until the point when such conditions are achieved that develop-
ment may occur and liberty may be realised. Mill’s contemporary Karl Marx 
was likewise concerned with the future of India, writing in 1853 in the New 
York Daily Tribune that:
England has to fulfil a double mission in India: one destructive, the other re-
generating the annihilation of old Asiatic society, and the laying the material 
foundations of Western society in Asia. […] Modern industry, resulting from 
the railway system, will dissolve the hereditary divisions of labor, upon which 
rest the Indian castes, those decisive impediments to Indian progress and Indian 
power. […] The Indians will not reap the fruits of the new elements of society 
scattered among them by the British bourgeoisie, till in Great Britain itself the 
now ruling classes shall have been supplanted by the industrial proletariat, or till 
the Hindoos themselves shall have grown strong enough to throw off the English 
yoke altogether.226
Due to the caste system, Marx considers the Indians as barbarians, but so also 
he sees as barbarians the British bourgeoisie that effects progress by ‘drag-
ging individuals and people through blood and dirt, through misery and 
degradation’.227 Nevertheless, Marx sees industrialisation and ‘the bourgeois 
period of history’ as creating the necessary material basis for a new world 
where human progress could truly flourish. 
In the 1983 postcolonial classic The Intimate Enemy, Ashis Nandy de-
scribes this second period of colonisation that followed the conquering of 
the colonies as having been carried out by ‘well-meaning, hard-working, 
middle-class missionaries, liberals, modernists, and believers in science, 
equality and progress’.228 Albeit in different ways, Comte, Mill and Marx all 
226  Marx 1853. 
227  Marx 1853. 
228  Nandy 2014, xi. 
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fall into these categories. All of them were, furthermore, concerned with de-
velopment both in their own societies and in the colonies, seeing an intimate 
relationship between the two. While colonialism relied on developmental 
notions of humanity, development thinking and practice were not confined 
to the colonies but found their expression in Europe in the regulatory regimes 
of capitalist development.229 Michael P. Cowen and Robert W. Shenton 
maintain that the domain of development is understood too narrowly if it 
is taken to refer only to the post-World War II period and if its sole object is 
assumed to be ‘Third World’ peoples.230 Instead, development is closely tied 
to the emergence of modernity, and it has always entailed a close connection 
between the production of order in the centre and in the periphery, in the 
North and in the South.
From the perspective of development, one of the most central features of 
modernity is the invention of poverty. Escobar argues that large-scale pov-
erty in the modern sense of the term appeared only when the spread of the 
market economy broke down communities and deprived millions of people 
of access to land, water and other resources.231 Majid Rahnema argues the 
same, claiming that ‘global poverty’ is a modern construct, created by the 
economisation of life and the forceful integration of vernacular societies into 
the world economy.232 While poverty has always existed, the modernisation 
of poverty meant that the poor increasingly became a social problem that 
required new mechanisms of control and more intervention into the society.233 
Escobar argues that the emerging order of modernity and capitalism relied 
on ‘a politics of poverty’ that was aimed at transforming society by turning 
the poor into objects of knowledge and management.234 Contemporary de-
velopment policies belong on the same continuum with such early modern 
politics of poverty.  
229  Sylvester 2006, 68. 
230  Cowen and Shenton 1996, 5. 
231  Escobar 2012, 22. 
232  Rahnema 2010, 178. 
233  Escobar 2012, 22. 
234  Escobar 2012, 23. 
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Similarly to Escobar and Cowen and Shenton, Mark Duffield emphasises in 
the 2007 book Development, Security and Unending War that the contempo-
rary idea of securing and developing humans is not a new departure but rather 
an expression of a liberal rationality of government that, since the beginning 
of modernity, has had the protection and betterment of population, economy 
and society as its aim. Industrialisation, capitalism, imperial expansion and 
the abolition of slavery created the need for a way of managing and making 
safe the surplus population that was created through these processes. Hence, 
Duffield defines development as ‘a practical technology for the protection 
and betterment of life through harnessing its powers of becoming’.235 What 
is central to modern development as a regime of biopolitics is its division of 
humanity into developed and underdeveloped life.236 Development is then 
framed as a solution to the problems of disorder and danger that a surplus 
population inevitably brings. Making ‘the human’ the referent object of de-
velopment is thus deeply embedded in the modern liberal tradition. 
If modern development emerged as a response to industrialisation, capi-
talism and the abolition of slavery, at the end of the Second World War the 
international order was faced with a new set of challenges. The development 
discourse that found its way into the core of everyday international politics 
at that time was shaped by faith in technology and science, as well as by the 
need to curtail the spread of communism and to find new markets. The aim 
was to replicate elsewhere the characteristics of the ‘advanced’ societies of the 
day: industrialisation and urbanisation, rapid growth of material production, 
technologisation of agriculture and the adoption of modern education and 
cultural values.237 The most important element in the shaping of develop-
ment theory was the process of capital formation and the factors that were 
associated with it, such as technology, population and resource management, 
monetary and fiscal policies, industrialisation and agriculture, and trade. Fi-
nally, there was a need to create institutions that were capable of managing the 
complexity of these factors. As a result the World Bank and the International 
235  Duffield 2007, 216. 
236  Duffield 2007, 16. 
237  Escobar 2012, 4. 
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Monetary Fund (IMF) were created in 1944 following the Bretton Woods 
conference, and most of the UN specialised agencies saw the light of day in 
the 1940s. Likewise, after Bretton Woods, the concept of GDP, which had 
been developed in the US in the early 1930s, became popularised as a measure 
of a country’s economy and welfare. 
In the 1950s and 1960s, the focus of development was on industrial mod-
ernisation and large-scale infrastructure development. The 1969 book The 
Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto by Walt W. Rostow 
exemplifies the modernisation approach to development. According to Ros-
tow, ‘it is possible to identify all societies, in their economic dimensions, as 
lying within one of five categories: the traditional society, the preconditions 
for take-off, the take-off, the drive to maturity, and the age of high mass-
consumption.’238 Modernisation is to be achieved through industrialisation 
and through a general shift from tradition to modernity. Rostow’s model is 
based on the British industrial revolution, yet he argues that in other countries 
modernisation may not emerge endogenously and may require an outside 
‘push’. Thus, he argues that colonialism was not primarily about Western 
national interests or economic power, but about the need ‘to fill a vacuum; 
that is, to organize a traditional society incapable of self-organization (or 
unwilling to organize itself ) for modern import and export activity, includ-
ing production for export.’239 As the subtitle of Rostow’s book indicates, 
modernisation theory was closely connected to anti-communism and to 
supporting anti-socialist guerrilla movements in countries such as Angola, 
Nicaragua and Afghanistan as well as anti-socialist dictatorships in places 
such as Iran, Guatemala, Brazil and Chile.240
A shift in development discourse occurred in the late 1960s when the US 
Secretary of Defence Robert McNamara, who had thus far led the fight against 
communism in the Vietnam War, became the President of the World Bank. 
In coming into office, McNamara doubled the Bank’s lending and shifted its 
focus from infrastructure to poverty reduction.241 According to McNamara, 
238  Rostow 1960, 4. 
239  Rostow 1960, 109. 
240  See McEwan 2009, 96. 
241  World Bank 2003. 
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the most important problem of the time, and the key to poverty reduction, 
was population growth.242 Any country wishing to borrow money from the 
Bank had to present a plan for economic development and, starting with 
McNamara’s tenure, the plan was required to include a population control 
component.243 This new focus on population control contributed to the 
‘discovery’ of women as the subjects of development. In 1974, the Women 
in Development (WID) Office was created within the United States Agency 
for International Development (USAID), which enabled the US to take the 
lead in what was declared in 1975 as the UN Decade for Women. 
Research conducted by the WID Office showed that in many parts of 
Africa, Latin America and Asia women were actively involved in agriculture 
and in decisions concerning what crops to plant.244 As agriculture and food 
production were becoming the USAID’s main focus, this finding reinforced 
the need to include women in the development discourse. However, as 
President Ronald Reagan came into office in 1981 it was expected that his 
administration might even close down the WID Office, hostile as the admin-
istration was towards anything that might involve a feminist agenda. Yet, in 
the early 1980s, research in Bangladesh and India showed that poor women 
were much more likely than men to pay back uncollateralised loans.245 Hence, 
the Reagan administration adopted its own market-driven WID approach 
that targeted women as potential entrepreneurs. On the eve of the 1981 
North-South conference in Cancún, Mexico, Reagan summed up the plan 
for the future as follows:
The road to prosperity and human fulfillment is lighted by economic freedom and 
individual incentive. As always, the United States will be a friend and an active 
partner in the search for a better life. We take with us a solid record of support 
for development and a positive program for the 1980’s. Free people build free 
markets that ignite dynamic development for everyone.246
242  World Bank 2003. 
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In the course of the 1980s, neoliberal development became the standard 
approach in Latin America. At the same time, the so-called Berg Report, issued 
by the World Bank in 1981, signaled the beginning of economic liberalisation 
and the institution of the now ominous structural adjustment programmes in 
Africa. Following the 1979 oil crisis and the subsequent worldwide recession, 
several African countries defaulted on their debt obligations and there was 
a need to restructure their debt in a way that would restore the stability of 
the international financial system. Within the framework of the structural 
adjustment programmes, governments were given more loans in return for 
their commitment to adopt free-markets, privatise state industries and lib-
eralise trade policies. The detrimental effects of the structural adjustment 
programmes have been recorded extensively.247 
Following the end of the Cold War and ‘the end of history’, democracy and 
good governance became the new buzzwords of development policy. Both 
‘human development’ and ‘sustainable development’ saw the light of day in 
the early 1990s. The concept of sustainable development was consolidated 
after the 1992 UN Conference on Environment and Development, the ‘Rio 
Earth Summit’. The foundations of sustainable development are economic 
progress, democratic governance, equitable prosperity and opportunity, and 
healthy and productive natural systems, which together should result in 
improved human wellbeing.248 Human development, in turn, was supposed 
to challenge the neoliberal ‘Washington consensus’ promoted by the World 
Bank and the IMF. According to Martha Nussbaum and Amartya Sen, the 
Founding Presidents of the Human Development and Capability Associa-
tion, the framework is a revolutionary counter-theory to macro-economically 
motivated conceptions of development. Nussbaum argues that their approach 
‘brings moral philosophy into development economics’.249 This account of 
the revolutionary character of both human development and sustainable 
development will be challenged in more detail in the following chapters. 
247  See Pfeiffer and Chapman 2010; Klein 2008; Abouharb and Cingranelli 2006; SARPIN 2002 and 
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In the decades following World War II, development achieved the status 
of an unquestionable certainty in the social imaginary. For a long time even 
those who opposed the prevailing capitalist strategies had to express their 
critiques in the form of ‘another development’, ‘socialist development’, ‘par-
ticipatory development’, and so on. Emerging in the 1970s, the neo-Marxist 
underdevelopment and dependency schools drew attention to the historical 
processes that had deprived colonies of their resources and lands, pauperising 
their people, yet these schools did not question the goal of modernisation 
itself.250 Christine Sylvester concludes that ‘Marxists and neoliberals alike 
pledge allegiance to development progress.’251 Eduardo Gudynas calls devel-
opment a ‘zombie concept’.252 It has been declared dead over and over again 
but still it seems to come back to haunt us every time. 
Wolfgang Sachs suggests that ‘the tragic greatness of “development” consists 
in its monumental emptiness.’253 Development seems to be both everything 
and nothing and, as such, it is a difficult concept to define. There is nevertheless 
an idea that development as such is important, and it is being used both as a 
general vision of the future and as a model explaining how to get there. As a 
tautological concept, development refers to both the means and an end; to 
the process and the outcome. Development is achieved through development. 
Instead of aiming at a definition, this dissertation discusses ‘development’ as 
a generic idea that is an integral part of the ontology of Western modernity. 
What follows from this brief genealogy of modern development is that 
contemporary development too should be examined as a technology for the 
production of order; a technology that travels between and influences both 
the so-called developed and the developing countries and peoples. In the 
following parts of this chapter I will discuss two different but closely related 
ways of problematising contemporary development biopolitically. 
250  Sylvester 1999, 706. 
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Development and the Biopolitics of Population
The concept of ‘population’, referring to the aggregate properties of society or 
nature, emerged in the English language in the early seventeenth century. The 
notion was used in enumeration, calculation and modelling, which were gradu-
ally introduced to manage complexity in respect to problems such as mortality 
and public revenues, though these practices remained tentative until the end of 
the eighteenth century.254 The concept gained the meaning that it has today in 
the hands of the founders of mathematical statistics who sought to create a tool 
for giving Darwin’s theory of evolution a political interpretation.255 According 
to Foucault, the idea and reality of population is ‘absolutely modern’.256 Enabling 
access to the aggregate level of life processes, the problematic of population gave 
rise to a new art of government: biopolitics. For Foucault, it is power’s focus 
on the processes that characterise a population – birth, death, (re)production, 
illness and diet – that determines the distinctiveness of biopolitics. 
If we now return to the Millennium Development Goals and the Sustain-
able Development Goals that were presented in the Introduction, it should 
be clear that contemporary development is biopolitical. Eradicating poverty 
and hunger, reducing child mortality, improving maternal health and com-
bating HIV/AIDS and other diseases constitute the MDGs that are most 
directly within the purview of the biopolitics of population as formulated 
by Foucault. While also ends in themselves, the further goals of empower-
ing women, achieving universal primary education and developing global 
partnerships are important means with which the first-stated goals can be 
achieved. Much like Foucault argued, the state of health, illness, fertility, 
productivity and the patterns of diet of populations have become of interest 
to governments and are the variables that techniques of power are concerned 
with.257 I focus below on the notion of population in the context of fertility 
and illness, while the productivity and patterns of diet of populations will be 
given attention in Chapters 4 and 5, respectively.
254  Kreager et al. 2015, 25.
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The current development framework draws on the shift in development 
policy that occurred from the 1960s onwards. When development policies got 
into full swing in the 1950s, the development discourse was largely dominated 
by macro-economists and engineers. In the 1960s, however, the concerns 
of demographers became increasingly important and ‘population’ started 
to find its way into the core of the development agenda. In the imagination 
of ecologists and demographers, population connoted ‘overpopulation’ and 
problems concerning the ‘carrying capacity’ of the planet. The demographer 
Paul Ehrlich argued in his 1968 book The Population Bomb that:
The battle to feed all of humanity is over. […] The birth rate must be brought 
into balance with the death rate or mankind will breed itself into oblivion. We 
can no longer afford merely to treat the symptoms of the cancer of population 
growth; the cancer itself must be cut out.258 
While Ehrlich’s book was polemic and controversial, in the course of the 1970s 
it became an accepted truth that population growth was pitted against the 
‘survival’ of the planet and its resources, thus requiring measures to curb the 
growth of the population. Consequently, birth control became an established 
part of the development agenda. In the beginning policymakers assumed that 
‘underdeveloped’ peoples want to reduce the number of their children, but 
they simply lack the knowledge and the means to do so. Yet, anthropologists’ 
field studies showed early on that contraceptives were often rejected and even 
when they were accepted, they were only effective when they were accompa-
nied by a cultural transformation in the experience of love, in the meaning 
of womanhood and in attitudes towards the female body.259 Barbara Duden 
argues that such population programmes were the most arrogant part of all 
externally imposed development strategies precisely because they entailed such 
a thorough transformation in the meaning of (female) existence.260 Popula-
tion control policies began to receive increasing critique from the mid-1970s 
258  Ehrlich 1968, xi-xii. 
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onwards,261 and in contemporary development discourse the term ‘population’ 
has disappeared altogether. The problematic of family planning is, however, 
as central as ever, but it is now framed as a matter of women’s empowerment. 
Nevertheless, as the next part of this chapter will show, the shift in discourse 
does not mean that contemporary policies are necessarily any less coercive. 
Duffield points out that Foucault’s account of biopolitics is almost exclu-
sively concerned with Europe, or, in other words, the biopolitics of a ‘devel-
oped’ society.262 In Duffield’s view, the extending of Foucault’s insights onto 
the international level will emphasise the differentiation between developed 
and underdeveloped life. With this move, the legacy of colonialism and the 
‘colonial difference’ also come into view. Family planning is a good example 
of the differential status that the so-called developed and developing lives 
have in the policies of developed countries. The fertility of the poor in the 
Global South is framed as a danger to the planet, while at the same time 
declining fertility rates in the North are seen as a problem. These concerns 
wholly disregard the fact that in places where fertility is the highest, per capita 
ecological footprints are the lowest. The developed countries are responsible 
for about 80 percent of the world’s CO2 emissions, while having only about 
20 percent of the population.263 According to Betsy Hartmann, making the 
poor people of colour in the Global South responsible for climate change is 
a form of ‘eugenic environmentalism’.264
The becoming global of biopolitics can also be considered by comparing 
development to the thought of the English cleric and economist Thomas 
Malthus who famously argues that population growth tends to outpace 
261 See, for example, Bondestam and Bergström 1980.
262 Duffield 2007, 16. 
263 In 2011, the United States was responsible for 17 tons of CO2 emissions per capita, compared to 1.7 
tons in India and 0.4 tons in Bangladesh, for example. In 2013, the world’s highest total fertility rate 
(the average number of children per woman) was in Niger, where CO2 emissions add up to only 0.1 
tons per capita. See World Bank 2015 and Population Reference Bureau 2013. In the next twenty 
years, most population growth is estimated to occur in sub-Saharan Africa, where carbon dioxide 
emissions are the lowest in the world. While we might consider the political and social impact of 
population growth on the societies of what are some of the poorest countries in the world, it seems 
totally out of order to assign the people of those countries the responsibility for climate change or 
for exceeding the ‘carrying capacity’ of the planet. 
264 Hartmann 2009. 
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food production, and if the former is not restricted through postponement 
of marriage, celibacy and other preventive means, it will eventually be cur-
tailed by famine, disease and war. In the 1798 text “Essay on the Principle of 
Population”, Malthus makes a case against the Poor Law that obligated the 
propertied class to care for the livelihood of the poor:
To remedy the frequent distresses of the common people, the poor laws of England 
have been instituted; but it is to be feared, that though they may have alleviated a 
little the intensity of individual misfortune, they have spread the general evil over 
a much larger surface. It is a subject often started in conversation and mentioned 
always as a matter of great surprise that, notwithstanding the immense sum that is 
annually collected for the poor in England, there is still so much distress among 
them. Some think that the money must be embezzled, others that the church-
wardens and overseers consume the greater part of it in dinners. All agree that 
somehow or other it must be very ill-managed. In short the fact that nearly three 
millions are collected annually for the poor and yet that their distresses are not 
removed is the subject of continual astonishment.265
In Malthus’ view, such support enabled the increase of the population of the 
poor classes which, in the end, left everyone worse off. The poor man who 
married without being sure that he could provide for his offspring was to be 
considered the enemy of everyone.266 Instead of considering, for example, 
a more radical redistribution of wealth, Malthus blamed the poor for their 
own poverty and for the ultimately ensuing misery of everyone. Restraining 
population growth thus provided Malthus with a solution to the problem of 
poverty that did not threaten the interests of the landed minority. 
In his most recent book The Age of Sustainable Development, Jeffrey Sachs 
approvingly quotes Malthus, pointing out that ‘we cannot say we have not 
been warned’, and that ‘we should thank Malthus wholeheartedly for pointing 
out a deep conundrum that continues to this day.’267 By substituting ‘poor laws’ 
265  Malthus 1798. 
266  Malthus 1798. 
267  Sachs 2015, 207; 317. 
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with ‘development aid’, the above quote by Malthus could be an example of 
the contemporary development discourse that revolves around the supposed 
ineffectiveness of direct development aid while carefully avoiding the question 
of the redistribution of wealth. The problematic of population and poverty 
has thus become global. The management of the circulation of the good and 
the bad elements in a population, which Foucault identifies as central to 
biopolitics, has likewise become globalised.268 While dealing with phenom-
ena such as health and reproduction, for Foucault, biopolitics is essentially 
a security apparatus. Security, according to Foucault, ‘is simply a matter of 
maximizing the positive elements, for which one provides the best possible 
circulation, and of minimizing what is risky and inconvenient.’269 Biopolitics 
operates by increasing and enhancing the life of the desired elements, while 
disallowing that which is undesirable. Ehrlich expresses the problematic of 
population, circulation and security thus:
I have understood the population explosion intellectually for a long time. I came to 
understand it emotionally one stinking hot night in Delhi a few years ago. My wife 
and daughter and I were returning to our hotel in an ancient taxi. The seats were 
hopping with fleas. The only functional gear was third. As we crawled through 
the city, we entered a crowded slum area. The temperature was well over 100, and 
the air was a haze of dust and smoke. The streets seemed alive with people. People 
eating, people washing, people sleeping. People visiting, arguing, and screaming. 
People thrusting their hands through the taxi window, begging. People defecating 
and urinating. People clinging to buses. People herding animals. People, people, 
people, people. As we moved slowly through the mob, hand horn squawking, the 
dust, noise, heat, and cooking fires gave the scene a hellish aspect. Would we ever 
get to our hotel? All three of us were, frankly, frightened.270 
Writing almost 200 years after Malthus, Ehrlich gives the same interpreta-
tion of the situation: Not poverty as such, but the number of the poor is the 
268  Foucault 2009, 18. 
269  Foucault 2009, 19. 
270  Ehrlich 1968, 1.
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problem. And, if the problem of the number of the poor is not addressed, all 
of ‘us’ may need to be frightened.  
The same idea is captured in the mantra that is repeated by many contem-
porary development actors: ‘There can be no development without security 
and no security without development.’271 Marlies Glasius and Mary Kaldor put 
it succinctly: ‘The whole point […] is, that Europeans cannot be secure while 
others in the world live in severe insecurity.’272 The underdevelopment of some 
is seen to threaten the wellbeing and security of all. Kaldor and Shannon Beebe 
warn that inability to respond to the challenges of underdevelopment means 
that we are creating our enemies for the future.273 This ‘development-security 
nexus’ has become a truism of contemporary international politics.274 The 
budget of the UK Department for International Development, for example, 
has been markedly increased during the current Tory government, and the 
former Prime Minister David Cameron argues that development is ‘a powerful 
instrument of our foreign policy and profoundly in our national interest’.275 
Cameron was also one of the three co-chairs of the UN High-Level Panel 
that was tasked with drawing up the post-2015 development agenda. As will 
be discussed in the following part of this chapter, current UK development 
policy associates birth control with both security and economic viability. 
Alongside poverty and population growth, infectious diseases are likewise 
considered a threat to the stability of the international system. The case of 
HIV/AIDS prevention serves as an example of the way in which the pur-
suit of development goals often reflects the political power and values in 
developed countries. This can most readily be seen in the US support for 
abstinence programmes aimed at the reduction of HIV/AIDS in Africa. 
Although the abstinence programmes are often regarded as the brainchild of 
President George W. Bush, when coming into office, President Barak Obama 
did not change the HIV/AIDS prevention focus away from abstinence.276 
271  See World Bank 2013; Annan 2005 and Ki-moon 2005.
272  Glasius and Kaldor 2005, 70. 
273  Beebe and Kaldor 2010, 202. 
274  See Duffield 2010; 2007.
275  Cameron 2010a. 
276  Berg-Nordlie 2010. 
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Recent research argues that the $1.3 billion that the US has spent since 2005 
to promote abstinence and faithfulness in sub-Saharan Africa has had no 
significant impact on sexual behaviour.277 Not only has money been thrown 
down the drain, but the programmes favouring abstinence and faithfulness 
have actively curtailed both the distribution of condoms in schools and 
campaigns promoting condom-use among youths.278 While the abstinence 
projects are an example of development policy gone wrong, the failure of the 
programmes goes to show also the limits of normalisation. 
Nevertheless, HIV/AIDS has been one of the development policy areas 
where the framing of illness as a security threat has legitimised increasing inter-
vention into people’s lives. While the biopolitical securitisation of HIV/AIDS 
has been examined elsewhere,279 more recently there have also been attempts 
to formulate different takes on HIV/AIDS prevention. The World Bank, for 
example, is exploring the use of financial incentives to encourage safer sexual 
behaviour. Experimenting with a lottery system where those who test nega-
tive for HIV get a lottery ticket with a chance to win a high prize, the World 
Bank has found that ‘lottery incentives appear to be particularly effective for 
individuals willing to take risks.’280 With such a system, the idea is to direct 
people’s ‘risk loving’ tendencies towards behaviour that is not detrimental to 
their health. Instead of aiming to curtail risk-taking behaviour – the existence 
277 Lo et al. 2015. 
278 Berg-Nordlie 2010. One may think that the USAID is merely one development agent among many, 
and surely others have more sensible policies. While this may be the case to an extent, the US is also 
active in pushing its development agenda on other actors. The Office of the United States Global 
AIDS Coordinator declared in 2004 that it would ‘actively [work] to ensure that all resolutions and 
commitments agreed to in the multilateral area are compatible with our bilateral policies.’ HIV epi-
demiologist Elizabeth Pisani clarifies: ‘For those who don’t speak Development Bully, that translates 
as: “We’ll do our damnedest to make sure that all the international organisations toe the US party 
line.”’ See Pisani 2008, 254. It is also worth noting that the USAID budget for the year 2016 alone 
is $22.3 billion, while the integrated budget for UNDP, UNFPA, UNICEF and UN-Women for 
the four-year period 2014-2017 is $24.3 billion. See USAID 2015a and United Nations 2013, re-
spectively. On a yearly basis, the USAID has thus four times as much funds at its disposal as the most 
important development bodies of the UN combined. While the general international development 
goals are negotiated within the UN framework, and other actors adopt their language (the MDGs 
and the SDGs, for example), the mode of execution of those goals rests very much in the hands of 
those who control the funds. 
279 See, most notably, Elbe 2009; 2008; 2005. 
280 Björkman Nyqvist et al. 2015, 2.
96 | Suvi Alt: Beyond the Biopolitics of Development
of which is necessary for the functioning of markets – the aim is to redirect 
risk-taking in a biopolitically beneficial way. Development can thus also be 
understood as what Foucault calls a ‘technology of the self ’, a technology 
with which humans modify their conduct so as to better contribute to the 
overall life of the population.
People’s own life choices have become increasingly important in the 
contemporary development framework. As Nikolas Rose points out, it is 
no longer the state that has the responsibility to resolve people’s needs for 
health.281 Rather, the aim is to create the kinds of conditions within which 
individuals can make healthy choices. According to the UNDP, develop-
ment aims at making people better able to master their lives so that they do 
not ‘become a burden on society’.282 ‘People should be able to take care of 
themselves.’283 The UNDP appeals thereby to a neoliberal logic where people 
are encouraged to take more responsibility for their own lives so that there 
would be less need for care by the government. With neoliberalism, social 
risks such as poverty and illness are thus transformed into problems of ‘self-
care’.284 This neoliberalisation of development policy is discussed in more 
detail in Chapter 4. For now, I will turn to a different way of problematising 
the governing of life through development. 
The Bare Life of Development
Today’s democratico-capitalist project of eliminating the poor classes through 
development not only reproduces within itself the people that is excluded but 
also transforms the entire population of the Third World into bare life.285
While Foucault did not discuss development as an international problematic, 
Agamben takes it up explicitly and argues that ‘the obsession with develop-
281  Rose 2001, 6. 
282  UNDP 1994, 24. 
283  UNDP 1994, 24. 
284  Lemke 2002, 59. 
285  Agamben 1998, 180. 
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ment is so effective in our time because it coincides with the biopolitical plan 
to produce a people without fracture.’286 Development is aimed at creating a 
universal community of people in which everyone is included (or in which 
the excluded are eventually eliminated). According to Agamben, the paradox 
of modernity is that it inevitably produces bare life, but it is then unable to 
tolerate it.287 The liberal international order is premised on the perpetual 
reinclusion of excluded populations. While Hegel and others excluded the 
Africans from the realm of humanity proper, liberal thinkers have sought 
ways to include the excluded. Yet, inclusion comes at a cost as life needs to 
be transformed in order to be included. 
Agamben argues that the problem of humanitarian organisations, despite 
all good intentions, is that they are able to conceive of the human only as 
bare life.288 Only bare life can be the object of aid and protection. Therefore, 
humanitarianism shares a ‘secret solidarity’ with the power it is supposed to be 
critiquing.289 Humanitarian emergencies strip people of their history, culture 
and identity,290 and thus the objects of development and aid are characterised 
by a profound sense of lack. The lack may be actual (e.g. lack of clean drink-
ing water) but it may also be imagined or relative (e.g. lack of knowledge). 
Especially in the latter case, the lack is to be addressed by constructing the 
objects of aid as certain kinds of subjects. According to Agamben, it is then 
the people who refuse to be integrated and assimilated into the dominant 
political body that become bare life.291 Development may therefore mean 
inclusion for those who accept its specific conception of being human but 
(inclusive) exclusion for those who refuse it. 
In a parallel vein to Agamben, Jenny Edkins argues that contemporary 
humanitarianism often relies on the production of its subjects in a way that 
imitates the constitution of the subjects of the state.292 On the other hand, 
and again in a parallel vein to Agamben, she also points towards the subjects 
286  Agamben 2000, 34. 
287  Agamben 2000, 34. 
288  Agamben 1998, 133. 
289  Agamben 1998, 133. 
290  Duffield 2007, 34. 
291  Agamben 1998, 179. 
292  Edkins 2003, 255. 
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of humanitarianism being produced as lives with no political voice.293 Devel-
opment aims to construct subjects that are invested with certain rights and 
duties but, in the process of doing this, it ends up producing bare life; it strips 
people of their bios in order to encourage the creation of a new one. Agamben’s 
work suggests that bare life is a constitutive component of contemporary 
politics, and politics as it is conventionally understood cannot escape the logic 
that produces bare life. Development can thus be regarded as an attempt to 
alleviate the suffering that is necessarily produced by the same international 
system that the discourse of development also supports.
In the camp, in the permanent state of exception, the treatment of people 
depends not on law but on the judgement of those who temporarily act as 
sovereigns,294 or as Judith Butler calls them, ‘petty sovereigns’.295 As noted 
earlier, mainstream International Relations theory has not recognised such 
everyday use of sovereign power, focused as it has been on the state as the 
only entity wielding sovereignty. Taking up the mundane sovereignty of the 
so-called petty sovereigns, Agamben formulates the relationship between 
the sovereign and homo sacer in the following way: ‘The sovereign is the one 
with respect to whom all men are potentially homines sacri, and homo sacer 
is the one with respect to whom all men act as sovereigns.’296 Although in 
modernity all life is arguably bare life, it should be evident that some lives 
are nevertheless barer than others. 
In the context of development, this problematic can be exemplified with 
programmes such as “Click to Feed” by The Hunger Site and “Free Rice” by 
the World Food Programme. On The Hunger Site one merely needs to click 
a button to feed people. ‘Click Here – It’s Free!’ the button says. According 
to the website, ‘since its launch in June 1999, The Hunger Site has established 
itself as a leader in online activism, helping to feed the world’s hungry and food 
insecure.’297 The Free Rice website, in turn, offers games so that one can ‘play 
and feed hungry people’. Each correct answer donates 10 grains of rice, which 
293  Edkins 2003, 256. 
294  Agamben 1998, 174. 
295  Butler 2006, 56. 
296  Agamben 1998, 84. 
297  The Hunger Site 2015b. See also The Hunger Site 2015a. 
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is paid for by the sponsors whose ads are displayed each time the player gets 
the answer right.298 On the World Food Programme’s website, through testing 
one’s ‘hunger IQ’, one can likewise give food for free. You can even ‘ensure a 
child is fed in your name’ by giving your personal details at the end of the test.299 
Hungry people somewhere far away are depending on us to sit at our comput-
ers and play games. The websites explicitly tell you that you can directly make 
a decision on the life of a child. The more we click the more people we feed 
and the more lives we let live. Thus, we seem to live in a world where humans 
occupy different positions in the international order that works through the 
logic of the camp: some of us being petty sovereigns, others homines sacri, while 
the colonial difference cuts through the division between the two.
Whereas it can be argued that the decision to click in order to feed a child 
nevertheless values life positively, a more sinister example of the contemporary 
(de)valuation of life can be found in the sterilisation programmes deployed 
especially in India. As Escobar points out, representations of hunger and over-
population often go hand in hand, as do the means of dealing with them.300 
While the above mentioned programmes construct an image of a hungry child 
needing to be fed, the other side of the coin are the sterilisation programmes 
that are aimed at curtailing the fertility of the poor. Sterilisation is common 
particularly in India, where sterilisation programmes have their roots in the 
1970s when large-scale compulsory sterilisation led to men hiding in the 
fields and on trees to avoid undergoing vasectomy.301 After years of disrepute, 
sterilisation programmes have again become the preferred policy choice for 
curtailing fertility, yet now the focus is on the ‘free choice’ of women. 
Despite the language of empowerment, in practice women are often coerced 
into sterilisation.302 Recent reports also tell of deaths in Indian state-run mass 
sterilisation camps where women are arguably forced to attend.303 Although 
vasectomy is much simpler a procedure and carries far less risk of complica-
298  World Food Programme 2015a.
299  World Food Programme 2015b.
300  Escobar 2012, 103.
301  Mukherjee 2014. 
302  Mukherjee 2014. 
303  Bhardwaj 2014; Burke 2014a; Wilson 2014 and Chamberlain 2012.
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tions than female sterilisation, it is not well-accepted socially which is why an 
overwhelming majority of sterilisations are done on women, leading to a high 
number of botched operations.304 Doctors have reported that the state has set 
quotas for female sterilisations which they are pressured to meet, otherwise 
they face suspension or dismissal.305 Doctors and health care officials also 
receive bonuses based on the amount of surgeries that are carried out.306 Some 
Indian states run lotteries in which people can win cars, televisions or kitchen 
appliances if they agree to undergo sterilisation.307 Although not a direct form 
of coercion, such financial incentives are a questionable family planning tool 
and they also call into question the concern for the climate as the rationale for 
curtailing fertility. Giving a car or electrical appliances to people who agree to 
undergo sterilisation hardly helps to reduce their carbon footprints.  
The Indian sterilisation camps have reportedly been funded with devel-
opment aid from the UK Department for International Development,308 
though the UK administration denies involvement in forced sterilisations.309 
According to its own report, the USAID, in turn, has provided more than 
810 000 sterilisations in one single Indian state (Uttar Pradesh) between 1998 
and 2006.310 Uttar Pradesh is among the states where sterilisation camps have 
been found to blatantly disregard standards of informed consent.311 Although 
neither USAID nor the UK Department for International Development 
explicitly supports forced sterilisation, the Indian state has nevertheless de-
ployed it as a method of securing development funds from them. Furthermore, 
even when the Indian government does not openly condone the use of force, 
the incentives that it provides to doctors and health care officials effectively 
amount to a promotion of coercion. Kalpana Wilson argues that UK support 
for forced sterilisation is ‘covert’.312  
304  Burke 2014a and Human Rights Watch 2012.
305  Burke 2014a and Human Rights Watch 2012.
306  Mukherjee 2014 and Chamberlain 2012.
307  Chamberlain 2012; Deutsche Welle 2012 and BBC 2011.
308  Wilson 2014 and Chamberlain 2012.
309  Cameron 2012 and O’Brien 2011.
310  USAID 2012, 24. 
311  Open Society Foundations 2011.
312  Wilson 2014. 
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Serving as the UK Undersecretary of State for International Development, 
Stephen O’Brien argued that ‘we are proud to be giving more women the 
choices they crave’.313 According to David Cameron, the UK will contribute 
to family planning over £500 million between 2012 and 2020, targeting 
24 million women and girls.314 Family planning has been seen as the most 
crucial aspect in attempts to achieve the Millennium Development Goals of 
reducing child mortality and improving maternal health.315 Admittedly, child 
mortality and maternal health are less of an issue when babies are not born 
in the first place. The case of sterilisation camps shows how far the execution 
of a particular development goal can deviate from the goal itself. Presumably 
hardly anyone could be against the aims of reducing child mortality and 
improving maternal health. Yet, the picture changes drastically when taking 
into consideration that these goals might be ‘achieved’ through measures 
such as forced sterilisation. 
According to the UK’s former Secretary of State for International Devel-
opment Andrew Mitchell, ‘family planning is excellent value for money’.316 
Sterilisation, furthermore, is considered a cheaper option than teaching 
poorly educated women to use contraceptives.317 While being carried out in 
the name of ‘free choice’, ‘empowerment’ and ‘reproductive rights’, the steri-
lisation programmes dehumanise poor women. Acting as state-authorised 
petty sovereigns, the doctors effectively render poor women as bare lives. Yet, 
although playing along in sovereign biopolitics, the doctors have not invented 
the rules of the game. As Butler puts it, petty sovereigns are ‘mobilized by 
aims and tactics of power they do not inaugurate or fully control.’318 Poor 
women are turned over – abandoned – to the sovereign power temporarily 
wielded by the medical staff that reportedly treats the women ‘like cattle’.319 
Yet, the devaluation of life in sterilisation camps does not produce bare life 
just for the sake of it. Rather, what is at stake is the creation of conditions 
313  O’Brien 2011. 
314  Cameron 2012. 
315  O’Brien 2011. 
316  Mitchell 2011. 
317  Burke 2014b. 
318  Butler 2006, 56. 
319  See Burke 2014a. 
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for the continuation of order. Sterilisation is a contemporary way of dealing 
with a surplus population that could become potentially problematic for the 
maintenance of order. The triad of abandonment, bare life and the camp that 
underpins Agamben’s conception of biopolitics can thus be argued to find its 
expression in the contemporary sterilisation programmes.
As these two examples show, the concept of bare life can be used to shed 
light on a variety of phenomena. With the exercise of some conceptual flex-
ibility, the feeding of hungry children through clicks and games and the 
violence inflicted on poor women in sterilisation camps can be placed on the 
same continuum of bare life. While clearly not the same thing, in Agamben’s 
terminology, these two phenomena would be part of the same paradigm.320 
Although the notion of bare life does not enable much differentiation between 
various ‘types’ of bare life, it is a powerful diagnostic tool for highlighting prac-
tices of inclusive exclusion. Others have also sought to make use of Agamben’s 
concepts in the context of development. Trevor Parfitt cites evidence from 
dam projects in India and Nigeria where people opposing industrialisation 
and modernisation have been met with violence and, ultimately, exclusion. 
Likewise, he points out how the policies of the IMF and the World Bank 
have resulted in many African countries in the undermining of the legislature 
for the benefit of market discipline, and in the subsequent relegation of large 
numbers of people to bare life. 
According to Parfitt, these examples show how Agamben’s account of sov-
ereign biopolitics can be applied in the analysis of both macro and micro level 
development projects. However, even though Parfitt’s analysis of the cases is 
compelling, he assumes that there is a ‘bare-life/good-life dyarchy’ in Agam-
ben’s work where there can be a ‘progress from bare life to the good life lived 
in accordance with the Logos and juridical order.’321 Hence, he fails to situate 
Agamben’s work on bare life within the larger context of his work, which entails 
precisely a rejection of a transition from bare life to a life in the polis. ‘There 
is no return from the camps to classical politics’, Agamben states.322 While 
320  See Agamben 2009a, 9-32. 
321  Parfitt 2009, 45-46.
322  Agamben 1998, 188. 
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providing a powerful diagnostic of the problem, Parfitt’s argument reflects a 
broader lack of engagement with the affirmative aspects of Agamben’s work 
in International Relations. The theoretical implications of naming something 
‘bare life’ are rarely pursued by those who apply the concept. 
Furthermore, an analysis deploying the concept of bare life can easily result 
in a simplification of the object of its study as the concept does not allow for 
a very nuanced understanding of human being. When bare life is understood 
in the broadest possible sense, it seems that it is both those who embrace their 
‘development’ as well as those who refuse it that become bare life. The former 
become bare life through their surrender to the illusory discourse of rights, and 
the latter through their exclusion from the community that still holds on to these 
concepts. Either way, the result is the production of bare life. The application 
of the concept of bare life to development politics is somewhat problematic 
also because by invoking ‘bare life’ to describe ‘non-rights-bearing, apolitical, 
nonagentive victims’,323 there is a danger that we simply reproduce the repre-
sentation of non-Western subjects as powerless, passive and desubjectivised. 
In International Relations, a more optimistic view of Agamben’s relevance 
has been developed by Jenny Edkins.324 Together with Veronique Pin-Fat, she 
suggests an ‘assumption of bare life’ as a way of resisting sovereign biopolitics. 
Assumption of bare life refers to the taking on of the form of life that sovereign 
power has sought to produce, thus turning this form of life against that very 
power. As examples of the assumption of bare life, Edkins and Pin-Fat cite 
the lip-sewing refugees in the UK, Australia, France and the Netherlands.325 
In their discussion of the refugees who sewed their lips together in protest 
of their treatment by the authorities, Edkins and Pin-Fat purport to follow 
323 Youssef 2008, 154.
324 See Edkins 2003; 2007 and Edkins and Pin-Fat 2004; 2005. 
325 Patricia Owens accuses Edkins and Pin-Fat – and Agamben – of celebrating ‘the life that sovereign 
power has sought to produce’. On the contrary, Owens interprets refugee lip-sewing as forming ‘the 
basis of a new politics if it is acted upon and talked about over and over again; if, in other words, bare 
life is repudiated and a new worldly community is formed around resistance to injustice: that is, when 
individuals begin to create a public space between them.’ Preferring Hannah Arendt’s conception of 
the refugee over that of Agamben, Owens argues that what we need is ‘the ability to forge a public 
realm grounded on the appropriate distinction between nature and political artifice, between human 
life and the political world.’ Thus, she seeks to reinstate the distinction between bios and zoē. See 
Owens 2009, 569-578; original emphases.  
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Agamben who calls for transforming bare life into a ‘form-of-life’, into a ‘life 
of potenza’.326 They argue that what Agamben means by ‘a life of potenza’ is 
comparable to Foucauldian power relations:
Significantly, Foucault’s notion of relations of power contains within it a sense of 
potentiality or possibility comparable to potenza. As we have seen, freedom and 
resistance are a central part of Foucauldian power relations. […] Power as potenza 
in Agamben is the realm of politics, or what we will call later properly political 
power relations. […] Agamben argues that the question we should be addressing 
is not Is there any escape from power relations? but, on the contrary, Is today a life 
of power available? Such a life of power would be a life of potentialities and pos-
sibilities, a life in the field of power relations, resistance, and freedom: in other 
words, a political life.327 
In basing their reading of Agamben almost exclusively on Homo Sacer, Edkins 
and Pin-Fat disregard Agamben’s extensive discussions on potentiality (po-
tenza). Agamben’s ‘life of potenza’ is a life of potentialities and possibilities, 
and even a life of freedom and the political – but not in the sense suggested 
by Edkins and Pin-Fat. In conflating Agamben’s potenza with Foucauldian 
power relations, they ignore the depth of Agamben’s account of life as po-
tentiality, as life that can hardly be equated with a Foucauldian conception 
of power. Thus, Edkins and Pin-Fat suggest moving from sovereign violence 
to Foucauldian power relations, but not beyond.
While it has become commonplace to describe the subjects of develop-
ment as ‘bare life’, I suggest in the following chapters that understanding 
‘underdeveloped’ or ‘developing’ life as bare life is not sufficient, and a deeper 
critique can be made by examining development through the concept of po-
tentiality. The challenge that Agamben’s philosophy poses to contemporary 
politics comes from a rethinking of the ontological conditions of life, and 
326 In Italian there are two terms that correspond to the English word ‘power’. Potere refers to the power 
of a structured and centralised capacity, for example the power of a state. Potenza means the poten-
tiality of a decentralised force. Potenza and potere correspond to the Latin potentia and potestas. See 
translators’ note in Agamben 2000, 143.   
327 Edkins and Pin-Fat 2005, 9-13; original emphases.
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potentiality is the concept that allows for this ontological critique. A critique 
of the bare life of development is therefore complemented in Chapter 4 with 
a critique that recognises development as a project that requires people to 
‘realise their potential’. In contrast, Chapter 5 will discuss what Agamben’s 
‘life of potentiality’ entails. Discussions that centre on bare life and the camp 
generally ignore the fundamentally affirmative intent of Agamben’s thought. 
This aspect of his work has only recently begun to receive more attention.328 
For now it suffices to say that Agamben’s understanding of the possibility of 
politics goes beyond ordinary, or even Foucauldian, conceptualisations of 
political subjectivity or resistance. 
To conclude, the problematics that President Truman and Heidegger 
formulated in 1949 have travelled to present discourses of development and 
its biopolitical critique. The contemporary rationalisation for development 
echoes that which was popular in Truman’s time: The security of ‘our’ well-
being depends on ‘their’ development. As a co-chair of the UN High-Level 
Panel on the post-2015 development agenda, Cameron suggests that:
 
The UK government is taking a whole new approach to development. We know 
that in the long term we can not help countries develop just by giving them money. 
Development can not be done to the poor by outsiders. It has to be driven by the 
people who need the change. Our role is to help the poorest countries create the 
building blocks of private sector growth and prosperity. These building blocks 
are the same the world over.329
Obviously there is nothing new in this approach to development. It simply 
repeats what Truman stated sixty years before. Yet, this does not mean that 
the problematic of development has not changed at all. The most significant 
alteration in the notion and practice of development has been effected by the 
transformation of liberalism into neoliberalism. This transformation and its 
effects on development are examined in the next chapter.  
328  See, most notably, Prozorov 2014c; 2014d; 2010; Whyte 2014 and Kishik 2012. 
329  Cameron 2012. 
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While the biopolitical critiques discussed in this chapter are indebted to 
Heidegger’s problematisation of the production of makeable and disposable 
beings, they do not engage the ‘essence of poverty’. Rather, the consolidation 
of the Development Age has pushed the essence of poverty further and further 
away from view. Like the prison, which fails in reforming the criminal yet suc-
ceeds in producing a disciplined, normalised society, so does the development 
apparatus fail in solving the problem of poverty yet succeeds in producing a 
society where that problem is fundamentally depoliticised.330 The next chapter 
examines the different forms that this depoliticisation takes: the economisa-
tion and biologisation of life and the ontological monopolisation of Being. 
330  Escobar 2012, 143. 
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4. The Ontology of Neoliberal Biopolitics
The contemporary development paradigm is deeply embedded in Western 
liberalism. Martha Nussbaum explains the universality of the human devel-
opment approach in such terms, arguing that the approach is ‘without any 
grounding in metaphysical ideas of the sort that divide people along lines 
of culture and religion.’331 The approach, as a form of political liberalism, 
shows ‘respect for citizens by not asking them to endorse a political doctrine 
built on any particular religious or metaphysical view.’332 Following the 
lines of the classical liberal tradition, Nussbaum understands liberalism as a 
political philosophy that upholds each individual’s right to life, liberty and 
the pursuit of happiness, influenced, furthermore, by Adam Smith’s account 
of the appropriate nature and extent of government intervention as well as 
John Rawls’ theory of justice. She argues that because human development is 
a form of political liberalism, ‘it is not a comprehensive doctrine of any sort’ 
and, therefore, it should be able to attract a universal consensus.333 
Rooted in the liberal tradition, development has also transformed as a 
result of the shift from liberalism to neoliberalism in the 1970s.334 The no-
tion of ‘Washington Consensus’, which is often used to refer to neoliberal-
ism in general, was originally coined to describe the consensus among the 
US administration, the IMF, the World Bank and other Washington-based 
institutions on the appropriate policy reforms for Latin America in the wake 
331 Nussbaum 2011, 109.
332 Nussbaum 2011, 79.
333 Nussbaum 2011, 92-93.
334 Early notions of ‘neoliberalism’ were developed in the 1930s by Walter Lippman, Ludwig von Mises 
and Friedrich von Hayek, among others. Foucault traces the development of German ordoliberalism 
and the later emergence of American neoliberalism in the lecture course “The Birth of Biopolitics”. 
See Foucault 2010.  
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of the 1982 debt crisis. At the core of the Washington Consensus were fiscal 
discipline, reform of public expenditure, import liberalisation, privatisation 
of state enterprises, general deregulation, clarification of property rights and 
letting the market determine interest and exchange rates.335 These policies 
were mainstreamed in development in the 1980s. Following the 2008-2009 
financial crisis, among others the then-British Prime Minister Gordon Brown 
declared the Washington Consensus ‘dead’.336 However, as the economist 
John Williamson, who originally coined the term and promoted its policies, 
points out, the policies pursued in the original Washington Consensus are 
very much alive, and President Obama, for example, has in no way contra-
dicted these policies.337 
According to David Harvey, neoliberalism is ‘a theory of political economic 
practices that proposes that human well-being can best be advanced by liber-
ating individual entrepreneurial freedoms and skills within an institutional 
framework characterised by strong private property rights, free markets, and 
free trade.’338 However, neoliberalism cannot be reduced to a tool that inter-
national institutions, the United States or other developed countries may 
use according to their preference in order to subjugate developing countries. 
Rather than simply a political programme or an institutional arrangement 
generated in the 1980s by Western states or a dominant class, neoliberalism 
ought to be examined as a specific understanding of human nature, subjectivity 
and social existence.339 As Jason Read argues, most central to neoliberalism is 
the production of particular kinds of understandings of subjectivity, freedom 
and possibility.340 Irrespective of whether the Washington Consensus is dead 
or not, neoliberal notions of life, freedom and possibility live on. 
Biopolitics, furthermore, is a necessary condition of liberalism. The liberal 
‘discovery’ of society is only possible due to the biopolitics of population.341 
Yet, within biopolitical approaches there is considerable debate concern-
335  Williamson 1990. 
336  Painter 2009. 
337  Williamson 2009. 
338  Harvey 2005, 2. 
339  Read 2009, 26. 
340  Read 2009, 36. 
341  Dean 2010, 133. 
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ing the defining feature of liberal biopolitics, some preferring to emphasise 
economy,342 others biology.343 Mitchell Dean identifies economy, security, law 
and society as the major features of liberal government.344 Biology does not 
come across as central in his examination of liberalism. For Julian Reid, on 
the contrary, liberalism gains its consistency and singularity from its commit-
ment to an understanding of the human in terms of its biological properties 
and capacities.345 I argue below that both the economic and the biological are 
crucial to understanding the ways in which liberalism functions as a modern 
rationality of governance. Liberalism, biopolitics and development are thus 
intimately intertwined, and informed by both economy and biology. 
In order to delve deeper into contemporary development, this chapter 
focuses on two notions that are crucial to its ontology: contingency and po-
tentiality. In policy terms, the idea of contingency is expressed in the language 
of adaptation, implying a biologised conception of the human. Potentiality, 
in turn, is discussed through the concepts of capability and human capital, 
which, while also drawing on biology, entail an economised conception of 
the human and of social relations. Yet, although biopolitical critiques rightly 
draw attention to the biologisation and economisation of life in modernity, 
this chapter argues that those critiques disregard the ontological monopo-
lisation of Being that sustains such biologisation and economisation. Each 
of these will be discussed below. I turn firstly to the discourses of adaptation 
and resilience, which serve as an entry point into the ontology that underpins 
contemporary development policy.
The Biopolitics of Adaptation and Resilience
In the course of the past decade, development has turned into a policy 
of adaptation and resilience. For several years now these concepts have 
circulated in policy texts and they have become increasingly central to the 
342  See Kiersey 2009. 
343  See Reid 2012b; 2010. 
344  Dean 2010, 133-154. 
345  Reid 2010, 393-394. 
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way in which development is contemporarily conceptualised. The UNDP 
subtitled its 2014 Human Development Report “Sustaining Human Progress: 
Reducing Vulnerabilities and Building Resilience”. The World Bank’s World 
Development Report of 2014, subtitled “Risk and Opportunity”, likewise 
raises the concept of resilience to centre stage. The World Bank defines 
resilience as ‘the ability of people, societies, and countries to recover from 
negative shocks, while retaining or improving their ability to function.’346 
The UNDP notes that ‘there is much debate about the meaning of resilience, 
but our emphasis is on human resilience – ensuring that people’s choices are 
robust, now and in the future, and enabling people to cope and adjust to 
adverse events.’347 With its conceptual roots in psychology and ecology, in 
the context of development, resilience refers to the ability of individuals and 
communities to ‘bounce back’, to adjust to and recover from various kinds 
of crises that happen to them. 
Resilience is conceptually closely related to ‘adaptation’, which is likewise 
a concept informed by both natural and social sciences. In general terms 
adaptation refers to a change in structure, function, or behaviour by which a 
species or an individual improves its chances of survival in a specific environ-
ment.348 Into the everyday vocabulary of international politics the concept 
of adaptation has found its way through the increasing recognition of the 
need to ‘adapt’ to climate change. The demand for adaptation is not limited 
to climate change, however, but includes various other phenomena such 
as environmental degradation, poverty and post-conflict situations.349 In 
policy texts, adaptation is often conceived of as a technical issue rather than 
a political or a cultural question.350 Yet, adaptation has important political 
and cultural effects because it operates through intervention into individual 
and collective life as well as into the environment in which lives are carried 
out. The biopolitics of adaptation entails techniques by which unpredictable 
 
346  World Bank 2014, 12. 
347  UNDP 2014, 1; original emphasis. 
348  American Heritage Science Dictionary 2005.
349  See Baldwin 2013; Clark 2012 and Reid 2010.
350  Grove 2014, 201. 
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future catastrophes are turned into vulnerabilities in the present, which can 
then be mitigated through behavioural modifications.351
Developing peoples are thereby being given new responsibilities to en-
sure their resilience in the face of various adversities. ‘Poverty’, for example, 
entails the responsibility for the poor to undertake certain types of behavior 
in order to become more resilient. Generally, this involves practices such 
as diversification of agriculture and the use of micro-finance. For Duffield, 
liberal development is based on household and community self-reliance and 
adaptation.352 Informal care arrangements such as the local community or the 
extended family are seen as the ‘natural’ social protection systems for ‘under-
developed’ peoples.353 ‘Households are the first line of support to confront 
risk and pursue opportunity’, the World Bank states.354 However, when ‘self-
reliance’ entered the development discourse in the 1960s, it was a strategy of 
‘delinking’ from the system.355 Self-reliance was conceptualised in terms of 
the rejection of the economic domination entailed by mainstream notions 
of development. On the contrary, contemporary self-reliance and resilience 
discourses assume integration into the global economic system but demand 
resilience in the case of economic downturns. 
Mario Blaser identifies the transformation of development into sustainable 
development as being symptomatic of the shift from a discourse of progress 
to a discourse of risk.356 Development is no longer considered to be the more 
or less inevitable march forward on the road of progress, but a distinctly 
fragile process that needs to be cultivated through resilience and adaptation 
in a world of risk and uncertainty. Like resilience, adaptation is attuned to 
the processes of change and becoming that are understood to characterise 
contemporary life. Yet, crucial to the discourses of adaptation and resilience 
is that while one cannot control the changes in one’s living environment, one 
can learn to approach change and risk as an opportunity. According to the 
351  Grove 2014, 204. 
352  Duffield 2010, 55. 
353  Duffield 2010, 65. 
354  World Bank 2014, 109. 
355  Rist 2008, 130. 
356  Blaser 2010, 89. 
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World Bank, ‘confronting risk, as the possibility of loss, is a burden – but it 
is also necessary to the pursuit of opportunity.’357 The aim is, therefore, not 
to eliminate risk, but to manage it in a biopolitically beneficial way. 
When the uncontrollable nature of the contemporary environment is used 
as the rationalisation for the necessity to adapt and change, what mode of 
power are we dealing with? Discourses on the resilience and adaptability of 
individuals and communities do not aim to discipline them. Instead, neolib-
eralism is linked to techniques that affect the rules of the game rather than the 
players, implying an environmental type of intervention instead of a direct 
subjugation of individuals.358 It is therefore distinct from both disciplinary 
society and normalising society. Whereas Agamben speaks of the perma-
nent state of exception as the paradigm of contemporary politics, neoliberal 
biopolitics appears to function more like a permanent state of adaptation. 
While Agamben’s ‘bare life’ is continuously subjected to the possibility of 
sovereign violence, life in a permanent state of adaptation is rather subjected 
to the necessity of being infinitely malleable, yet active in regard to one’s own 
adaptation. Whereas bare life is included in the political system through its 
exclusion, through being refused political status but thereby also exposing 
the violence of the sovereign, subjects in a permanent state of adaptation are 
included in the – more or less meaningless – political system so long as they 
conform to the continuous need to adapt. As a biopolitical technique, resil-
ience produces depoliticised subjects who accept their vulnerability and adapt 
to the conditions that they are in instead of seeking to change or to transcend 
those conditions.359 This depoliticisation results from both the biologisation 
and the economisation of life. These processes are discussed below. In terms 
of its ontological underpinnings, the demand for the capacities of adaptation 
and resilience is intimately linked to the notion of contingency. 
357  World Bank 2014, 5. 
358  Foucault 2010, 259-260.
359  Evans and Reid 2014; Grove 2014 and Reid 2012a.
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The Biologisation of Life: Governing through Contingency
Both biology and ‘life’ emerged at the beginning of the nineteenth century. 
Before the epistemic rupture that created the modern life sciences, all that 
existed was living beings understood as part of natural history.360 In the 
knowledge of these modern human sciences – especially biology and medicine 
– ‘life’ became thinkable as fundamentally dynamic. At this point, the value 
of life was founded on its own uncertainty and precariousness.361 Life came 
to be understood as the combination of the organic unity of the living body 
and the processes that threaten such unity. ‘Life itself ’ emerged as the vital 
totality of functions that resist death.362 Biological life is thus that which seeks 
to survive and its dynamic character is that which allows it to do so. Tracing 
these developments in The Order of Things, Foucault identifies ‘Life’, ‘Labour’ 
and ‘Language’ as the quasi-transcendentals of ‘Man’. ‘Quasi-transcendental’ 
means here that life, labour and language are both beyond knowledge and the 
conditions of knowledge about the human. They provide empirical multiplici-
ties with a foundation that constitutes the order of what is to be known.363 
‘The experience of life is thus posited as the most general law of beings, the 
revelation of that primitive force on the basis of which they are’, Foucault 
argues.364 Life, labour and language are modes of knowledge that sustain the 
correlation of the modern techniques of economics, biology and philology 
with the unprecedented objects of these knowledges.365
Thus, from early on, biopolitics was preoccupied with the dynamic nature 
of life. Yet, the developments in biology – especially the discovery of the ge-
netic code – in the latter half of the twentieth century have had a profound 
impact on the way in which ‘life’ is contemporarily conceptualised.366 Mi-
360 Foucault 1994, 128. 
361 Muhle 2014, 85. 
362 Rose 2007, 43. 
363 Foucault 1994, 244. 
364 Foucault 1994, 278. 
365 Foucault 1994, 253. 
366 I will not go into detail regarding these developments here. For accounts of the molecularisation 
and informationalisation of life in the context of biopolitics, see Dillon and Reid 2009, 55-77 and 
Rose 2007, 44-48.
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chael Dillon and Luis Lobo-Guerrero argue that a new order of the real has 
emerged where the quasi-transcendentals are circulation, connectivity and 
complexity.367 These three find their coherence in the ‘contingency’ that now 
presumably pervades the life of contemporary living beings. Contingency has 
become the foundation of social form, and life is understood to evolve and 
develop in a continuous process of adaptive emergence.368 The understanding 
of the fundamentally contingent character of life is a necessary precondition 
for the above discussed demand for adaptation that now pervades policy 
responses to various contemporary problems. 
In an increasingly interconnected world, complex economic, political 
and ecological systems require – so we are told – that we develop ways of 
thought that are able to account for that which can no longer be planned 
and controlled. Jeffrey Sachs argues that ‘a skilled sustainable development 
practitioner needs to be a complex-systems expert’ so as to be able to function 
with the emergent properties of complex systems.369 These emergent proper-
ties are essentially contingent. Contingency refers to things or events that 
may be or happen, but need not be or happen. Contingent things and events 
are those that could be or could have been otherwise. As such, contingency 
implies an uncertainty and a precarity in our dealings with the world, and it 
contests all such systems of metaphysics that give an account of what must 
be.370 Contingency is thus conceptualised in opposition to necessity. 
Contingency is often also conceived of as the unpredictable event that 
politics has to respond to. Politics is ‘the art of dealing with the contingent 
event’.371 In such a conception, contingency is something that is to be dealt 
with and adapted to. Contemporary contingency is the ‘unknown unknown’ 
that cannot be predicted – we do not even know that we do not know it – but 
must nevertheless somehow be prepared for.372 Political responses of the past 
decades to everything from terrorism to financial and environmental crises 
367  Dillon and Lobo-Guerrero 2009, 9. 
368  Dillon and Lobo-Guerrero 2009, 10. 
369  Sachs 2015, 8. 
370  Mackay 2011, 1. 
371  Pocock 1975, 156. 
372  Dillon 2011, 789. 
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to epidemics have involved an account of the need to recognise contingency. 
Governments, businesses, communities and individuals alike are encouraged 
to make contingency plans devised to mitigate the effects of possible cata-
strophic events. The resilience and adaptive capacity of a population depends 
on its ability to function with contingency. 
Yet, the contemporary recognition of contingency does not mean simply 
accepting that the future is unknowable. It rather implies the use of tech-
nologies that attempt to make it knowable. Here, what was once conceived 
as fortuna becomes translated into risk.373 The language of contingency thus 
becomes that of risk, probability and opportunity, where risk refers to ways 
of thinking and acting that involve calculations about the future, followed by 
interventions into the present in order to control potential futures.374 In the 
words of the World Bank: ‘risk management can be a powerful instrument 
for development—not only by building people’s resilience and thus reduc-
ing the effects of adverse events but also by allowing them to take advantage 
of opportunities for improvement.’375 Contingency inscribes on the subject 
a distinctive moral and behavioral economy where the subject has to secure 
its future by unleashing its own potential.376 In practice this means that vari-
ous technologies of risk such as classification and commodification intersect 
with criminalisation, medicalisation, statistics and policies of public safety, 
for example. While such techniques of risk may lead to increased surveillance 
and control, this is not necessarily the case. In health policies, for example, 
technologies of risk are not simply regulative but operate through principles 
of voluntary action, non-directiveness and choice.377 The World Bank’s HIV 
lottery that was discussed in the previous chapter is an example of such use 
of risk management as a tool of development. 
As possible disasters are no longer believed to have a single transcendent 
origin – such as the wrath of God – their cause is taken to be unpredictable 
373  Dillon and Lobo-Guerrero 2008, 281.
374  Rose 2001, 7. 
375  World Bank 2014, 3. 
376  Dillon 2008, 314. 
377  Rose 2001, 9. 
116 | Suvi Alt: Beyond the Biopolitics of Development
human agency.378 Often, therefore, the portrayal of those ‘at risk’ involves 
responsibilisation. In development policies this means, for example, identify-
ing populations most at risk of falling into abject poverty, and making them 
responsible for their own poverty by demanding them to undertake practices 
such as literacy training, entrepreneurialism and the marketisation of their 
agricultural practices. According to the World Bank, people’s risk manage-
ment skills are at the core of responses to possible shocks.379 Effective risk 
management requires knowledge of feasible choices and courses of action.380 
Technologies of risk are thus intimately related to the ways in which individu-
als are expected to realise their potential. 
The calculation of the probability of the uncertain and the aleatory is at 
the heart of Foucauldian conceptions of biopolitics. Biopolitics operates on 
a future that is not directly controllable or measurable and, therefore, it has 
to take into account that which might happen.381 The problem of biopolitical 
governance is, then, the problem of how to manage contingency. In human 
development this means, for example, the deployment of statistical devices 
that chart fertility, illness, premature death etc. The Millennium Development 
Goals Report 2014 argues that ‘data will play a central role in advancing the 
new development agenda. We need sustainable data to support sustainable 
development.’382 There is a call for a ‘Data Revolution’, which would mean ‘bet-
ter, faster, more accessible, and more disaggregated data.’383 In some countries, 
especially in sub-Saharan Africa, even the most basic development data (i.e. 
the number of births and deaths) is not available due to the lack of complete 
civil registration systems. Yet, as a result of the greater affordability of digital 
devices, there is simultaneously an ever greater quantity and diversity of real 
time digital data that could be used for development purposes. ‘Big data for 
development is about turning imperfect, complex, often unstructured data 
into actionable information.’384 Though the use of data mining and algorithmic 
378  Diprose et al. 2008, 269.
379  World Bank 2014, 53-72. 
380  World Bank 2014, 64. 
381  Foucault 2009, 19-20. 
382  United Nations 2014, 7. 
383  United Nations 2014, 7.
384  UN Global Pulse 2012, 6.
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modelling is only starting to be introduced into development policy, generally 
speaking these technologies effect a preemptive mode of control that allows 
for ever more differentiated knowledge of their subjects.385 
Yet, the need to recognise contingency pertains not only to what we can 
or cannot know of the world or of the subjects of development, but also to 
the way in which individuals need to conceive of their own life in a rapidly 
changing world. The extent to which contingency as an ontological category is 
central to contemporary biopolitics is exemplified by the above-discussed dis-
courses of adaptation. Crucial to the ontology of adaptation is that it does not 
entail the protection and preservation of a fixed object. Nor is transformation 
simply a phenomenon to be regulated but, in fact, to be required of subjects. 
In a time when everything is said to have become possible, everything has in 
fact become contingent, creating what Slavoj Žižek calls ‘the “postmodern” 
universe of globalised contingency’.386 To survive in what is taken to be an 
increasingly contingent world, contingency has to be accepted as constitu-
tive of one’s subjectivity. The biopolitical imaginary thus conceives of life as 
ontologically contingent and turns contingency into its epistemic category 
of rule. The ontological and epistemological referent of biopolitical govern-
ance is no longer the human but contingency, and this makes contemporary 
biopolitics a ‘governing through contingency’.387 
Part of the appeal of the notion of contingency is that it appears to reflect 
the vital dynamic of life. Biological life is constantly exposed to deviances that 
threaten its equilibrium.388 Particularly as a consequence of the shift from 
Newtonian and Darwinian science to complexity science, ‘life’ has come to 
be understood as self-organising, open, adaptive, and – contingent. This un-
derstanding of life moves from the presumption of stable entities to viewing 
movement as being primary and immanent to the forces of life.389 Maria Muhle 
argues that biopolitics functions precisely by imitating this vital dynamic of 
385  See Amoore 2013, 7-13. 
386  Žižek 2000a, 107.
387  Dillon and Lobo-Guerrero 2009, 10-16 and Dillon and Reid 2009, 82. 
388  Muhle 2014, 86.
389  Ansems de Vries 2015, 95.
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life.390 Biopolitical techniques do not encounter and impose themselves on 
‘life’. Rather, they operate by adopting the functioning logic of biological life, 
and by reducing political and social existence to that logic. Thus, biopolitical 
governance is so effective because it appears to reflect the reality of what life is. 
The popularity of the notions of adaptation and resilience shows the efficacy 
that biological conceptions of life have in the contemporary imagination. At 
the same time, many critical perspectives also find the source of their power 
in vitalist notions of life. Yet, as will be discussed in the next chapter, the idea 
of the infinite becoming enabled by the vitality of life does not necessarily 
challenge contemporary biopolitics in general or the biopolitics of develop-
ment in particular. For now, it is nevertheless necessary to turn to another 
aspect of neoliberal biopolitics: the economisation of life.  
The Economisation of Life: Governing through 
Potentiality
The emergence of the modern life sciences, and thus, of biopolitics, coincided 
with the development of capitalism.391 Francesco Paolo Adorno calls biopoli-
tics ‘the marriage of medicine and economics’.392 The will to know the life of 
living beings is combined with working towards ends that are dictated by 
economics. Yet, economics also has its own conception of the nature of ‘life’. 
The notion of contingency discussed above is central also to contemporary 
economics. Until the 1930s, economic theory was primarily concerned with 
the problem of how to deal with scarcity. As a result of the collapse of the 
1920s, from the 1930s onwards, economics became a science of coping with 
390 Muhle 2014, 87. 
391 Early capitalism coincided with the Scientific Revolution of the late Renaissance and the conquering 
of the colonies. Karl Polanyi argues that industrial capitalism as a social system was created in 1834 as 
a result of the institution of a competitive labour market in England. See Polanyi 2001, 87. This was 
also the time when advances in human biology enabled more accurate identification of diseases and 
a more precise mapping of the dynamics of populations made possible new policies of public health. 
See Osborne 1996, 102-105. Capitalism and natural sciences have been interrelated throughout their 
development.  
392 Adorno 2014, 98. 
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scarcity and uncertainty. This line of inquiry has only become stronger as a 
result of the financialisation of capital. In the words of a former volatility 
trader Elie Ayache, ‘the reality of the true contingent event is the same as the 
reality of the market. They are made of the same fabric.’393 The contingency 
that characterises biological life pervades also the life of economics. 
Alongside contingency, another concept that is absolutely crucial to 
contemporary life is that of ‘potentiality’. While contingency usually refers 
to something that may but need not be or happen, potentiality is generally 
understood as that which will or ought to come into being. Potentiality refers 
to a capacity for growth, development, fulfilment or coming into existence. 
It is often also referred to as an ability or a capability that is to be realised. 
People are encouraged to ‘realise their potential’ and if they do not, their 
potential remains ‘unfulfilled’. One can see this discourse equally in devel-
opment policies that frame ‘underdevelopment’ as a problem of people not 
realising their full potential as well as in the self-improvement mentality that 
sees various social and political problems everywhere as a result of people not 
living up to their full potential. Liberal conceptions of potentiality conceive 
of its realisation as a necessity for the full development of human lives, and 
for the functioning of the global economy. As far as humans are ‘the real 
wealth of nations’,394 their potentiality is integral to the functioning of the 
liberal international order. 
Conceptions of development that take ‘the human’ as their main point 
of reference often define development as ‘a process which enables human 
beings to realise their potential.’395 Development is considered to be some-
thing that all peoples should strive to reach, and ‘underdevelopment’ is an 
exception to norm (albeit an exception that has become the rule). Crucially, 
underdevelopment is not to be understood as the opposite of development 
but rather as its embryonic form.396 This embryonic life serves as basis for the 
continuous creation of prospects for lives lived differently. The liberal prefer-
ence for progress narratives entails a will to see potentialities actualised. Yet, 
393  Ayache 2011, 28. 
394  UNDP 2010; 1990. 
395  See Rist 2008, 8 and UNDP 1994, 13.
396  Rist 2008, 73-74. 
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with neoliberalism has come also the need for the infinite creation of new 
potentialities. The UNDP now argues not only that development enables 
people to realise their potential, but also that development makes it possible 
to instil new potentialities in people. 
The change in the notion of potentiality that has occurred as a result of the 
shift from liberalism to neoliberalism can be elaborated through Foucault’s 
discussion of homo oeconomicus and neoliberal governmentality in The Birth 
of Biopolitics. Foucault contrasts homo oeconomicus, the economic subject, 
and homo juridicus, the subject of right, which are not governed by the same 
logic and do not have the same relationship to political power.397 Whereas 
homo juridicus is a subject in a positive system of law where the sovereign has a 
responsibility to respect his or her rights, homo oeconomicus is not concerned 
with his or her rights being respected by the sovereign. Instead, he or she is 
interested in the usefulness of his or her actions. The realm of biopolitics 
concerns particularly the realm of homo oeconomicus. According to Miguel 
Vatter, Foucault’s theory of biopower is situated at the level of ‘the ontology 
of the economic’.398 
Yet, there is an important shift in liberal discourses occurring from the 
1930s onwards and, politically, from the 1970s onwards. American neolib-
eralism emerged in response to what was perceived as excessive government 
intervention in the form of the New Deal and its big economic and social 
programmes. Foucault however emphasises that the particularity of Ameri-
can neoliberalism does not lie in its attempt to safeguard the market from 
government intervention.399 Rather, it aims to extend the rationality of the 
market to domains which are not primarily economic, such as the family, the 
birth rate and penal policy, for example. Accordingly, one of the most central 
ideas of neoliberalism is the theory of human capital. Mostly associated with 
the American economist Gary S. Becker, the theory of human capital holds 
that conventionally non-economic – that is, non-material – aspects of life 
can be analysed within the same economic framework as material behaviour. 
397  Foucault 2010, 274-283. 
398  Vatter 2014b, 172. 
399  Foucault 2010, 323. 
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As a result, expenditures on education, training and medical care,400 but also 
practices such as marriage and caring for one’s children,401 are to be understood 
as investments in human capital.
According to Foucault, the idea of human capital made Becker ‘the most 
radical of the American neoliberals’.402 This is the case because the economisa-
tion of social relations entailed by the human capital theory meant construct-
ing a social fabric where the basic units, such as the family, follow the logic 
of an enterprise.403 Neoliberal policy does not conceive of the market as one 
domain of the society among others. Rather, it aims to make the market into 
the formative power of the entire society. As Melinda Cooper points out, 
Becker’s theory of human capital was already beyond Foucault’s analytics of 
normalisation since it attempted to intervene in a field which no longer rec-
ognised the norm as the organising category.404 In his lectures, Foucault also 
recognises that the pathologisation of difference is not the primary operat-
ing logic of neoliberalism. The aim is, rather, the ‘optimisation of systems of 
difference’.405 In terms of development, this means that diversity of life forms is 
encouraged as long as such difference is not hostile to neoliberalism. Diversity 
is often also the source of value production, such as in tourism development 
that claims to offer access to ‘authentic’ difference by marketising indigenous 
peoples’ ways of life. 
When understood through the concept of human capital, the human ap-
pears as a kind of ‘abilities-machine’.406 This entails a change in the way homo 
oeconomicus is conceptualised. Whereas in classical liberal economics homo 
oeconomicus was a partner of exchange, in neoliberalism he becomes an en-
trepreneur of himself, being for himself his own capital.407 Correspondingly, 
while in classical liberalism the market was primarily about exchange, in neo-
400  Becker 1993b. 
401  Becker 1993a. 
402  Foucault 2010, 269. 
403  Foucault 2010, 148.
404  Cooper 2014, 40. 
405  Foucault 2010, 259. 
406  Foucault 2010, 229. 
407  Foucault 2010, 225-226.
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liberalism it is about competition.408 Therefore, a neoliberal homo oeconomicus 
will be most interested in such activity that will give him or her an advantage 
over others in the competition on the market. To ensure the success of one’s 
enterprise, one is to make such investments that will make one’s enterprise 
well-equipped to handle the competition. The enterprise being the ‘self ’, the 
object of investment will be ‘human capital’. 
In the World Development Report 2014, the World Bank cites the im-
portance of Becker’s ‘seminal contribution’ to the way in which we are to 
understand the household as a ‘little factory’ where knowledge, protection 
and insurance are produced.409 In bad times, the household can provide protec-
tion and a framework of risk management for its members.410 However, the 
downside is that failure to function in the competitive market also becomes 
framed as a problem of insufficient human capital. Thus, neoliberalism puts 
the onus of utility and justice on the individual’s capacity to perform on the 
market.411 Neoliberal subjects cannot count on the state or on any other social 
system to provide for them. Instead, one has to rely on one’s own human capi-
tal and, thereby, economic analysis is extended into the domain of the social, 
resulting in the inversion of social relationships to economic relationships.412 
Whereas classical liberalism looked for a free space for the market within a 
political society, neoliberalism is interested in the modeling of the exercise 
of political power on the principles of the market.413
Despite the radicality of the economisation of social relations entailed by 
the idea of ‘human capital’, the notion has become a mainstream development 
concept. The UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon demands that instead of fo-
cusing on macro-level economic development, urgent attention must be paid 
to rebuilding human capital.414 According to the African Development Bank, 
the demography of the continent ‘offers endless opportunities for economic 
and social development, if the talents of this rising youth cohort are harnessed 
408  Foucault 2010, 118.
409  World Bank 2014, 12; 21. 
410  World Bank 2014, 21.
411  Prasad 2009, 3. 
412  Foucault 2010, 219. 
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and channeled towards the productive sectors of the economy.’415 The African 
Development Bank’s Human Capital Development Strategy (2012-2016) 
states that ‘the Bank’s vision for Human Capital Development in Africa is to 
create jobs, provide equal opportunities and harness the potential of 1 billion 
people to promote inclusive growth.’416 The future of Africa depends on suc-
cessful investments in and the harnessing of people’s potential – their human 
capital. Whereas from the 1950s onwards the main obstacle to development 
was considered to be low capital availability in developing countries, today 
the principal reason for development failure is considered to be low human 
capital. Development has thus become thoroughly biopolitical. 
Whereas in Western countries the spread of the logic of the enterprise 
society is often seen to fragment collective values of care and obligation to the 
other,417 in developing countries it is exactly those traditional relationships and 
values that are considered vital for individuals and communities. While these 
‘traditional relationships and values’ could be taken as a counter-tendency to 
the individualism of the enterprise society, they can equally well be susceptible 
to being used and incorporated by the neoliberal economy. This should not 
be taken to undervalue the significance of extended families, social groups 
or communities for people’s welfare. Neither does this mean arguing that all 
countries should have the same kind of state-based welfare systems as some 
Western countries have (had). However, taking care of one another should 
not become a necessity inflicted by the neoliberal economy, a necessity that 
takes advantage of empathy and care only to enable the integration of people 
into markets that demand them to ultimately compete against one another 
in every aspect of life.
Traditionally, the freedom of homo oeconomicus has been the freedom to 
choose between different lifestyles, economic opportunities, and goods and 
services.418 Being secured as such means that the subject settles for the freedom 
to choose what to buy. It seems, however, that when understood through the 
concepts of human capital and adaptation, the freedom of homo oeconomicus 
415  African Development Bank 2011, 5. 
416  African Development Bank 2011, 14. 
417  McNay 2009, 65. 
418  Odysseos 2010, 7.
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becomes the freedom to modify oneself indefinitely. This modification can, 
and often does, take the form of consumption. In its essence, however, the 
neoliberal homo oeconomicus is not the subject of exchange or of consumption, 
but of enterprise and production.419 Being secured as the subject of enterprise 
means accepting that the environment in which one lives is in permanent 
crisis and therefore requires constant reshaping of the self. Not only is the 
subject changing but it has to change. Neoliberal economy is in a constant 
state of emergency from which it does not even try to escape. Instead of try-
ing to shelter itself from the emergency, neoliberal economy spontaneously 
organises itself in it.420 This is one of the points where neoliberal economics 
and complexity science converge. To survive in the emergency environment, 
individuals need to assume the functioning logic of the economy (or biology), 
and turn towards the environment instead of trying to protect themselves 
from it. Instead of being seen as single destructive events, disasters are now 
understood as vital for the development of populations.421 Self-organisation 
is not seen to arise despite but because of chaotic circumstances. The vitality 
and dynamism of (biological) life lends efficacy to the neoliberal economy.
An enterprise is by definition an activity that involves willingness to under-
take new ventures and risks to achieve the greatest possible profit. Utility, in 
turn, refers to a measure that is to be maximised in situations involving choice. 
Utility is created by the homo oeconomicus following his or her own interest. 
In liberalism it is the idea of interest that individualises human beings and 
that provides for the singularity of the individual in a way that enables the 
liberal economic, legal, political and moral order.422 Homo oeconomicus draws 
agency from interest and directs activity in such a way that the choices he or 
she makes will maximise his or her utility. In neoliberalism, homo oeconomi-
cus’ utility increases when he or she acquires capacities that give him or her 
an advantage over others in the competition on the market. Doing business 
is always surrounded by the necessity of adapting to changes in the market 
environment. Yet, when adaptation is not only conceived of as a successful 
419  Foucault 2010, 147.
420  Massumi 2009, 176. 
421  Reid 2010, 403. 
422  Lobo-Guerrero 2016, 14-15. 
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way of conducting one’s business, but also becomes the definitive feature of 
being human, it means that one’s relation to oneself, and to others, succumbs 
to the logic of the market. 
For homo oeconomicus, the entrepreneurship of the self entails a never-
ending process of attempting to maximise one’s utility in an environment 
where utility becomes increasingly elusive. Human development thus 
implicitly demands people to accept that their potentialities will never be 
fully realised. There are always more potentialities to be created. Life, thus 
conceived, is a project and a pursuit for something that will never be achieved. 
Unlike sometimes suggested, the subjects of this kind of a development 
project are by no means passive objects. They are not allowed to be such. 
Surviving in the emergency environment demands the active participation 
of every person. When the need for change becomes perceived as something 
that the environment necessitates, there is less need to govern the subjects 
per se. The focus on adjustment in the face of change reverts attention from 
the possibility of acting in ways that contest the ways in which one’s life en-
vironment is changing. When focusing on adaptation, resilience and human 
capital, development channels social and political discontent in such a way 
that it is not threatening to the contemporary neoliberal political economy. 
As a result, human potentiality is realised in ways that imply a political pas-
sivity that accepts and takes for granted the inability to challenge that which 
demands human capital accumulation, adaptation and resilience.
Capability creation and realisation have thus come to function as apolitical 
necessities. Yet, considering the discussion in the previous sections, how can 
there be anything necessary in a contingent world? In The Life of the Mind, 
Hannah Arendt notes that the mind has a way of making whatever exists seem 
like a necessity. Even if what now is reality once was contingency, it presents 
itself to us as necessity.423 With the example of capitalism, Žižek explains how 
a particular order that emerged from contingent origins has reinscribed its 
contingent conditions into a logic that comes to posit its own necessity.424 
As a consequence, the possible and the impossible are distributed in such a 
423  Arendt 1978, 138. 
424  Žižek 2000b, 225.
126 | Suvi Alt: Beyond the Biopolitics of Development
way that, in the domain of personal progress, we are to believe that nothing 
is impossible. In the domain of socio-economic relations, on the contrary, 
we have learned to accept the constraints of necessity.425 With its focus on 
human capital, adaptation and resilience, the contemporary development 
discourse does not challenge this distribution of the possible and the impos-
sible but reinforces it. 
The debate concerning Foucault’s own relationship to neoliberalism has 
also recently rekindled.426 Despite some claims to the contrary, Foucault’s 
alleged turn to (neo)liberalism during the final decade of his life is hardly a 
new discovery. As Vanessa Lemm and Miguel Vatter point out, the idea that 
Foucault became a liberal in the mid-1970s is a recurring legend.427 Still, it 
is difficult to find justification for the contention that Foucault would have 
embraced any type of liberalism in his late work. As Roberto Nigro puts it: 
‘It would be highly misleading to suggest that Foucault’s reading of liberal-
ism was liberal.’428 Furthermore, as Johanna Oksala notes, ‘the only relevant 
question the academic left should be asking regarding Foucault’s analyses of 
neoliberalism is whether they provide us with any useful tools that can be 
successfully deployed against the current neoliberal hegemony.’429 Here the 
crucial point is that, for Foucault, neoliberalism is neither an economic theory 
nor a political ideology. It is rather a rationality or an art of governing human 
beings: a ‘way of doing things’.430 This understanding enables an analysis that 
goes beyond focusing on particular economic policies such as trade liberali-
sation and fiscal discipline. When understood as the reorganisation of the 
private, the social and the political spheres according to the principles of the 
market, neoliberalism is alive and well. 
425  Žižek 2011, 419.
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The Enframing of Capability in Human Development
Alongside the market, another system of knowledge about the human, society 
and nature that claims validity everywhere and for everybody is technology.431 
As President Truman’s speech indicated, after the Second World War, it 
was technology and science that were considered as the primary reasons for 
the superiority of the North, as well as the promise of development for the 
South. Technology was considered to be a neutral tool that could be relatively 
unproblematically transferred and applied to underdeveloped countries. No 
attention was paid to the socio-cultural changes that the introduction of new 
technologies would require. While the transfer of technologies contributed to 
the planetary extension of modernist ideals, it was not considered that such 
a transfer involves factors that create new social and cultural orders that go 
well beyond the transfer of technical elements.432 
In the 1970s it started to become increasingly obvious that the import of 
Western technology to developing countries resulted in the devastation of na-
ture, the destruction of cultures and the creation of large-scale slums.433 Taking 
stock of the developments thus far, Johan Galtung argued in 1979 that ‘the total 
picture is one of transfer of technology as a structural and cultural invasion; 
possibly of much larger significance than colonialism and neo-colonialism, pre-
cisely because it is not necessarily accompanied by any physical personal western 
presence, not even in the form of elites with allegiance to the west.’434 Galtung’s 
cultural and structural problematisation of technology is largely concerned with 
the instrumentalisation and destruction of nature. This instrumentalisation 
dates back to the Industrial Revolution, as a result of which ‘nature’ was con-
ceived of as ‘natural resources’. Nature thus became a storehouse of objectified 
and neutralised materiality that exists for the fulfillment of economic goals.435
431 Sachs 2010, 120. 
432 Escobar 2012, 36. 
433 It should also be noted that throughout the post-World War II period the largest part of Western 
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Heidegger’s critique of technology makes a similar point, but it takes the 
problematisation of technology beyond its cultural and structural aspects. 
In an interesting 1963 interview with a Thai monk Bhikkhu Maha Mani, 
Heidegger briefly addresses the question of technology and development. 
Heidegger picks up on Maha Mani’s reference to Thailand as being ‘underde-
veloped,’ and he notes that ‘I would say that your country, because of its old 
and continuous traditions, is highly developed. The Americans, on the other 
hand, with all their technology and atomic bombs are underdeveloped.’436 ‘If 
one talks about underdevelopment’, Heidegger notes, ‘one always has to ask to 
which end development is thought.’437 It is the technological view of the West 
that renders the rest of the world as ‘underdeveloped’. A year before the inter-
view, Heidegger also noted the following in the lecture “Time and Being”:
Now that modern technology has arranged its expansion and rule over the whole 
of the earth, it is not just the sputniks and their by-products that are circling around 
our planet; it is rather Being as presencing in the sense of calculable material that 
claims all the inhabitants of the earth in a uniform manner without the inhabit-
ants of the non-European continents explicitly knowing this or even being able 
or wanting to know of the origin of this determination of Being. (Evidently those 
who desire such a knowledge least of all are those busy developers who today are 
urging the so-called underdeveloped countries into the realm of hearing of that 
claim of Being which speaks from the innermost core of modern technology).438 
The ‘busy developers’ are thus the handmaidens of the global expansion of 
a technological conception of Being. Despite these interesting remarks and, 
more importantly, the relevance of Heidegger’s critique of technology to 
a critique of development, the relationship between the two has only very 
recently been taken up in a sustained manner.439 Trish Glazebrook and Matt 
Story note that those who have engaged with Heidegger’s thought have largely 
been preoccupied with the accuracy and authenticity of the interpretation of 
436  Heidegger 1963. 
437  Heidegger 1963. 
438  Heidegger 2002b, 7. 
439  See George 2015 and Glazebrook and Story 2015. 
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his works, and the development of the implications of his thinking to various 
contexts and topics has come only relatively recently.440 Siby K. George states 
the matter even more explicitly, noting that now is the time for engaging with 
Heidegger’s thought in a way ‘that does not get bogged down in the insular 
industry of interpretive quagmire that Heidegger research often is.’441 It is 
in this spirit that I also seek to employ his work below and in the following 
chapters. 
As discussed in Chapter 2, for Heidegger, technology designates primarily 
the enframing of reality in such a way that everything that appears is under-
stood as a standing-reserve. The standing-reserve is not even an object for a 
subject.442 It is the generalised availability for ordering of all potentiality. This 
applies to nature and history, to the humans as well as divinities. Heidegger 
complains that the ‘ill-advised’ theology of the day resorts to the results of 
modern atomic physics in order to prove the existence of God, thereby only 
placing even God into the same realm of the orderable as everything else.443 
At the time of writing “The Question Concerning Technology”, Heidegger 
was already in a position to see the ways in which the ordering and instru-
mentalisation of nature was being extended to human beings. However, for 
centuries, this ordering had already been applied to colonised peoples who 
were often conceived of as part of ‘nature’ (i.e. lacking culture), and therefore 
freely available to be used, transformed, distributed and switched about. The 
extension of the ordering of life to ever newer groups of people is an extension 
of the logic that justified expropriation and colonisation. 
Of course, the effects of ‘human resource management’ on contemporary 
late-modern subjects are very different from those experienced by colonised 
peoples at the beginning of modernity and quite often far into late-modernity. 
Such resource-thinking has nevertheless been repackaged and extended to 
postcolonial societies through the ‘capability approach’ to human develop-
ment. The UNDP begins its Human Development Report of 1994 by stating 
440  Glazebrook and Story 2015, 121. 
441  George 2015, ix. 
442  Heidegger 2011a, 225. 
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130 | Suvi Alt: Beyond the Biopolitics of Development
that ‘human beings are born with certain potential capabilities’.444 Developing 
peoples, however, have not yet been able to realise these potential capabilities, 
and development is needed for them to be able to move from the sphere of 
unrealised potential to ‘life that they have reason to value’.445 More recently, 
in the 2014 Human Development Report, the UNDP emphasises that it is 
possible to instil new capabilities in people, and this is even necessary for 
the purpose of addressing vulnerabilities and building resilience in a rapidly 
changing world.446 When life is understood as continually unfolding, the 
capabilities that enable this unfolding become key. Minor as the change may 
appear, it reflects the neoliberalisation of UN development discourse.
The notion of capability which is at the centre of the UNDP’s human de-
velopment framework is defined by Sen as ‘the substantive freedom to achieve 
alternative functioning combinations (or, less formally put, the freedom to 
achieve various lifestyles).’447 In the human development framework, ‘capa-
bility’, i.e., the ontological condition of something being potential, is more 
important than ‘functioning’, i.e., the actual manifestation of a capability’s 
existence. Whereas low income, for example, is only instrumentally signifi-
cant, capability deprivation is ‘intrinsically important’.448 Following this line 
of reasoning, poverty and inequality are defined as capability failure,449 and 
are thereby conceived of primarily in ontological terms. ‘A genuine solution’ 
to development problems, Nussbaum argues, ‘would require addressing the 
capability failures of the vulnerable populations.’450 
Heidegger’s ontological problematisation of the standing-reserve reflects 
the centrality of ‘capabilities’ in human development. What is at stake in the 
contemporary human development framework is the way in which human 
capabilities such as emotions, intelligence and the capacity to relate to others 
are the resources that become enframed as standing-reserve. Human develop-
ment positions human beings in such a way that they come to perceive, under-
444  UNDP 1994, 13. 
445  Sen 1999, 63. 
446  UNDP 2014, 9. 
447  Sen 1999, 75. 
448  Sen 1999, 87. 
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stand and develop themselves as a makeable reserve of capabilities. Nussbaum 
sees the makeability of human beings through the creation of capability and 
choice in such terms. While there can be debate regarding the specificities of 
the framework, the political principles guiding it – liberalism, the creation 
of capability and individual choice – are something that should become the 
object of ‘an overlapping consensus’.451 As it monopolises the truth of being as 
makeability, neoliberalism does not merely encourage economically rational 
conduct but is also a process of ontological violence that enframes all beings 
as standing-reserve.452 It is important to emphasise, however, that the term 
‘standing-reserve’ does not imply human passivity. Rather, it means that the 
actual is revealed as the potential. Capabilities function as the kind of future-
oriented, endless reserve that can be unlocked, transformed and distributed 
in various ways so as to secure the revealing of Being that enframes beings as 
standing-reserve. 
In this vein, Nussbaum argues that because human psychology is malle-
able to intervention, we ought to work on ‘figuring out the psychological 
dispositions that support or impede the realisation of human capabilities.’453 
Nussbaum goes on to say that ‘the normative side (which emotions we ought 
to foster) will come from the political principles themselves, which presum-
ably have already become the object of an overlapping consensus.’454 By these 
political principles she means political liberalism and freedom of choice. Posi-
tive emotions such as compassion and respect are seen as supporting human 
development, whereas negative emotions such as anger and disgust are seen as 
subverting it. According to Nussbaum, our hope of achieving political stability 
depends on the development of a ‘reasonable political psychology’.455 People’s 
psychological dispositions and emotions are to be the object of development 
and ordering so that they will support choice-making and the realisation of 
capabilities, thereby also guaranteeing political stability. Bearing in mind 
451  Nussbaum 2011, 79. 
452  Joronen 2013a, 359. 
453  Nussbaum 2011, 181. 
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that Jean-Luc Nancy calls anger ‘the political sentiment par excellence’,456 the 
political psychology that is seen as supporting human development is also 
a psychology of pacification and depoliticisation. The point that I wish to 
make here, however, is that this biopolitical governance of human psychol-
ogy derives its rationality from the underlying enframing of the real which 
thereby secures its own continuation. 
With the concept of capability, it is no longer only the actions and be-
haviour of the subjects of development that are of interest to development 
practitioners. Rather, it is the ontological constitution of the human that 
becomes the principal site through which he or she is governed. The neoliberal 
ontology of potentiality is based on assuming the existence of subjects with as 
of yet unfulfilled capabilities that need to be realised in order for them to be 
able to live valuables lives. While neoliberal potentiality lacks a predetermined 
aim – neoliberal life is continuously unfolding – the unfolding, the continu-
ous realisation of potentiality and creation of new capabilities, is deemed a 
necessity. The question of how to counter this demand for constant capability 
creation and realisation by thinking ‘potentiality’ in ways that are politically 
more enabling will be tackled in the following chapter. 
Enframing thus forms the ontological conditions of possibility for the pro-
duction of biopoliticised, depoliticised subjectivities who participate in and 
reproduce enframing. Hence, enframing regulates not so much the specific 
ways in which capabilities become manifest in the world but their contribu-
tion to securing the continuation of the calculative ordering of the real. This 
is why the human development framework is capable of including a variety of 
ways of life as long as they do not contest the ontology of becoming that is so 
central to neoliberalism, and on which the framework also relies. Underlying 
human development is an ontology that presupposes the total makeability of 
human beings, which derives its raison d’être from the enframing of the real 
that demands contingency of its subjects while at the same time concealing 
its own contingent ground. Capability is thus an ontological category that 
contributes to solidifying neoliberal forms of governance in international 
politics. Disregarding the ontological presuppositions on which the approach 
456  Nancy 1992, 375-376. See also Sloterdijk 2012c. 
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is based, Nussbaum fails to acknowledge that liberalism, too, is grounded in 
a certain metaphysical tradition. Sen and Nussbaum’s insistence on the uni-
versality of their approach and, therefore, on its applicability everywhere is 
indicative of the need to address the approach as a totalising framework that 
implies a particular way of delimiting the horizon within which beings become 
intelligible. Hence, although Sen and Nussbaum have a deep-seated belief in 
the functioning of the market mechanism, a critique of the human develop-
ment framework cannot be limited to a critique of their ‘market romance’.457 
Heidegger, furthermore, sees enframing as being intimately related to 
liberalism. Contrary to understanding liberalism as a political ideology, for 
Heidegger, it is a comprehensive metaphysical system that is characterised by 
self-certainty, a supposed knowledge of what it means to be a human being.458 
Because of this self-certainty, liberalism claims for itself eternal progress. In 
liberalism, ‘all experiences and accomplishments are carried out merely as an 
expression of a “self-certain life” and are therefore held to be organizable.’459 
Always focusing on the self-certainty of the ‘I’, liberalism is a modern subjectiv-
ism that does not even ask the question of who we are, let alone the question of 
how Being happens. The certainty of the self is thus indicative of the broader 
forgetting of Being in the Western metaphysical tradition. The forgetting of 
the question of Being, furthermore, entails depoliticisation because it fore-
closes the possibility that there could be any radically other ways of being. 
While Heidegger’s critique of liberalism is directed at the modern liberal 
subject for whom other beings are mere objects available for manipulation, 
his notion of standing-reserve anticipates the late-modern neoliberal reduc-
tion of all beings to resources. The essence of technological modernity is thus 
the absolutisation of a particular horizon of disclosure. The problem of the 
neoliberal enframing of Being is not that it is unreal or untrue. – For example, 
it may very well be the case that investments in human capital increase one’s 
competitiveness on the market. – The problem is rather that its conception 
of reality is partial and yet totalising. The biologisation and economisation 
457  See Pupavac 2010. 
458  Heidegger 2012a, 43. 
459  Heidegger 2012a, 43; original emphasis.
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of life in contemporary neoliberal development are thus sustained by the on-
tological monopolisation of a particular horizon of disclosure. The essence of 
poverty – the overflowing of Being – thus remains hidden. The next chapter 
considers reconceptualising contingency and potentiality in ways that are 
politically more enabling than their neoliberal iterations.  
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5. Conceptualising Ontological Politics
The modern problematic of governance and politics is fundamentally embed-
ded in accounts of the life that is their subject. The previous chapter discussed 
the centrality of the ideas of contingency and potentiality to modern biopo-
litical governance in general and to contemporary development policies in 
particular. While the contemporary popularity of the idea of contingency 
is due to its relation to liberal conceptions of freedom, the prevalence of 
potentiality is attributable to the liberal fascination for progress and develop-
ment. In dominant understandings these concepts are perceived as entailing 
various possibilities: Potentiality can be the potentiality for this or that and 
contingency implies a may or may not that likewise, in and of itself, entails 
a multiplicity of options. The concepts of potentiality and contingency are 
easily adopted in a time that embraces flux, change, decentering, hybridity, 
mutations, re-composition, flow and becoming. They resonate with a wide 
spectrum of political and theoretical endeavours ranging from liberal to 
poststructuralist. Furthermore, potentiality and contingency are variably 
discussed as either contributing to neoliberal biopolitical governance or as 
having the effect of enabling resistance to it. In critical discourse, contingency 
has been argued to be both that which facilitates neoliberal governance and 
that which enables politics. Likewise, as the previous chapter showed, human 
potentiality is integral to the functioning of the liberal international order. Yet, 
it is also human potentiality that can arguably have the effect of undermining 
that very same order, bearing within it the source of different ways of life. 
The conditions of possibility for the popularity of potentiality and con-
tingency lie in an understanding of life as mobile and dynamic as well as in a 
conception of the world as being in constant flux. The contemporary situa-
tion can therefore be seen as holding immanent conditions of possibility for 
political engagement as life is not determined by any transcendent principle. 
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Yet, the broad-based consensus on the undecidable and indeterminate nature 
of life has also led to the politics of resistance being increasingly based on the 
same ontology of contingency and potentiality through which neoliberal 
biopolitics operates. By pointing towards the need to retheorise contingency 
and potentiality, this chapter also suggests reconfiguring biopolitical critique. 
Such reconfiguration is needed because, although problematisations that fol-
low Foucault’s analytic of biopolitics are crucial in bringing to light the various 
ways in which contemporary governance operates, it is not possible to move 
beyond those problematisations by merely reaffirming the indeterminacy of 
life as a way of countering the depoliticising effects of neoliberalism. In order 
to follow Foucault’s often cited call to ‘separate out, from the contingency that 
has made us what we are, the possibility of no longer being, doing, or thinking 
what we are, do or think’,460 we, in fact, require a different interpretation of the 
relationship between life and contingency. This involves exploring the pos-
sibilities of ontological alternatives by retheorising, rather than reaffirming, 
the philosophical categories that are most central to contemporary biopolitics. 
Hence, I pursue here a reinterpretation of the concepts of contingency and 
potentiality from an ontological perspective. 
Yet, it should be reminded that engaging with the notion of ontological 
politics does not mean longing for grand narratives or espousing essentiali-
sation. Ontological politics refers rather to the opening up of ontological 
positions, which forms the conditions of possibility for various kinds of 
ontic forms of politics. This means that my intention is not to oppose con-
tingency or potentiality as such, but to critique the way in which they have 
contemporarily been appropriated by neoliberal biopolitics generally, and by 
the biopolitics of development more specifically. Jason Read suggests that, 
ultimately, ‘a political response to neoliberalism must meet it on its terrain, 
that of the production of subjectivity, freedom and possibility.’461 Central as 
potentiality and contingency are to contemporary ways of understanding 
subjectivity, freedom and possibility, it is by retheorising them in ways that 
challenge the neoliberal regime of truth about life that it becomes possible 
460  Foucault 2007a, 114; emphasis added.
461  Read 2009, 36. 
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to think and practice a different life and a different politics. Therefore, in the 
following, I will gesture towards a politics of potentiality and contingency 
that is not limited to dominant ways of understanding their relationship to 
life. I suggest that crucial resources for this can be located in Heidegger’s 
and Agamben’s works, as well as in postcolonial and decolonial thought. 
In discussing the notions of potentiality and contingency, this chapter also 
engages with the problematic relationship between development studies and 
postcolonial thought. Through a juxtaposition of the notions of ‘food security’ 
and ‘food sovereignty’ the chapter shows what such a reconceptualisation 
of contingency and potentiality can mean in the context of development. I 
begin below by making the case for moving beyond the biopolitics of ‘life’.
Towards a Beyond of the Biopolitics of Life
It will be necessary […] to embark on a genealogical inquiry into the term ‘life’. 
This inquiry, we may already state, will demonstrate that ‘life’ is not a medical 
and scientific notion but a philosophical, political and theological concept, and 
that many of the categories of our philosophical tradition must therefore be 
rethought accordingly.462
The conception of life that underpins biopolitics is precisely ‘life’ as a medical 
and scientific notion. The biopolitical logic that has ‘life’ as its referent object 
also expresses a certain understanding of the nature of the real. The character 
of the real associated with contemporary biopolitics is ‘emergence’.463 Con-
temporary biopolitics thus conflates life with species-being, giving rise to an 
account of life as permanent emergence,464 or a ‘permanent state of adaptation’ 
as I suggested in the previous chapter. The notions of capability, potentiality, 
adaptation, resilience and contingency reflect such a conception of life. Fur-
thermore, the intertwinement of biology and economy, so central to liberal-
462  Agamben 1999, 239. 
463  Dillon and Lobo-Guerrero 2008, 267.  
464  Dillon and Lobo-Guerrero 2009, 3.
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ism, is crucial also to the functioning logic of development. The development 
discourse’s conception of life is heavily influenced by the natural sciences as 
well as by a naturalised conception of economics. Changes in the discourse 
of development reflect the changes that are occurring in these sciences. 
As noted earlier, Foucault argues in The Order of Things that ‘life’ is one of 
the notions that have been elevated to the status of a quasi-transcendental in 
the modern period. Foucault’s discussion of ‘life’ is worth quoting at length 
here: 
For life – and this is why it has a radical value in nineteenth-century thought – is 
at the same time the nucleus of being and of non-being: there is being only because 
there is life, and in that fundamental movement that dooms them to death, the 
scattered beings, stable for an instant, are formed, halt, hold life immobile – and 
in a sense kill it – but are then in turn destroyed by that inexhaustible force. The 
experience of life is thus posited as the most general law of beings, the revelation 
of that primitive force on the basis of which they are; it functions as an untamed 
ontology […] In relation to life, beings are no more than transitory figures, and 
the being that they maintain, during the brief period of their existence, is no more 
than their presumption, their will to survive.465 
The conception of life that emerges from modern biology is nothing more than 
a will to survive. Life, thus conceived, contains the force of its own unmaking 
and, more importantly, of its own re-making. In being premised on the aim 
of increasing one’s chances of survival in a given environment, the notions of 
adaptation and resilience also draw on this conception of life as that which 
seeks to survive by remaking itself.  
While the complicity of such notions of life with the depoliticisation 
entailed by biopolitical governance is clear, the vitality of ‘life’ is often also 
proposed as grounding the possibility of a different kind of politics. Kevin 
Grove suggests envisioning ‘an affirmative biopolitics of adaptation’ that 
would mobilise the techniques and rationalities of vulnerability, resilience 
and adaptation for the purpose of alleviating the insecurities produced by 
465  Foucault 1994, 278; emphasis added.
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neoliberalism.466 While he does not fully explicate what such an affirmative 
biopolitics of adaptation would entail, Grove suggests that it is enabled by 
‘the excess of life’ that confounds attempts to govern the future.467 Indeed, 
recent years have seen the emergence of discourses of ‘affirmative biopolitics’, 
the purpose of which is to move beyond the negativity in which much of 
previous biopolitical critique appears to be embedded. While not forming 
a consistent body of thought, a characteristic feature of these perspectives is 
that they seek to ground the affirmative political potential of (human) beings 
on the properties of life that also make those beings vulnerable to biopolitical 
governance. 
According to Roberto Esposito, ‘what men have in common, what makes 
them more like each other than anything else, is their generalized capacity 
to be killed: the fact that anyone can be killed by anyone else.’468 This leads 
to the modern solution of immunising the community against an external 
(or internal) threat. As an alternative to the inevitably violent and exclusion-
ary process of immunisation, Esposito proposes a biopolitics based on the 
affirmation of shared vulnerability. Esposito makes clear that the alternative 
community put forward in his affirmative biopolitics ‘doesn’t keep us warm, 
and it doesn’t protect us; on the contrary, it exposes us to the most extreme 
risks: that of losing, along with our individuality, the borders that guarantee 
its inviolability with respect to the other.’469 Esposito’s affirmative biopolitics 
is based on common vulnerability that recognises and accepts the inherently 
risky nature of ‘life’.
Likewise, for Judith Butler, our shared precariousness is the condition 
that should ground affirmative politics. Butler suggests ‘reimagining the pos-
sibility of community on the basis of vulnerability and loss.’470 Such loss and 
vulnerability, Butler says, ‘follow from our being socially constituted bodies, 
attached to others, at risk of losing those attachments, exposed to others, at 
466  Grove 2014, 207. 
467  Grove 2014, 207. 
468  Esposito 2010, 13. 
469  Esposito 2010, 140. 
470  Butler 2006, 20. 
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risk of violence by virtue of that exposure.’471 For Butler, it is the universal 
precariousness and mortality of life that should be recognised as the ethical 
basis of politics. However, Jodi Dean points out that this only leads Butler 
to an ethics without any politics.472 Janell Watson likewise offers a pointed 
critique of Butler’s and Esposito’s recourse to vulnerability and precariousness 
as the grounds of affirmative biopolitics. While Esposito’s concepts are more 
explicitly biological, as Watson notes, Butler has a much more ambivalent 
relationship to biology: for Butler, bodies need to be understood in terms 
of the sociality that produces them.473 Nevertheless, both are concerned 
with dissolving the individual into common vulnerability. For Butler, such 
vulnerability is inherent to sociality, whereas for Esposito it is inherent to 
the shared flesh of the world. 
The contemporary meaning of the resurrection of the flesh, Esposito 
argues, ‘cannot be the body inhabited by the spirit, but the flesh as such: a 
being that is both singular and communal, generic and specific, and undif-
ferentiated and different, not only devoid of spirit, but a flesh that doesn’t 
even have a body.’474 No body, no spirit, only shared flesh. Watson points out 
that Esposito’s notion of shared world flesh overlooks the differentiations 
imposed by the unequal distribution of precarity: ‘To state the obvious, some 
bodies suffer much more than others. Will the recognition that all share the 
same world flesh actually help those who suffer?’475 In the end, even if Butler’s 
and Esposito’s affirmative biopolitics manage ‘to launch a politics of life, the 
politics of precariousness risks falling into the same systemic naturalism cham-
pioned by neoliberalism.’476 Thus, it does not appear plausible that a beyond 
of neoliberal biopolitics could be located in an affirmative biopolitics which is 
premised on precariousness and vulnerability – whether biological or social. 
Yet another kind of affirmative biopolitics is formulated by Vanessa Lemm, 
for whom it is a ‘project of cultivating inherently singular, nontotalizable 
471  Butler 2006, 20. 
472  Dean 2009, 124. 
473  Watson 2012. 
474  Esposito 2008, 167. 
475  Watson 2012. 
476  Watson 2012. 
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forms of animal life.’477 Lemm understands the Foucauldian notion of biopoli-
tics as ‘a politics of domination over the human being’s animal life.’478 Yet, she 
suggests that it is precisely this animal life where an alternative, affirmative 
biopolitics that would resist the civilising and normalising objective of nega-
tive biopolitics is to be sought. Through Nietzsche’s philosophy, Lemm argues 
for the vitality of animal life as a source of resistance to negative biopolitics. 
Elsewhere, Lemm also emphasises the animality of the ancient Cynics, who 
are Foucault’s chosen example of truth-telling subjects. Animality, as under-
stood by Lemm, brings forth its own bios, a form of life that is not imposed 
on nature and does not attempt to exclude it, but rather finds its model of 
existence entirely in zoē.479 A further closely related avenue of pursuing what 
might be referred to as affirmative biopolitics is based on notions of élan 
vital, drawing on the works of Gilles Deleuze and Henri Bergson. Such no-
tions presuppose an ontology that is premised on the endless becoming of 
life, and the possibility of politics is understood as being grounded on such 
infinite becoming. Yet, the metaphysical idea of totality is not overcome by 
such vitalism. Instead, the celebration of infinite becoming forces all events 
under a unitary ontology and thus there is nothing inherently radical about 
the idea of life’s perpetual becoming.480 A life that is always becoming is just 
as metaphysical as a life that always is. 
Although offering different accounts of the character of life, Esposito, But-
ler and Lemm implicitly agree that it is the same notion of ‘life’ that grounds 
both attempts to govern it biopolitically and enables a different kind of af-
firmative biopolitics. As was noted above, biopolitics is not simply a form of 
politics that has life as its object. Rather, the specificity of biopolitics lies in 
that its techniques are intrinsic to life. Rejecting vitalist readings of biopolitics, 
Maria Muhle argues that there can be no vitality that would be external to 
strategies of biopower.481 While Esposito and others seek to think an affirma-
tive biopolitics starting from the conception of life that animates biopolitics, 
477  Lemm 2009, 152. 
478  Lemm 2009, 153. 
479  Lemm 2014, 221; original emphasis. 
480  See Prozorov 2014a, 68 and Joronen 2013b, 628.
481  Muhle 2014, 93. 
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Heidegger can be fruitful for thinking beyond biopolitics precisely because 
he is not limited by biologised conceptions of life. Indeed, Heidegger asks:
But must there be “biology,” since it derives its justification and its necessity from 
the sovereignty of science within modern machination? Will not every biology 
necessarily destroy “living beings” and thwart a fundamental relation to them? 
Must this relation not be sought completely outside of “science”? In what space 
should this relation abide?482 
The above discussed thinkers would likely respond to Heidegger that natural 
life, animal life or ‘flesh’ is such that it can never be completely captured by 
a ‘science’. Yet, the direction that I would like to explore is somewhat differ-
ent. Dillon and Lobo-Guerrero note that thinkers such as Jacques Derrida, 
Emmanuel Levinas, Georges Bataille, Jacques Rancière, Nancy and Agamben 
all gesture towards ‘a discourse of being which is not confined to life.’483 – All 
of them, one might add, are to varying degrees influenced by Heidegger’s 
thought. – In different ways they object to the biological and economic ways 
in which life is valued within modernity. The idea that there is an excess life 
that is not exhausted in accounts of what it is to be a living thing is central to 
all of these thinkers. Along these lines, Lobo-Guerrero proposes a distinction 
between ‘capable life’ and ‘potential life’, where the former is understood as a 
life provided with certain properties and qualities that are expected to mate-
rialise and which can be projected into the future, whereas the latter is that 
which is marked by indeterminate possibility.484 Central to Lobo-Guerrero’s 
argument is that potential life cannot be anticipated and, therefore, it is 
beyond the reach of biopolitical strategies. ‘Whereas the rationality of life 
as capability entails a fixed ontology, an expectation of traceable origins […], 
the ontology of a rationality of life as potential is of continuous emergence’, 
Lobo-Guerrero explains.485 
482  Heidegger 2012a, 217.
483  Dillon and Lobo-Guerrero 2009, 3. 
484  Lobo-Guerrero 2016, 9. 
485  Lobo-Guerrero 2016, 9-10.
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Yet, Dillon and Lobo-Guerrero importantly note that ‘an ontology of ex-
cess’ still ‘remains sequestered in the very species-thinking so otherwise hostile 
to that which resists species-thinking, in that the logic of species-thinking 
ultimately exceeds the classification, biologisation and valuation which com-
prises it.’486 Thus, the thought of an excess, of becoming or of emergence does 
not necessarily challenge the biopolitical imaginary because ontologically the 
idea of an excess is constitutive of species-thinking. Nevertheless, engage-
ments with the question of how to challenge or move beyond biopolitics in 
one way or another revolve around the question of how to understand the 
relationship between natural life (zoē) and life with form (bios) in a way that 
is politically enabling. I explore this question below through the notions of 
contingency and potentiality. 
Contingency beyond Neoliberalism
The French Revolution gave expression to the idea that truth is created rather 
than found.487 Instead of being of a transcendent origin, truth is made in the 
human world. The ontological proposition of contingency has thus been 
necessary for a modern account of freedom from transcendental rule.488 
Contingency is a precondition for liberal freedom. The contemporary im-
portance of contingency is also founded on its association with the biopoliti-
cal imaginary. As discussed in the previous chapter, contingency is not one 
property of emergent life; it is the property of emergent life.489 Furthermore, 
Foucauldian conceptions of power are also based on an understanding of both 
the origins and nature of power as contingent. Recognising the contingency 
of all forms of social and political order is arguably one of the core tenets of 
different forms of poststructuralist thinking. Likewise, poststructuralism has 
contributed to politics an understanding of humans as beings produced by 
contingent histories, events and practices. Foucauldian analyses of ourselves 
486  Dillon and Lobo-Guerrero 2009, 7. 
487  Rorty 1989, 3. 
488  Dillon and Reid 2009, 82. 
489  Dillon and Lobo-Guerrero 2009, 14.
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as historically determined beings are directed at ‘the contemporary limits of 
the necessary’, thus exposing the contingency of such truths and practices 
that produce subjects.490 
Contingency is put forward as a precondition for politics in the works of 
a number of contemporary thinkers including William Connolly, Jacques 
Rancière and Michael Shapiro. Appreciation of our own contingency and 
of our indebtedness to difference provides, for Connolly, a way of counter-
ing dogmatic identities and thus functions as the basis of his account of a 
pluralistic democratic ethos.491 Likewise, Shapiro affirms the possibility of ‘a 
contingency-embracing order where new relations, based on de-identification 
with old imposed essences, can flourish.’492 For Rancière, democracy refers to 
the institution of politics as the system through which any order of distribu-
tion of bodies is ‘thrown back on its contingency.’493 According to Robert 
Nichols, a free relation to the world means ‘being attuned to the contingency 
and indeterminacy of world-disclosure, which, in turn, means accepting that 
“we” (our selfhood) are beholden to this contingency – that we are contin-
gent beings who are “held” by ontological freedom.’494 The effectiveness of 
the political is arguably manifested wherever the necessity of subjectivities, 
relations and systems of governance is exposed as a fiction and replaced with 
a recognition of contingency as the formative principle of the political. The 
biopolitical problematisations of various practices and rationalities pertaining 
to ‘life’ that have proliferated within the past decade are also intimately tied 
to the concept of contingency. According to Thomas Lemke, the primary aim 
of an analytics of biopolitics is to reveal the contingency of the rationalities 
on which biopolitical governance is based.495 Biopolitical analysis ought to, 
therefore, be concerned with exposing contingency where none appears to 
exist. But how can this construction of contingency as the site of the political 
delineate itself from the neoliberal governing that relies on contingency for 
490  Foucault 2007a, 110-114. 
491  Connolly 1995, 26-27. 
492  Shapiro 2008, 216. 
493  Rancière 1999, 101. 
494  Nichols 2014, 71. 
495  Lemke 2011, 122. 
5. Conceptualising Ontological Politics | 145
its very functioning? This question is often left unaddressed by those pursu-
ing biopolitical analysis. 
As contingency appears to have become the principal characteristic of 
neoliberal life and the primary site through which it is governed, how can 
we think of a politics that is capable of challenging such ‘governing through 
contingency’ without resorting to pre-conceived transcendental truths or 
simply settling for the existing ontology? If the referent of biopolitical govern-
ance is, indeed, no longer the human but contingency, then the challenge to 
biopolitical governance has to either come from within that contingency or 
give its own account of the relation between life and contingency. Politics that 
is internal to neoliberal contingency will perceive contingency as the price that 
is to be paid for freedom. The search for ways of being governed differently 
is arguably possible because all systems of governance are contingent, except, 
of course, for the governance implied by the neoliberal conception of life as 
contingent. Put differently, life is free to become anything but the ontology 
of becoming cannot be questioned. 
While ontological contingency implies an epistemological crisis for neo-
liberal governance, for neoliberal governance to continue thriving, it does 
not need to escape this epistemological crisis. It only needs to govern it to a 
sufficient degree.496 Hence, instead of conceptualising resistance to governing 
through contingency by looking for ways of evading techniques of prediction 
– important as these too may be – this chapter proceeds from the premise that 
an effective account of the political will be one that addresses the ontological 
proposition of contingency. What is needed, therefore, is an ontological crisis. 
Yet, this cannot be a crisis of subjectivity – for the neoliberal subject lives a 
life of continuous crisis anyway – but a crisis of the neoliberal ordering of the 
real. If one takes seriously the ontological proposition of life’s contingency 
as the formative principle of neoliberal governance, politics will need to do 
more than settle for the freedom afforded by the infinite indeterminacy of 
life. Thus, by retheorising the ways in which contingency can be thought of 
as a political category, it may also be possible to broaden the scope within 
which to pursue biopolitical critique, or within which to conceive of a be-
496  Dillon and Lobo-Guerrero 2009, 14.
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yond of the biopolitical. I suggest that the notion of ontological difference 
can be useful here. 
In Politics of Security, Dillon notes that ontological difference is ‘the very 
thought that re-opens the question of the political.’497 The distinction between 
beings and Being is Heidegger’s way of drawing attention to the metaphysical 
forgetting of Being in the Western tradition of thought. More specifically, 
metaphysics entails the forgetting of the indeterminacy of Being. Even though 
metaphysics may concern itself with Being, it ends up elevating one particular 
horizon of disclosure to the status of the only possible one.498 Metaphysics 
puts us in an unfree relation to the world not because its interpretation of 
reality is incorrect but because it is totalising.499 This point was made in the 
previous chapter in relation to the ontology of potentiality and contingency 
underlying human development. Yet, development discourse will argue that 
it is not totalising at all. Its whole purpose is to advance freedom and choice 
for everyone. However, capability-creating, choosing beings are nevertheless 
not allowed to choose the conditions within which choice is to happen. The 
realm of individual possibility can be extended infinitely, but only within the 
framework of (neo)liberalism. 
While openness to the contingency that constitutes us is embraced both 
in neoliberalism and in much of the critique of biopolitics, on the contrary, 
according to Reza Negarestani, our relation to contingency cannot be based 
on being open to contingency because such openness is always determined 
by our capacities for interaction within that openness, and thus such open-
ness can only be a liberal illusion.500 It is the operating principle of neoliberal 
biopolitics that life is open, interconnected and relational. While neoliberal 
biopolitics demands its subjects to be open to risk, to the environment and to 
connections, it denies them of any way of determining that which cannot be 
altered. In logic, quite tellingly, the contingent is necessarily neither true nor 
false but can have its truth value changed by that which surrounds it. The con-
tingent is always dependent on facts outside of it and, therefore, a contingent 
497  Dillon 1996, 32. 
498  Young 2002, 29. 
499  Nichols 2014, 75. 
500  Negarestani 2011, 13. 
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subject possesses no truth of its own. Negarestani juxtaposes such neoliberal 
openness with a radical openness that cannot be realised through a subjective 
desire to be open. Hence, radical openness does not entail a cancellation of 
closure because it is not directed against closure as such, but against the mode 
of openness that, within the parameters of liberalism, is intrinsically tied to 
survival.501 Instead of attempting to survive by opening oneself toward the 
contingent outside, and thereby becoming contingent oneself, Negarestani 
suggests closure as a way of realising a more radical kind of openness.502
Negarestani’s discussion of a closure that realises radical openness echoes 
Heidegger’s account of the moment that opens up the ‘abyss’ (Abgrund) of 
Being. The abyss is the staying away of the ground, the fullness of what is yet 
undecided.503 The Abgrund is the condition of possibility for the constitu-
tion of all ontologies.504 The Heideggerian abyss is thus essentially radical 
contingency. Yet, such radical contingency differs from the contingency 
entailed by neoliberalism in that the neoliberal enframing of the real de-
mands contingency of its subjects while at the same time concealing its own 
contingent ground. While propounding the contingency of subjectivity is 
hardly sufficient to counter governance that operates by demanding that very 
contingency of its subjects, what needs to be revealed is the contingency of 
the real that discloses beings in such a way. Each mode of being necessarily 
involves the concealment of other modes of being. Yet, enframing conceals 
not only other forms of being but also concealing as such. The concealment 
of concealment amounts to the oblivion of Being and thus, of the Abgrund 
that could provide the (groundless) ground for new ways of being. The elusive 
essence of poverty is this groundless ground. 
The radical contingency of the abyss is therefore the kind of contingency 
that should be affirmed. However, beings can never dwell in the abyss. While 
the radical contingency of the groundless ground is that which allows for the 
constitution of all ontologies, the effectiveness of any given politics is always 
historical and context-specific. In a situation where the political is colonised 
501  Negarestani 2008, 196-197.
502  Negarestani 2011, 15. 
503  Heidegger 2012a, 299-302.
504  See Joronen 2013a, 364.
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by dogmatic and exclusionary identities, being complicit with radical con-
tingency demands exposing the historical constitution and – indeed – the 
contingency of those identities. But within contemporary neoliberalism, to be 
complicit with radical contingency through closure can be understood as the 
opening of the abyss precisely through a refusal of the management of one’s 
life in ways that make one’s very being thoroughly contingent. Ontological 
politics is thus to be understood as a historically sensitive approach where 
there is always an ontico-ontological point of articulation. In order to get 
beyond the tendency to simply valorise all contingency, a politically more 
enabling view ought to draw attention to the interplay between necessity 
and contingency, closure and opening. Politics is not something that happens 
through as much openness as possible, but requires a certain amount of closure 
on the part of the political subject. While recognising the contingent nature 
of the political – the radical contingency of the abyss – a political being has 
to transcend the contingency of his or her subjectivity in order to resist the 
ways in which governance operates on him or her. 
Form-of-Life: On Eating and Speaking
Agamben argues that the struggle over Being is conducted on the level of 
modal categories – possibility, impossibility, contingency and necessity. Ac-
cording to Agamben, ‘Being gives itself in modalities’, and the subject is created 
in the interaction of these categories of modality.505 Instead of considering 
them as logical or epistemological categories that concern the structure of 
propositions or our faculty of knowledge, Agamben understands modalities 
as ontological operators that shape subjectivity. Hence, politics needs to entail 
a rethinking of these categories. Agamben defines them in the following way:
possibility (to be able to be) and contingency (to be able not to be) are the opera-
tors of subjectification, the point in which something possible passes into exist-
ence […] Impossibility, as negation of possibility (not [to be able]), and necessity, 
505  Agamben 2002a, 147. 
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as the negation of contingency (not [to be able not to be]) are the operators of 
desubjectification, of the destruction and destitution of the subject.506
In defining contingency as ‘to be able not to be’, Agamben introduces con-
tingency as a mechanism that, through negation, constitutes the subject’s 
potentiality for action. This is a very different conception of contingency than 
that offered by contemporary accounts of the uncertainty of life. Understood 
as the ability ‘not to’, contingency is, for Agamben, a step towards being that 
finally is able to ‘not not-be’. Such a form of being is able to escape the terms 
of debate that underlie liberal accounts of freedom. It is not freedom from 
or freedom for, but life that can not be (un)free. It can simply be its mode of 
being. Such a life is fundamentally affirmative rather than negative or reactive. 
Agamben calls this kind of being ‘whatever’. Yet, ‘whatever’ does not mean 
being such that nothing matters. On the contrary, it means ‘being such that 
it always matters’.507 For both Negarestani and Agamben, the radical potential 
of contingency lies in understanding it as a mechanism that enables both the 
coming of the new and the agency of those it befalls; agency that is not to be 
conceived of in terms of mere adaptation to change. Through such an alter-
native rendering of contingency, it becomes possible to think beyond such 
biopolitical problematisations that offer as politics or resistance the same on-
tology of contingency on which neoliberal governance is based. Nevertheless, 
metaphysics is not a problem that can be solved once and for all, but rather 
something to work against in specific instances of entrapment.508 ‘There can 
be no “wholesale” transcendence of a historically inherited field or space of 
opening, only a creative appropriation that realises latent possibilities and, 
in so doing, simultaneously fulfils and exceeds that field’, Nichols argues.509 
Agamben’s above quote appears, however, to simplify the subject’s rela-
tionship to contingency and necessity. Necessity need not be a historical 
or a structural necessity that destroys and desubjectifies the subject. While 
Agamben opposes contingency to necessity in the quote above, it appears that 
506  Agamben 2002a, 147. 
507  Agamben 1993, 1. 
508  Nichols 2014, 78.
509  Nichols 2014, 84. 
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what he means by ‘whatever’ is beyond such a distinction. For the subject, its 
own being as being thus is not only the experience of being able not to but 
also the experience of not being able not to. Whatever beings inhabit both 
contingency and necessity in that they are able to refuse that which does not 
conform to their being while also being inseparable from their being in such 
a way that in each moment they could not be otherwise. Agamben refers to 
such being as a ‘form-of-life’, which is ‘a life for which, in its way of living, 
what is at stake is living itself, and, in its living, what is at stake above all else 
is its mode of living.’510 Whereas bare life is a life that has been separated from 
its form, and adaptable life is a life reduced to its biological will to survive, 
form-of-life is a life where living cannot be separated from a way of living; 
where the natural cannot be distinguished from the spiritual. 
Judith Revel blames Agamben for ‘biologising’ life with his concept of bare 
life.511 Yet, her own suggestion for an affirmative biopolitics is not far from 
Agamben’s notion of a form-of-life. Revel proposes a politics where ‘life’ is 
entirely understood as bios, as thoroughly produced by the sociality of differ-
ential singularities. For Revel, such forms of being are excessive in relation to 
apparatuses of power. ‘Where power administers life’, Revel argues, there is ‘a 
simultaneously ontological and political strategy of resistance: a creation, an 
augmentation of being.’512 In a recent text, Agamben explains that form-of-life 
is not a question of thinking a better or more authentic form of life, a superior 
principle or an elsewhere, which arrives from outside the forms of life and the 
factical vocations to revoke and render them inoperative. Inoperativity is not 
another work that appears to works from out of nowhere to deactivate and depose 
them: it coincides completely and constitutively with their destitution, with living 
a life. And this destitution is the coming politics.513 
According to Agamben, the constitution of a form-of-life coincides exactly 
with the destitution of the social and biological conditions into which life 
510  Agamben 2014, 73. 
511  Revel 2014, 121. 
512  Revel 2014, 123. 
513  Agamben 2014, 74; original emphasis.
5. Conceptualising Ontological Politics | 151
has been thrown.514 This is not a matter of denying the biological as such. A 
beyond of biopolitics cannot take place by simply rejecting the biological. A 
form-of-life does not negate or devalue zoē, but neither does it valorise it as 
the sole ground of politics. 
At this point it is useful to remember that colonialism was responsible for 
implanting Western conceptions of nature and culture in the colonies. Colo-
niality imposed its particular separation between zoē and bios on colonised 
peoples. Mignolo shows how the Andean indigenous peoples of Quechua 
and Aymara have a conception of Pachamama (the human relationship with 
life) that rejected – and still rejects today – a separation between nature and 
culture.515 For them, culture is nature and nature is culture. Mario Blaser dis-
cusses the same point in relation to the indigenous people of Yshiro in Chaco 
(an area spanning parts of Paraguay, Bolivia, Argentina and Brazil).516 Similar 
examples can be drawn from indigenous cultures from around the world. By 
and large, colonial culture refused or was unable to recognise indigenous 
peoples’ bios, instead concluding that the native peoples had no culture. In 
early development discourse, it was recognised that the so-called underde-
veloped peoples had cultures, but they were simply not fully developed yet. 
Contemporary development, in turn, recognises and embraces the plurality 
of cultures, however this embrace often amounts to appropriation rather than 
genuine respect for diversity. 
While coloniality and development are responsible for imposing modern 
conceptions of nature and culture on developing peoples, another way of 
engaging with the relationship between zoē and bios is through the difference 
between postcolonial thought and development studies. Christine Sylvester 
argues that there is a disconnect between postcolonial studies’ concern with 
the question ‘can the subaltern speak’ and development studies’ interest in 
whether the subaltern can eat. According to Sylvester, in postcolonial stud-
ies, the question of how coloniality and postcoloniality affect the way people 
think of themselves is at least seemingly more important than whether peo-
514  Agamben 2014, 74. 
515  Mignolo 2011. 
516  Blaser 2010. 
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ple have enough to eat.517 Conversely, development studies is arguably only 
concerned with the material conditions that sustain ‘life’.
Although postcolonial and decolonial thinking had existed for decades in 
colonised countries, ‘postcolonialism’ entered the US and European academia 
at the same time as ‘postmodernism’, and the latter was a heavy influence on 
the former.518 Much of early postcolonial critique focused on literary criticism, 
and it has faced the same kinds of critique as poststructuralism for being too 
abstract and dealing ‘merely’ with discourse. Conversely, development studies 
has largely failed to see many of the reasons why development is problematic 
– reasons which have been discussed in this dissertation thus far. Concerned 
mainly with economic growth and the factors that enable it, development 
studies has disregarded the voices of the people that are being developed. For 
much of its history, development has been primarily interested in zoē, the 
natural life of the living, expressed at the end of the day in the question of 
eating. Postcolonial thought, on the contrary, has concerned itself with the bios 
of postcolonial peoples and the ways in which their speaking has functioned 
to resist different forms of colonialism/coloniality. While this dichotomy is 
of course a simplification, it helps to consider the kinds of issues that are at 
play. It also helps to consider Agamben’s notion of form-of-life in the con-
text of development as a life where living cannot be separated from a way of 
living, where eating cannot be separated from speaking. In other words, we 
can think of being beyond biopolitics as a form of existence that is capable 
of transcending the separation between zoē and bios. Neither by elevating zoē 
to the principle of politics, nor by imagining a form of politics that disregards 
the very real material concerns that people in postcolonial societies have. I 
discuss this relationship in the remainder of this chapter through notions of 
potentiality, security and sovereignty in the context of development policies 
concerned with food and hunger. 
517 Sylvester 1999, 715. 
518 According to Mignolo, decolonial thinking originated in the works of Afro and Afro-Caribbean 
activists and intellectuals, whereas postcolonial thinking emerged from the experience of decolo-
nisation of British India, Egypt and Palestine. ‘Both walk in the same direction, following different 
paths,’ he argues. See Mignolo 2011, 55.  
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Potentiality beyond Neoliberalism
Liberal potentiality refers to capabilities for increasing one’s knowledge, 
freedom and abilities as well as contribution to the creation of economic 
growth. Yet, because of its undecidable nature, there is no way of knowing 
what direction the emergence of this potentiality will take. Brad Evans calls 
this the ‘liberal paradox of potentiality’.519 Because potentiality is radically 
undecidable, it may or may not contribute to neoliberal governance. It can 
go either way. While it does not seem desirable to get beyond the underlying 
indeterminacy of Being – the radical contingency of the abyss – a politically 
more enabling understanding of potentiality might look for those moments 
where that undecidability gives way to a form of being that exceeds it. To 
think being beyond the liberal paradox of potentiality is not an attempt to 
fix a determinacy, certainty or a telos but an attempt to seek an understanding 
of potentiality that allows for transcending its undecidability. 
Throughout his work, Agamben has suggested that the form-of-life capable 
of countering contemporary forms of governance has to be one that is based 
on potentiality that exceeds actualisation. For Agamben, pure potentiality 
is in relation to actuality by being its suspended form.520 Understanding 
potentiality in these terms does not entail a denial or a refusal of actuality. 
Rather, it means that although potentiality may realise itself in actuality, it 
does not disappear in the actuality but preserves itself in it.521 In Heideggerian 
terms, this means that the revealing of a particular actuality conceals other 
potentialities but it does not obliterate them. The preservation of the excess 
of potentiality restores possibilities for being otherwise. Potentiality thus con-
ceived has no telos, the realisation of which would exhaust it. There is no end 
to potentiality. Agamben’s account of potentiality owes much to Heidegger, 
according to whom there is always that which ‘’resides’ prior to the ‘activity’ 
and reaches beyond the activity.’522 This realm that is both prior and beyond 
is potentiality. The situation of meaningful action cannot be calculated in 
519  Evans 2013, 73. 
520  Agamben 1998, 45. 
521  Agamben 1999, 183.
522  Heidegger 2012a, 81. 
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advance but becomes actualised ‘in a free resolving which has not been de-
termined beforehand but is open to the possibility of such determination.’523 
Because potentiality is not exhausted in any telos, there always remains the 
possibility of another Being, another life and another politics. 
While the preservation of excess potentiality is that which enables the 
being otherwise of every being, this formulation alone is insufficient for 
challenging the contemporary biopolitical account of potentiality which, 
as discussed above and in the previous chapter, is also premised on the idea 
of the infinitely evolving nature of potentiality. Hence, potentiality without 
an end needs to be qualified with a recognition of the relation between 
potentiality and impotentiality. For Agamben, ‘to be potential means: to be 
one’s own lack, to be in relation to one’s own incapacity. Beings that exist in 
the mode of potentiality are capable of their own impotentiality.’524 Such a 
formulation of potentiality does not entail a celebration of life’s incapacities. 
Rather, being capable of impotentiality means being capable of not doing 
something. Reformulating Deleuze, Agamben argues that contemporary 
governance operates primarily by separating people from what they can not 
do. Separated from their impotentiality, people are incapable of seeing that 
which they cannot do, adopting instead the liberal fiction that they can be and 
do anything, thus assuming the flexibility that the market requires of them.525 
In order to overcome such governance, Agamben returns to a line by Aris-
totle, according to which, ‘every potentiality is simultaneously the potentiality 
of the negation of what it is the potentiality of.’526 As far as contemporary 
politics – and contemporary conceptions of life – focus on activity and ac-
tualisation, they dismiss this other side of potentiality. Whereas neoliberal 
biopolitics inscribes on the subject a conception of life that makes it into 
a project and an enterprise, this retheorisation of potentiality enables the 
subject to see what, within the parameters of such neoliberal biopolitics, he 
or she cannot do. Yet, this simultaneously amounts to a ‘can not do,’ an abil-
ity and a freedom not to that enables the subject (not) to act. ‘It is only the 
523  Heidegger 1962, 355 [307].
524  Agamben 1999, 182; original emphasis. 
525  Agamben 2011, 44-45.
526  Aristotle 2004, 275. 
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lucid vision of what we cannot, or can not, do that gives consistency to our 
actions.’527 Action, therefore, is meaningful only insofar as it arises out of a 
possibility not to act. 
Agamben begins his essay “On Potentiality” with an example of the ex-
perience of potentiality that is very far from the accounts of passivity often 
associated with his work. He refers to the Russian poet Anna Akhmatova’s 
description of her experiences in the 1930s Leningrad where she had been 
standing outside a prison, waiting for news of her son who had been arrested 
for political reasons. Distressed by the situation, another woman outside the 
prison had asked her ‘Can you describe this?’ and Akhmatova had replied 
‘Yes, I can.’528 Agamben argues that:
For everyone a moment comes in which she or he must utter this “I can,” which 
does not refer to any certainty or specific capacity but is, nevertheless, absolutely 
demanding. Beyond all faculties, this “I can” does not mean anything – yet it marks 
what is, for each of us, perhaps the hardest and bitterest experience possible: the 
experience of potentiality.529   
It is only through an experience of the possibility not to do that doing becomes 
significant. Thus, the hardest thing is not the experience of the nothing but 
letting something from this nothing be.530 This is neither an experience of 
contingency nor of necessity, but rather that of exigency. This moment that 
is absolutely demanding is the Augenblick that will be discussed in the next 
chapter. 
Freedom, then, implies a form-of-life ‘in which the single ways, acts, and 
processes of living are never simply facts but always and above all possibilities 
of life.’531 Yet, Agamben does not remain confined to the neoliberal under-
standing of the contingent and adaptive subject that lives a life of supposedly 
infinite possibilities. Instead, he understands potentiality as ‘that through 
527  Agamben 2011, 45.
528  Akhmatova 2009, 87.
529  Agamben 1999, 178. 
530  Agamben 1999, 253. 
531  Agamben 2000, 4; original emphasis.
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which Being founds itself sovereignly.’532 Unlike often suggested, Agamben is 
not opposed to sovereignty as such, but against the ways in which processes 
of (de)subjectification capture sovereignty from the free use of beings. A 
potential being, then, is one that reappropriates the sovereignty of the appa-
ratuses that capture its potentiality. For Agamben, ‘an act is sovereign when 
it realises itself by simply taking away its own potentiality not to be, letting 
itself be, giving itself to itself.’533 What is needed, therefore, is not the infinite 
suspension of action so as to remain within the sphere of pure potentiality 
but, likewise, sovereign acts that interfere in processes of (de)subjectification. 
I discuss below an example of such interference.
From Food Security to Food Sovereignty
I think it could be plausibly argued that changes of diet are more important than 
changes of dynasty or even of religion.534 
The UN, the IMF, the World Bank and other development organisations 
generally discuss problems of hunger and malnutrition under the rubric of 
‘food security’. According to a definition by the World Bank, food security 
means the ‘access of all people at all times to enough food for an active, healthy 
life.’535 The notion of food security has been central in attempts to achieve the 
first of the Millennium Development Goals: eradicating extreme poverty and 
hunger. According to the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United 
Nations (FAO), food security consists of four pillars: availability, access, uti-
lisation and stability.536 This four-pronged constitution of food security has 
been accepted across institutions. ‘Availability’ refers to the sufficient supply 
of food. ‘Access’ refers to people’s ability to purchase or produce enough food 
for their needs. ‘Utilisation’ is concerned with people’s ability to absorb nu-
532  Agamben 1998, 46. 
533  Agamben 1998, 46. 
534  Orwell 1937, 46. 
535  World Bank 1986, v. 
536  FAO 2008. 
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trients from the food they eat, and ‘stability’, in turn, concerns the potential 
risks that may affect the first three pillars negatively.537
The policies aimed at ensuring food security as defined above that are 
pursued by the World Bank and the IMF are based on the marketisation of 
agriculture, the privatisation of land and trade liberalisation. Food security 
is perhaps the area of contemporary development policy where the presence 
and interests of private companies are most pronounced. At the beginning 
of the Obama presidency, the US launched a global food security initiative 
‘Feed the Future’. The Feed the Future programme is based on close coopera-
tion with companies such as the multinational biotechnology corporation 
Monsanto. USAID Administrator Rajiv Shah sees the role of USAID as 
that of ‘creating synergies between the public and private sectors to meet 
the global food security challenge.’538 In 2011, Shah met with the CEOs of 
Unilever and Monsanto at the World Economic Forum in Davos to launch 
a new global framework titled ‘Realising a New Vision for Agriculture’. The 
operating principles of the New Vision for Agriculture are:
•	 Mobilize the private sector to unleash agriculture as core driver of future 
growth and stability
•	 Employ market-based solutions to activate public and private investments
•	 Empower farmers and entrepreneurs to reach their full potential
•	 Integrate interventions to achieve momentum and scale
•	 Collaborate with diverse stakeholders to build on strengths and distribute 
risk.539
The ‘new vision’ is thus less new and more an extension of the solutions that 
have been around at least since the 1980s: privatisation, entrepreneurialism 
and market-led development. According to Benjamin Shepherd, instead of 
focusing on the problem of hunger, food security has become a means of 
competing for profit in an increasingly resource scarce world.540 William 
537  Gibson 2012, 9. 
538  USAID 2011. 
539  World Economic Forum 2010, 23. 
540  Shepherd 2012, 198. 
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Schanbacher argues that ‘ultimately, the food security model is founded on, 
and reinforces, a model of globalization that reduces human relationships to 
their economic value.’541 
The notion of food sovereignty, on the contrary, offers an interesting per-
spective on possible ways of resisting the operation of neoliberal biopower. Yet, 
‘food sovereignty’ is nowhere to be found in the New Vision for Agriculture, in 
Feed the Future, in the Millennium Development Goals dealing with food and 
hunger, or in Sachs’ new magnum opus The Age of Sustainable Development. 
While not recognised by the mainstream development agenda, the notion 
of food sovereignty emerged in the 1990s as a response to the corporate food 
regime that directed increasing pressures on small farmers. Defining itself in 
terms of ‘food sovereignty’, the peasant organisation La Vía Campesina has 
become arguably the most important transnational social movement in the 
world today.542 According to La Vía Campesina,
food sovereignty is the right of peoples to healthy and culturally appropriate food 
produced through sustainable methods and their right to define their own food 
and agriculture systems. It develops a model of small scale sustainable production 
benefiting communities and their environment. It puts the aspirations, needs and 
livelihoods of those who produce, distribute and consume food at the heart of 
food systems and policies rather than the demands of markets and corporations.543
Philip McMichael and Mindi Schneider consider the food sovereignty per-
spective as an alternative to the development policy that subordinates agricul-
ture to trade liberalisation and capital accumulation.544 This it undoubtedly is. 
But I would argue that the notion of sovereignty in question here goes deeper 
than the sovereignty of each nation to determine the mode of its food produc-
tion and trade policy. While it is true that the core of La Vía Campesina’s work 
is couched in rights discourse, and this framing of the problematic provides 
541  Schanbacher 2010, ix. 
542  See Martínez-Torres and Rosset 2010, 150.
543  La Vía Campesina 2011a.
544  McMichael and Schneider 2011. 
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it with both strategic benefits and potential constraints,545 it is possible to 
examine the question also from another perspective: the sovereignty of Being. 
An important culmination point in the food sovereignty discussion is the 
struggle over seeds. In traditional forms of agriculture, the seeds of grain and 
vegetables are saved and used from year to year. Seed saving and sharing has 
made possible the gradual development of seed varieties that are suitable for 
particular environments and particular populations. The displacement of 
peasant seeds by industrial varieties has been taking place in Asia, Africa and 
Latin America since the 1960s when development programmes forcefully 
introduced so-called high-yielding crops as part of the ‘Green Revolution’. By 
now it has become a received truth that further yield growth in developing 
countries is vital to feeding the world’s growing population.546 A key element 
in achieving yield growth is the use of genetically modified (GM) and hybrid 
seeds. The modified seeds developed and produced by companies such as 
Monsanto and Syngenta cannot be saved, which forces farmers to buy new 
seeds every year as well as having to buy the fertilisers and pesticides that the 
new seeds require. What is also distinctive about the new seeds is that the 
fertilisers that they need kill all other types of plants around them. Only the 
modified seeds and plants will survive. Everything else dies. And all that is left 
is covered by the corporate patent. Furthermore, new legislation effectively 
decrees peasant seeds illegal and they are branded as inadequate and treated 
as a source of risk which needs to be eliminated.547 
While the notion of food security is concerned with securing the biological 
life of the world population by ensuring that people have enough to eat to 
lead an active life, ‘seed sovereignty’ seeks not only to enable the existence of 
sufficient biological conditions of existence, but also biodiversity and diverse 
forms of being. The pursuit of seed sovereignty is not a rejection of biological 
life in favour of some purely formalist or ideational notion of the political. 
It concerns rather the indistinguishability of the biological and the spiritual. 
545 See Claeys 2012. 
546 See World Economic Forum 2010, 10. Isobel Tomlinson shows how the seeming consensus on the 
need to ‘double food production by 2050’ is explained more by the prior ideological commitments of 
key institutions than by the aim’s contribution to solving problems of hunger. See Tomlinson 2013. 
547 La Vía Campesina and GRAIN 2015, 8. 
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In the plainest terms, seed is the potentiality of life. The perversity of neo-
liberal development is that it seeks to govern the potential of life already at 
this stage.548 Yet, seeds do not concern only the biological basis of life, that 
is: eating. Rather, indigenous peasant seeds enable forms-of-life that have the 
potential to divest the apparatuses of neoliberal capitalism of their power. 
‘Seed saving gives farmers life. Seed monopolies rob farmers of life’, Indian 
environmental activist Vandana Shiva contends.549 While not immediately 
falling under biopolitics as understood by Foucault or Agamben, one could 
argue that seed monopolies are an extreme form of the absolutisation of a 
horizon of disclosure; of the governing of potentiality. The mechanised food 
industry that Heidegger saw as an expression of modern enframing was only 
the beginning of conceiving of all beings as makeable, accessible and calcu-
lable. The monopolisation of seeds expresses well the generalised availability 
for ordering of all potentiality that the notion of standing-reserve refers to. 
In their struggle over seeds and the potentiality that they contain, peasant 
organisations present a keen ontological awareness. 
Sovereignty, then, does not concern only the ability of a country to define 
its trade policy and market-orientation. Rather, sovereignty concerns the 
ability to refuse the monopolisation of the ways in which Being can happen. 
La Vía Campesina states:
We are committed to continue defending and keeping alive our peasant and indig-
enous seeds, to recover them in the hands of communities so as to reproduce and 
multiply them based on our peasant systems. We will not hesitate in the struggle 
against all forms of privatization and appropriation of seeds and life forms.550 
The question, then, is not only ‘Can the subaltern eat?’ but, rather, who has 
the power to decide what the subaltern eats, how is the food produced, and 
who benefits from food production. And, finally, can enframing reign to 
the extent that life and being are monopolised already at the level of their 
548 My argument here is not primarily about whether GM food is unhealthy or dangerous. Rather, I am 
interested in the monopolisation of the horizon through which Being can reveal itself. 
549 Shiva 2004. 
550 La Vía Campesina 2015.
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potentiality? Agamben almost never writes of ‘resistance’ but he does so in a 
short text discussing cinema: ‘What does it mean to resist? Above all it means 
de-creating what exists, de-creating the real, being stronger than the fact in 
front of you.’551 Instead of seeking to realise their full entrepreneurial potential 
in the sense that is expected of them by development institutions, the peasant 
organisations question what is assumed to be necessary in the world. Agamben 
understands a form-of-life as a being that is able not to, while continually also 
being such that it always matters. Not contingent in the sense that one could 
just as well be otherwise but a being whose being always matters; its being just 
as it is. Such a subject does not believe in the illusion that everything is pos-
sible, but – in being capable of seeing that which is not – is able to challenge 
the distribution of the possible and the impossible. Likewise, conceiving of 
potentiality as being without an end – as always conserving its excess – implies 
a mode of being that defies attempts to capture its potential. Not a subject 
that is infinitely amenable and determined by the contingency of the outside 
world, but a being capable of affirming its form-of-life and thus identifying 
that which it refuses. A politics following from such renditions of contingency 
and potentiality is not characterised by its radical undecidability but neither 
is it a project with a preconceived content. Rather, the political arises out of 
conceiving of beings that are capable of intervening in the processes of (de)
subjectification that capture their potentiality. 
This chapter has thus discussed a beyond of neoliberal biopolitics in terms 
of the ontological categories of contingency and potentiality insofar as they 
relate to subjectivity. As the chapter has shown, what I call ontological politics 
is not separate or detached from political action. It does not happen in some 
transcendental sphere independent of beings. In discussing some of the ways 
in which contingency and potentiality are contemporarily conceived of, I have 
sought to foreground the various ways in which they are related to politics that 
takes ‘life’ as its subject and object. Instead of reaffirming the ontology of con-
tingency and potentiality on which neoliberal biopolitics relies, I have argued 
for a form of ontological politics that opens up that ontology by retheorising 
the categories that are most central to the neoliberal regime of truth about life. 
551  Agamben 2002b, 318.
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More broadly, I have argued that, whereas biopolitical critiques are often 
satisfied with exposing the contingency of the practices and rationalities that 
produce subjects, politics cannot consist of mere illumination of contingency. 
Yet, this does not mean that there is one all-encompasing blueprint for what 
politics beyond such problematisation ought to look like. Nevertheless, as 
contemporary biopolitics governs not the human but contingency, and the 
life of neoliberal subjectivity is traversed by contingency, it is relevant to think 
beyond such conceptions of life that are concerned either with the calcula-
tion and prediction of the aleatory or with the construction of even more 
contingency. Likewise, neoliberal governance relies on a conception of the 
subject’s potentiality as something that can be infinitely moulded and realised 
in different ways according to contingent circumstances. Thus conceptions 
of potentiality that are premised either on the necessity of realising an end 
or on infinite becoming are unable to counter such governance that operates 
through the contingency of its subjects. As the example of food sovereignty 
shows, the alternative ways of thinking of contingency and potentiality that 
I have discussed here point towards quite concrete forms of politics. The 
problematic of eating and speaking as well as the politics of seeds are discussed 
further in the next chapter, which examines the idea of the disruption of the 
happening of Being and its relation to political action.
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6. Action, Truth and the Beyond
To conceive finitude and opening simultaneously: that is the matter at hand.552 
Ideas of a ‘beyond’ are often the substance of apocalyptic and eschatological 
visions that draw on originally religious themes, yet carry secular and historical 
significance that gets redeployed in situations of socio-political oppression, 
especially when a repressive regime is seen to be coming to an end.553 As a result 
of the contemporary sense of the crisis of the economic, political, ecological 
and social situation, conventional conceptions of politics are increasingly 
losing credence and there is a call for politics and theory that are capable of 
engaging with a ‘beyond’. If by ‘beyond’ we do not mean merely an overturn-
ing of a particular government, a transition from one political or economic 
ideology to another, or even a change in relations of power-knowledge, it 
seems that any politics that wishes to attach itself to a ‘beyond’ must take its 
bearings from the poetic, i.e. from the event that cannot be articulated in terms 
of strategy. While the strategic is ‘preoccupied with continuous capacity to 
intervene in the orchestration of the play of objectification and subjectifica-
tion’, the poetic is ‘an event that takes place at the limits of the intelligible.’554 
Michael Dillon follows Foucault in arguing that thinking politically must have 
a strategic aspect to it, meaning that it requires analysis of the specificity of 
mechanisms of power, thereby developing strategic knowledge appropriate 
for political struggles. Yet, Dillon recognises that the political is not exhausted 
by this strategic dimension but also requires nurturing through poetics.
552  Sloterdijk 2011b, 190.
553  Ward 2008, 109.
554  Dillon 2000, 14; 18. 
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Due to its location at the limits of the intelligible, there is a necessary 
ambiguity in the concept of a ‘beyond’. If we knew to begin with what the 
beyond consists of and how it comes about, it would no longer be a beyond. 
For the purposes of this chapter, I understand a beyond as something that is 
constituted by a disruption in the happening of Being. Heidegger describes 
such a break in the unfolding of Being with the concept of the Augenblick.555 
Although often referred to in passing, in examinations of Heidegger’s oeuvre, 
the Augenblick has remained a relatively neglected concept.556 One of the 
reasons for this neglect is perhaps the way in which, after his mid-1930s ‘turn’ 
(Kehre), Heidegger explicitly moves away from the concept of action which 
was central to his early notion of the Augenblick. In his later work, Heidegger 
recognises the problems implicit in ‘moments of action’ and emphasises the 
importance of shepherding the openness of Being – the radical indeterminacy, 
the Abgrund, which was discussed in the previous chapter. The moment of vi-
sion (Augenblick) thus gives way to letting be (Gelassenheit). Yet, I follow here 
William McNeill, who argues that although Heidegger’s later work focused 
on Ereignis and Gelassenheit, this should not be read as a move away from 
the Augenblick.557 The shift in emphasis regarding the Augenblick pertains to 
the originating power of Dasein, which in Heidegger’s later work becomes 
more and more decentred in relation to other worldly beings. Those who are 
concerned by the supposed individualism of Being and Time – which, too, 
is debatable – will find Heidegger’s later work more attuned to the deprior-
itisation of the human being. Yet, for Dasein, the site of the event (Ereignis) 
is still the Augenblick.558 
In choosing to discuss the concept of the Augenblick, I wish to retain and 
emphasise the connection between ‘action’ and a ‘beyond’. My aim is not to 
provide a systematic examination of Heidegger’s conception of the Augenblick, 
but to suggest that an engagement with the idea of the Augenblick allows us 
555 As discussed in the introduction, the Augenblick is variably translated into English as ‘moment’, ‘mo-
ment of vision’, ‘moment of transformation’, ‘decisive moment’, ‘instant’, ‘glance of an eye’, ‘twinkling 
of an eye’, or ‘blink of an eye’.
556 McNeill 1999, ix.
557 See McNeill 1999, 289.  
558 McNeill 1999, 301.
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to ask critical questions about the nature of action and of those who act when 
it comes to conceiving of a beyond. Such questions are no less pertinent in 
the context of contemporary desires for ‘end times’ and ‘coming politics’ 
than they are in relation to Heidegger’s own political engagements. These 
questions will be addressed in the current and the following chapter. I begin 
below by discussing the notion of agency that underpins the contemporary 
development discourse. This notion centers on ‘choice’. After problematis-
ing the limitedness of choice in human development, the chapter further 
juxtaposes this neoliberal conception of choice with an ontological notion 
of ‘decision’. The decision entails recognition of the finitude of the prevailing 
mode of being and thus cuts open a space for Being to happen differently. The 
problematic of finitude is then discussed through the case of farmer suicides 
in India, thereby engaging with different readings of the relevance of the 
Heideggerian being-toward-death in a postcolonial context. The notion of 
the Augenblick is discussed in contradistinction to biological conceptions of 
finitude, emphasising the role of truth in the Augenblick. Finally, the chapter 
discusses Haitian peasants’ refusal of the USAID’s seed donations as an ex-
pression of speaking truth to power.  
Development and the Freedom to Choose
The conception of agency that is at the heart of the human development 
paradigm centres on the notion of choice. While development was classically 
understood as a teleological process, contemporary human development is 
not teleological in the sense that it would necessarily grow in a linear way. 
Achieving development is no longer considered intrinsic to the subject but 
first of all a matter of choice. Thus, the main focus of contemporary develop-
ment is on the enlargement of human choice. Development projects such as 
the Millennium Development Goals and the Sustainable Development Goals 
market an idea of a telos – ‘end poverty by 2015’, ‘transform all lives by 2030’ 
– but they have nevertheless normalised the state of being in-between, always 
developing. Human development thus governs potentiality by demanding that 
it be realised through responsible human choices within a liberal framework. 
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Amartya Sen concludes each of the chapters in his book Development as 
Freedom by reiterating that the fundamental point of contemporary develop-
ment is to consider individuals as active agents of change instead of as passive 
recipients of benefit. Development is thoroughly dependent on people’s 
agency. Sen uses the example of unemployment to explain the importance 
of activity. For Sen, unemployment is a source of unfreedom even if the state 
makes up for the deficiency in income through unemployment benefits.559 
According to Sen, a focus on income inequality gives the impression that 
Europe is doing much better than the United States in terms of equality.560 
When focus is shifted to employment, the picture changes dramatically as 
Europe suffers from levels of unemployment that an American social ethics 
would find intolerable.561 In the United States, ‘unemployment rates of that 
magnitude would make a mockery of people’s ability to help themselves.’562 
Even in the case of famines ‘the approach of relief through employment 
[…] allows the potential famine victims to be treated as active agents, rather 
than passive recipients of governmental hand-outs.’563 Thus, the capabilities 
approach focuses on social welfare, but ‘understanding welfare, of course, in 
terms of capabilities, not the satisfaction of preferences’, Nussbaum explains.564
According to the UNDP, ‘choices depend on capabilities. An individual’s 
capabilities—all the things a person can do or be—determine the choices a 
person can make.’565 The framework within which humans are arguably best 
able to develop their capabilities and make their choices is a liberal-democratic 
market economy. Sen sees the freedom to enter markets as ‘a significant con-
tribution to development.’566 For him, the merit of the market mechanism 
lies not only in its ability to generate the most efficient outcomes, but rather 
he argues that economic interaction is fundamental to human sociality as 
559  Sen 1999, 21. 
560  Sen 1999, 95. 
561  Sen 1999, 95. 
562  Sen 1999, 98. 
563  Sen 1999, 178. 
564  Nussbaum 2011, 96. 
565  UNDP 2014, 23. 
566  Sen 1999, 7. 
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such.567 While equity problems need to be addressed in dealing with cases of 
serious deprivation, according to Sen, it is also necessary to take into account 
that equity-motivated interference with the market mechanism weakens 
efficiency.568 While individuals may need some help in helping themselves, 
the help need not come from the state but can involve various other types of 
organisations that do not interfere with the functioning of markets.569 Fur-
thermore, the functioning of the capitalist system is seen as being dependent 
on particular values and norms – not simply institutional arrangements or 
the lack of them. Therefore, developing countries must, according to Sen, 
pay particular attention to the development of values that complement the 
market mechanism.570 While the market must be allowed to function freely, 
there needs to be intervention into the society in order to make life as such 
conform to the logic of the market.571 Vanessa Pupavac aptly describes Sen’s 
approach as ‘a market romance’.572 
Sen argues also that with the freedom to choose comes a responsibility 
for the life that one has chosen.573 Hence, through its advocation of ‘choice’, 
human development imposes on humans a responsibility that obscures the 
limited extent to which they have actually been able to ‘choose’ their lives. In 
the ‘development as freedom’ framework, one has to choose. Yet, by choosing, 
one also blinds oneself to the fact that there could have been other options 
that have been effectively erased as options. The actions of La Vía Campesina 
are an example of the kind of ‘choice’ that is not easily tolerated. As Mignolo 
notes, as soon as ‘choice’ is articulated in the form of an alternative economy, 
powerful governments and the companies that enjoy their support will move 
to disallow ‘choice’.574 Freedom to choose is limited to the available capitalist 
options. As a result of what has been termed ‘causumerism’ (shopping for a 
567  Sen 1999, 26-27. 
568  Sen 1999, 120. 
569  Sen 1999, 284. 
570  Sen 1999, 266. 
571  See Foucault 2010, 145-150.
572  Pupavac 2010, 693. 
573  Sen 2010, 19. 
574  Mignolo 2011, 299. 
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better world, aiming to effect change through the market),575 global develop-
ment has begun to operate through the consumer choices made by guilt-ridden 
Westerners, thus producing a ‘biopolitics of choice’ whereby the lives of 
‘others’ are being decided upon through the union of ‘freedom of choice’ and 
market logic.576 Alongside offering the opportunity to click and feed hungry 
people, The Hunger Site, for example, encourages its visitors to ‘Shop for the 
cause!’ The website suggests that you can ‘start your do-good shopping with 
feel-great savings’, thereby ‘shopping to benefit those less fortunate’,577 thus 
capturing perfectly the causumerist biopolitics of choice that marks much of 
contemporary Western perspectives on development. 
While ‘choice’ undoubtedly becomes degraded when it turns into mere 
consumer choice, I am interested in pursuing the problematisation of choice 
further than a critique of the subsumption of ‘choice’ by consumerism. Neither 
is choice merely a social construction determined by the people with whom 
we interact and the society in which we live.578 Rather, the liberal conception 
of choice underlying human development is delimited by an enframing that 
makes choice always an expression of calculative rationality. Human develop-
ment is about enabling people ‘to live the kind of lives they have reason to 
value.’579 Sen and Nussbaum embrace a rationalist approach in which choices 
are to be based on reasoned evaluation and calculation. The assumption is 
that there are certain types of freedoms, capabilities, opportunities and lives 
that people have ‘reason to value’ more than others. Not just any life can be 
viably ‘chosen’. Choice is valued when it leads to the creation of more capability 
and to more choice. ‘A passive state of satisfaction’ cannot be an appropriate 
condition for human beings.580 Determining the capabilities and choices that 
people have reason to value is ultimately driven by market criteria and the 
imperatives of capital accumulation.581 Humans are thus enframed as active 
agents in relation to their capabilities. This does not mean, however, that 
575  Richey and Ponte 2011, 9.
576  See Goodman 2013.
577  The Hunger Site 2015c. 
578  Cf. Walby 2012. 
579  Sen 1999, 225. 
580  Nussbaum 2011, 56.
581  Levitas 2004, 616. 
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humans are entirely in control of their capabilities as an ontological reserve. 
The revealing of beings as makeable does not happen somewhere beyond all 
human doing but neither does it happen exclusively through human doing.582 
Rather, enframing forms the ontological conditions of possibility for the 
production of biopoliticised, depoliticised subjectivities who participate in 
and reproduce enframing.
Decision beyond the Choice of Development 
Within the human development framework there can be neither freedom 
nor development without the infinite becoming ordered by the expansion of 
‘choice’. Yet, considering the depoliticisation brought about by both biopoliti-
cal subjectification and the neoliberal ordering of the real, to choose within 
neoliberalism is to validate the depoliticisation of choice. This is not to say that 
the choices people make in their everyday lives are totally meaningless. But it 
is important to recognise the distinction between ontic choices made within 
neoliberal contingency and what is here discussed as ontological ‘decisioning’. 
Chapter 5 began to develop the idea of an ontological crisis – a crisis of the 
neoliberal ordering of the real. When considered in relation to the notion 
of choice, such a crisis would mean that the metaphysical tradition on which 
the contemporary development approach is based ought to be countered 
with a valorisation not of choice articulated within but against neoliberal 
contingency which, paradoxically, conceals its own contingency. Heidegger’s 
conception of ‘decision’ (Entscheidung) shows what this might mean.
In Being and Time, Heidegger describes the possibility for inauthentic Da-
sein to regain its potentiality-for-Being as lying in ‘making up for not choosing’, 
which, nevertheless, involves ‘choosing to make this choice – deciding’.583 This 
decision is not simply the realisation of a subjective will. In Contributions to 
Philosophy, Heidegger explains that the decision 
582 Heidegger 2011a, 229.
583 Heidegger 1962, 313 [268]. Heidegger’s formulation of the decision is heavily influenced by a 
secularised reading of Kierkegaard’s ‘single choice’. See Han-Pile 2013.
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has nothing in common with what we understand as making a choice or the like. 
Instead, de-cision [Ent-scheidung] refers to the sundering itself, which separates 
[scheidet] and in separating lets come into play for the first time the ap-ropriation 
of precisely this sundered open realm as the clearing for the self-concealing and 
still undecided.584 
The decision cuts open a space for Being to reveal itself in a way different 
from enframing. While choosing always only concerns something that has 
already been given, ‘de-cision means grounding and creating’.585 According 
to Heidegger, the decision is ‘a saving of beings’.  But why is such a saving 
needed?
Because the danger has increased to the extreme on account of the uprooting 
taking place everywhere and also (which is even more portentous) because this 
uprooting is already in the act of hiding itself – in other words, because the onset 
of the lack of history is already here.586
While human development demands of humans above all ‘activity’, Hei-
degger argues that what our era conceives of as the highest activity is in fact 
total decisionlessness.587 Decision is essentially responsiveness to a sense of 
urgency. For a decision to come about, human beings must first recognise the 
plight that they are in. In accepting the dominant form of political-economic 
organisation, as well as its historical-ontological conditions, the human 
development paradigm is unable to recognise that the solutions it offers 
to problems of human well-being are complicit with the problem. Sen and 
Nussbaum’s grounding of development in the ideas of capability and choice 
as well as their prioritisation of liberal market economy fall short of any sense 
of urgency or plight, and of their promise of a revolutionary new conception 
of development. As Heidegger notes, ‘the lack of a sense of plight is greatest 
where self-certainty has become unsurpassable, where everything is held to 
584  Heidegger 2012a, 70; original emphasis. 
585  Heidegger 2012a, 79; original emphasis.
586  Heidegger 2012a, 79; original emphasis.
587  Heidegger 2012a, 73. 
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be calculable, and especially where it has been decided, with no previous 
questioning, who we are and what we are supposed to do.’588 
But once the urgency of the situation is recognised, Heidegger does not 
rule out the possibility that what he calls ‘world-historical revolutions’ might 
gather together a people in such a way that they are brought into the nearness 
of the decision. Yet, he warns that in such revolutions the realm of decision 
may just as well be overlooked. For no doctrine or system will be able to bring 
about a radical change in Being. Despite Heidegger’s eschatological discourse, 
the decision is not something that can be achieved once and for all. As a divi-
sion that cuts through unconcealment, the decision is ‘constant’.589 Neither 
does the decision have an essence in itself. Rather, its essence is determined 
only through its occurrence.590 Hence, the notion of decision gives no specific 
content to the politics that challenges neoliberal development. Nevertheless, 
the decision is not a dehistoricised category but derives its meaning from the 
factical situation. In the decision one finds that which is prior to and beyond 
activity: the realm of potentiality. While Agamben’s notion of decision is 
generally seen to be drawn from Schmitt, here it is possible to identify also 
his affinity to Heidegger. As discussed in Chapter 2, the decision on the ex-
ception demarcates the space within which order can be established. Thus, 
like the Heideggerian decision, it concerns the space of potentiality. While 
human development works to monopolise that which is prior into a reserve 
of capabilities, the decision points towards the always already underlying 
openness of Being. 
Yet, the decision does not concern ‘life’ as far as life is grasped merely as 
a drive towards self-preservation.591 Whereas contemporary global politics 
exhibits what Heidegger would probably consider a mere battle over the 
conditions of surviving, what is at stake in the decision is not the continu-
ation of the biopolitical life of the population. Although the decision does 
not concern life, engaging with it does not mean arguing that the material 
needs of biological life are somehow unreal or irrelevant – a point worth 
588  Heidegger 2000, 99. 
589  Heidegger 2000, 116. 
590  Heidegger 2012a, 80.
591  Heidegger 2012a, 81.
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making especially when discussing such ontological ‘decisioning’ in relation 
to development. Rather it means countering biopolitical governance through 
a site that is not disconnected from ‘life’ but which is nevertheless different: 
Being. Hence, the Heideggerian problematisation of the enframing of the real 
as contingent standing-reserve does not force us to abandon the Foucauldian 
biopolitical analytic that examines the biological life of the population as the 
site through which it is governed. But Heidegger does help us in thinking 
of both beings and Being as something that can never be grasped by such 
biologised accounts of life. 
Ultimately, what is at stake in the decision is the event of appropriation 
(Ereignis).592 Rather than a shift to an entirely different world, turning from 
machination to Ereignis is a recognition of the finitude of our prevailing 
mode of being.593 In terms of human development, this means that the claim 
for the universality of capability creation and choice is recognised as limited. 
Thereby it becomes possible to question infinite makeability as the essence 
of beings, and to be critical of the neoliberal demand for such makeability. 
Richard Polt calls the recognition of finitude that leads to a new beginning 
the ‘emergency of being’.594 However, in international politics, the first decade 
of the 21st century is a case in point of the way in which liberal ‘emergency’ 
functions to produce not a new mode of being but more and more govern-
ance. Whereas liberalism seeks to secure its own continuation by securing the 
biological life of the population through myriad forms of governance,595 for 
Heidegger, on the contrary, finitude does not function to legitimate forms 
of governance – liberal or otherwise. The emergency of being is thus akin to 
what Agamben calls, following Walter Benjamin, ‘a real state of emergency’,596 
which severs the relationship between the exception and the sovereign, thus 
making space for radical contingency and the reappropriation of sovereignty. 
When finitude is conceived of as an existential threat, it gives rise to the 
kind of decisionism that has coloured, for example, the war on terror. The 
592  Heidegger 2012a, 370.
593  Joronen 2011, 1133.
594  Polt 2006. 
595  See Foucault 2009. 
596  Benjamin 1999, 248. 
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emergency of the war on terror has been an emergency of the survival of the 
present, liberal mode of being, rather than a sense of emergency concerning 
that being as such. But when finitude is instead conceived of as the possibilities 
provided by the groundless ground, regulatory government cannot militate 
against it.597 Without recognition of ontological finitude, it is not possible to 
break out of taken-for-granted world-disclosures. The violence of late moder-
nity is that it denies us this ontological finitude, the sense of the limitedness 
of the prevailing mode of being.598 As opposed to any sense of ontological 
finitude, Sen and Nussbaum deny altogether the metaphysical character of the 
concepts on which the human development framework relies. As a result, the 
question of Being is forgotten, and ‘capability’ and ‘choice’ in human develop-
ment function to solidify the enframing of Being that Heidegger identifies 
as key to the Western metaphysical tradition. When the question of Being 
is forgotten, choice happens within a totality where people can only choose 
that which already exists. The decision, on the contrary, draws on the idea 
that there is a possibility that Being could happen differently. The multiple 
notions of finitude at play here can be further elaborated by considering the 
phenomenon of farmer suicides.                          
Farmer Suicides and the Problem of Finitude
This is not about jazzing up farmers’ suicides with some postmodern jargon.599
It is estimated that between 1995 and 2009 more than a quarter of a million 
Indian farmers committed suicide, which is the largest wave of recorded 
suicides in human history.600 While the figures are striking as such, they 
become even more so when considering that the numbers do not include 
suicides committed by women because women do not have title to land 
597  Odysseos 2002, 391-392.
598  Joronen 2011, 1146. 
599  Srinivasan 2015. 
600  Center for Human Rights and Global Justice 2011, 1.
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and are therefore not recognised as farmers in the official statistics.601 The 
Center for Human Rights and Global Justice at New York University School 
of Law cites the past two decades’ economic reforms and the opening of 
agriculture to global markets, which has trapped small farmers in cycles of 
debt, as the main cause of the farmer suicides. In the mid-1990s, the World 
Bank’s structural adjustment policies required India to open its agriculture 
to global corporations. The rising costs of production (due to the modified 
seeds and pesticides discussed in the previous chapter) together with falling 
prices for produce (due to the heavily subsidised agriculture production in 
the West) led to rapidly increasing indebtedness and the massive increase in 
farmer suicides. Many farmers now take their own lives by swallowing the 
pesticides that they went into debt to purchase.602 
Nevertheless, Ashis Nandy points out that farmer suicides almost never 
take place in the ‘underdeveloped’ Indian states but in the states that are the 
most prosperous and most geared towards economic development.603 Vandana 
Shiva calls this ‘the suicide economy of corporate globalisation’.604 Accord-
ing to Shiva, the government of Karnataka – one of the states where large 
numbers of suicides have taken place – claims that the reasons for the suicides 
are psychological, not economic.605 By attributing the suicides to depression, 
marital discord and alcoholism, the government has aimed to ‘personalise’ the 
suicides.606 Instead of changing its agriculture policy, the government demands 
that farmers increase their self-reliance and self-respect.607 Following a colonial 
pedagogy, one of the responses has been to call on corporations to provide the 
farmers with more education, expertise and knowledge to foresee and cope 
with the insecurities of the contemporary world.608 As discussed in Chapter 
4, in the neoliberal economy ‘self-reliance’ has changed from being a way of 
delinking from the international economic system to being a demand for 
601  Center for Human Rights and Global Justice 2011, 1.
602  Center for Human Rights and Global Justice 2011, 1.
603  Nandy 2002, 114. 
604  Shiva 2004. 
605  Shiva 2004. 
606  Srinivasan 2015. 
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608  Kaushal 2015, 53. 
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integration into the global economy with acceptance that the adverse effects 
of its downturns will be borne by the people. As the phenomenon of farmer 
suicides shows, for some, the only way of breaking out of the grip of such 
corporate and government lead development appears to be through death. 
Referring to the institution of British rule in India and the changes in 
agrarian relations that followed, the leader of the Indian independence 
movement, and subsequently India’s first Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru 
wrote in 1936 that 
[the] Indian peasant has an amazing capacity to bear famine, flood, disease, and 
continuous grinding poverty – and when he could endure it no longer; he would 
quietly and almost uncomplainingly lie down in his thousands or millions and 
die. That was his way of escape.609 
Surinder Jodhka argues that although Nehru attributed the misery of the farm-
ers to colonial exploitation, he considered the Indian peasantry as fatalistic and 
politically docile, finding no other way of escape than lying down and dying.610 
Are the contemporary farmer suicides also a sign of political docility? Or are 
they the enactment of a very particular kind of resistance to contemporary 
development? According to Vasanthi Srinivasan, we have thus far failed to 
see the farmer suicides as a sign of resistance. ‘Could it be that the farmers are 
the seers of our time – elaborating the truth of our world as abandoned by the 
gods?’ Srinivasan suggests.611 She argues that ‘it is almost as if the farmers are 
redoubling and outbidding the stakes involved in the game of development.’612
Foucault argues in The History of Sexuality that death is the limit of power. 
Biopower as a power over life can never get hold of death. Suicide, then, is a 
way to evade biopower’s hold over life.
609 Nehru cited in Jodhka 2002, 3349.
610 Jodhka 2002, 3349. Jodhka examines the differences between Nehru’s and Gandhi’s conceptions 
of rural India. Nehru supported industrialisation and the use of modern technology in agriculture, 
whereas Gandhi thought that villages could remain self-sufficient and close to traditional methods 
of farming. Despite these differences, Jodhka argues that their ideas about the philosophical and 
social relevance of the villages were similar. See Jodhka 2002, 3350.   
611 Srinivasan 2015. 
612 Srinivasan 2015. 
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It is not surprising that suicide […] became, in the course of the nineteenth century, 
one of the first conducts to enter into the sphere of sociological analysis; it testified 
to the individual and private right to die, at the borders and in the interstices of 
power that was exercised over life. This determination to die […] was one of the 
first astonishments of a society in which political power had assigned itself the 
task of administering life.613 
A society whose main task is to make life live cannot tolerate individual 
decisions to relinquish life. Suicide becomes a pathology.614 Foucault, on 
the contrary, seeks in suicide an aesthetics of death beyond the banality and 
medicalisation of death in modern societies. In a 1979 essay “The Simplest 
of Pleasures”, dedicated to the subject of suicide, Foucault writes: ‘One has 
to prepare it bit by bit, decorate it, arrange the details, find the ingredients, 
imagine it, choose it, get advice on it, shave it into a work without spectators, 
one which exists only for oneself.’615 ‘Make something of it, something fine’, 
Foucault suggests.616 In reference to Foucault’s own death, his biographer 
James Miller writes that ‘if one’s bios had been fashioned like an artwork that 
would express “the trancendens pure and simple,” there could be no more fit-
ting capstone to this work, particularly in dark times, than the free embrace of 
a beautiful death.’617 But is such a free embrace of a beautiful death available 
to those who struggle in the grip of the developmental machine? Confronted 
with stories of farmers who consume pesticides or burn themselves alive, Akta 
Kaushal remarks that ‘it may also be considered a particular intellectual pur-
suit to seek glimmers of agency and self-assertion of the “subaltern” farmer 
in such an act.’618 Surely biological death cannot be the only possible way of 
conceiving of a beyond of biopolitics, and suicide the only possible form of 
political action with a view to such a beyond? 
613 Foucault 1990, 138-139.
614 Chloë Taylor shows how suicide emerged as a sociological concern but gradually psychiatry won the 
battle for suicide and, as a result, it is now predominantly understood as a problem of individuals 
rather than a problem of societies. See Taylor 2015.   
615 Foucault 2015. 
616 Foucault 2015. 
617 Miller 1993, 351. 
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According to Heidegger, authenticity emerges by being-toward-death 
(Sein-zum-Tode). In being faced with the singularity of one’s death, one may 
become free to the possibilities that are available to one’s being. Timothy 
Campbell pursues a biopolitical perspective on Heidegger’s thought by ar-
guing that Heidegger provides the grounds for a politics that distinguishes 
between proper (authentic) and improper (inauthentic) life, which can 
eventually lead to the sacrifice of those who lack a proper relation to Being. 
He concludes that ‘the Heideggerian ontology of Being presupposes the 
lesser form of the human’, making it deeply thanatopolitical.619 Contrary to 
such a reading, any engagement with Heidegger’s thought in the context of 
biopolitics should recognise the centrality of the openness of Being in his 
work. Instead of providing an ontology that implicitly legitimates the death 
of ‘lesser’ human beings, Heidegger’s ontological critique points towards 
the deconstruction of any such politics. Authenticity, furthermore, does not 
mean an original state or a condition that is more real or better than some 
other way of being. Contrary to this colloquial sense of the word, Heidegger’s 
notion of authenticity does not carry a moral weight. It means awareness of 
potentialities and thus of the fact that one’s being is not determined by cur-
rent actuality. Inauthenticity, by contrast, entails being immersed in actuality 
without awareness of other possibilities.620 Yet, inauthenticity is also a neces-
sary condition of human existence. In any case, it is by being-toward-death 
that one may become open to new possibilities. But being-toward-death does 
not bring Dasein closer to its end in terms of a clinical death, but is rather a 
way of being. Death, for Heidegger, is that which is absolutely singular and 
nonrelational. 
According to Simon Critchley, the basic idea of Being and Time is quite sim-
ple: ‘being is time and time is finite.’621 ‘If our being is finite, then an authentic 
619 Campbell 2011, 28. 
620 Often the most central concepts in Heidegger’s work draw from the same etymological roots: Ei-
gentlichkeit (authenticity), Ereignis (event) and sich ereignen (to take place; happen) draw on eigen 
(own). Entschlossenheit (resoluteness) and Entscheidung (decision) draw on schliessen (to close) but 
also on entschliessen (to open). While entschliessen means ‘to open’, sich entschliessen means ‘to decide.’ 
The decision is thus created by an interplay of closure and opening, similarly to what I suggested in 
Chapter 5. 
621 Critchley 2009. 
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human life can only be found by confronting finitude and trying to make a 
meaning out of the fact of our death’, Critchley explains.622 What Heidegger 
seeks is the mobilisation of mortality as the condition for free action in the 
world. Yet, Nelson Maldonado-Torres argues that for colonial peoples death 
is not an individualising factor in the way discussed by Heidegger.623 Rather, 
death is constitutive of the reality of colonised and racialised subjects. The 
colonial world, Maldonado-Torres argues, is ‘a world where the allegedly 
extraordinary event of anticipating one’s own death cannot be achieved, not 
because the individual is lost in an anonymous “mass,” but simply because 
death [...] is already part and parcel of ordinary life.’624 In a similar spirit but in 
more poetic form, Frantz Fanon argues that the black man lacks the possibil-
ity of descending into an authentic hell from which a genuine new departure 
could emerge.625 The ‘emergency of being’ as the recognition of finitude that 
leads to a new beginning is not available. For this reason, Maldonado-Torres 
suggests that decolonialisation does not arise out of one’s encounter with the 
singularity of one’s death but from a desire to evade death, not only one’s own 
but also that of others.626
Returning to the farmer suicides, we might ask whether they are even a 
problem for the biopolitics of development. After all, the flipside of ‘making 
live’ is ‘letting die’. If development is so concerned with the health and well-
being of populations, why is the number of farmers killing themselves not a 
bigger problem than what it is currently considered to be? ‘Why isn’t the num-
ber enough, when numbers seem to be what reason and rationalizations call 
for?’ Kaushal asks.627 Chloë Taylor suggests that, rather than a way to escape 
biopower, in some cases suicide may just give biopower what it was looking 
for.628 Instead of a means of resistance that would have broader repercussions 
in the form of affecting politics, the farmer suicides effectively dispose of a 
population that has become surplus in the contemporary developmental vi-
622  Critchley 2009. 
623  Maldonado-Torres 2007, 252. 
624  Maldonado-Torres 2008, 100. 
625  Fanon 2008, xii. 
626  Maldonado-Torres 2007, 251. 
627  Kaushal 2015, 53. 
628  Taylor 2015, 205. 
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sion that seeks a move from small to large-scale industrial farming. Through 
such biopolitics of disposability, those who do not contribute to the life and 
productivity of a population can be let die. Such biopolitics of disposability 
will be discussed further in the next chapter. 
According to Dillon, modern biopolitics is the problematisation of politics 
and security as the securing of the infinite government of finite things. ‘Factical 
finitude’ means that there is ‘only an infinite succession of finite entities whose 
days are always numbered.’629 Biopolitics is the governing and administration 
of the infinite coming and going of life forms. As long as the finitude of things 
and beings does not become threatening to the infinitude of government, it 
is crucial to the operation of biopolitics. It appears that the farmer suicides 
have functioned to further legitimate biopolitical calls to educate those who 
remain on how to cope, manage risk and live properly. What is entirely miss-
ing from modern factical finitude is an account of a beyond of the infinite 
government of finite things. ‘The infinity of finite things knows no eschatol-
ogy in the traditional sense of an ending to time combined with the advent 
of a different, a better, time to come’, Dillon explains.630 Factical finitude, 
thus, entails the denial of ontological finitude. I turn next to the notion of 
ontological finitude understood as a disruption in the happening of Being. 
The Truth of the Augenblick
In the most general terms, the concept of the Augenblick is understood in 19th 
and 20th century Western philosophy as a momentous event that entails a 
change in the experience of time and existence.631 For Heidegger, the Augen-
blick is a disruption in the happening of Being. The event of appropriation 
(Ereignis) occurs to Dasein as the Augenblick. According to Heidegger, the 
Augenblick is ‘the moment of vision of genuine action’.632 Yet, the action im-
629 Dillon 2015, 20. 
630 Dillon 2015, 7. 
631 For an examination of the notion of the ‘decisive moment’ in Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, Heidegger 
and Jaspers, see Ward 2008. 
632 Heidegger 1995, 295. 
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plied by the Augenblick ought not to be understood in terms of completeness 
but as a way of being that is responsive to the factical – spatial and temporal 
– situation. Hence, in the Augenblick, action in the present is the condition of 
possibility of the opening of a beyond; a beyond that is created from within 
the conditions of the present, yet ‘undoing’ the present. Nevertheless, the 
Augenblick does not refer to the end of the world in any conventional sense, 
or to the end of history as such. The eschaton that is seen in the Augenblick 
exposes the limitations of contemporary modes of being and opens a being 
to its possibilities. What is revealed in the Augenblick is therefore not any 
particular ‘end’ but a field of possibilities that is opened up by the suspension 
of the existing order of things. Although the literal meaning of the Augenblick 
implies something sudden, dramatic, quick and momentary, Heidegger notes 
that it is ‘a phenomenon which in principle can not be clarified in terms of 
the “now.”’633 Rather, ‘the moment of vision permits us to encounter for the 
first time what can be.’634 While the Augenblick is authentic present, it also 
transcends and undoes the present. It draws attention to and brings about 
that which is not. 
But how is one to arrive at such a moment of transformation? In Heidegger’s 
reading of Nietzsche, the Augenblick comes to him or her who questions 
critically. Heidegger reads the Augenblick in Thus Spoke Zarathustra as the 
moment where a decision is made on that which is to recur:
If you allow your existence to drift in timorousness and ignorance, with all the 
consequences these things have, then they will come again, and they will be that 
which already was. And if on the contrary you shape something supreme out of 
the next moment, as out of every moment, and if you note well and retain the 
consequences, then this moment will come again and will have been what already 
was: ‘Eternity suits it.’ But the matter will be decided solely in your moments. It 
will be decided on the basis of what you yourself hold concerning beings, and 
what sort of stance you adopt in their midst.635 
633  Heidegger 1962, 387-388 [338].
634  Heidegger 1962, 387-388 [338].
635  Heidegger 1991b, 135-136; original emphasis.
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It is a common element of various eschatologies that knowledge of the ways 
in which the world errs is a precondition for the revelation of truth.636 Yet, 
Heidegger argues that ‘only individual action itself can dislodge us from 
[the] brink of possibility into actuality, and this is the moment of vision.’637 
While questioning is necessary in leading us to the brink of our possibilities, 
in the Augenblick those possibilities are actualised. Heidegger notes that ‘to 
be sure, it occurs only to one who does not remain a spectator but who is 
himself the Moment, performing actions directed toward the future and at 
the same time accepting and affirming the past.’638 To inhabit the Augenblick 
means to assume a stance in the situation that one is in. ‘Stance’, however, 
does not refer to some fixed position but to the coming into being of a finite 
response.639 ‘To stand in a “free” relation to the world, to oneself and one’s 
ethical commitments, is to know that one’s standpoint does not exhaust 
the total range of meaningful, viable, and worthwhile possibilities’, Nichols 
explains.640 Nevertheless, one has to assume such a stance. Yet, the way in 
which the beyond translates into the materiality of ‘this’ world cannot be 
known by examining the moment itself. The resoluteness arising from the 
Augenblick does not necessarily culminate in the release of energy in activity 
in the moment. Rather, resoluteness is ‘the decisive inception of action that 
reaches ahead of and through all action.’641 The action of the Augenblick does 
not happen in a fleeting moment but is rather an ongoing responsiveness to 
the situation one is in. This means not attempting to see that which is to come 
nor ascribing content to the beyond – that is to be decided in each factical 
situation. The Augenblick gives new meaning to Being; the meaning of the 
Augenblick is not produced by the being itself. 
While the Augenblick is an existential moment that concerns one’s very 
being, it is not disconnected from the historical situation. But no matter 
how badly needed, the Augenblick cannot be achieved through strategisa-
636  Taubes 2009, 6. 
637  Heidegger 1995, 173; original emphasis. 
638  Heidegger 1991b, 56; original emphasis.
639  McNeill 1999, 233. 
640  Nichols 2014, 12. 
641  Heidegger 2000, 22. 
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tion or calculation. As discussed in Chapter 2, in its essence, calculation 
does not refer to numerical expression or counting, but to the inclusiveness 
and unquestionableness of the makeability of beings.642 The incalculable, to 
the extent that it exists, is merely something that has not yet been included 
in calculation but will be incorporated in the future. The question of ‘truth’ 
is no longer needed. While calculation proceeds step by step in order to 
establish something known from what is unknown, in the Augenblick one 
takes a leap without guidelines, and this leap is ‘a journey into truth’.643 It is 
common to various eschatologies that the beyond requires a ‘leap’. Whereas 
for Marx this is a leap from the realm of necessity to the realm of freedom, 
and for Kierkegaard it is a leap towards God, the leap – and thus the action 
– in the Augenblick does not operate on the basis of the protection of a truth 
that pre-exists it. It is ‘a leap by which human beings leap away from all the 
previous safety of their Dasein, be it genuine or presumed. The asking of this 
question happens only in the leap and as the leap, and otherwise not at all.’644 
According to Karl Jaspers, the more ‘rational’ human being becomes, the 
more it has a need for the Augenblick.645 As the action in question in the Au-
genblick cannot be calculated, it must be something that does not conform 
to existing logos. The Augenblick thus functions as the limit of reason, chal-
lenging the modern European paradigm of rationality where knowledge is a 
product of a subject-object relationship, and where the subject is the bearer 
of reason, while that which is considered to be ‘outside’ the subject becomes 
an object. Furthermore, the distinction between reason and unreason lies at 
the bottom of the late-modern articulation of the political, the community, 
the subject and the good life.646 ‘Within this paradigm, reason is the truth of 
the subject and politics is the exercise of reason in the public sphere’, Mbembe 
explains.647 The truth of the Augenblick is, on the contrary, something quite 
different than the conflation of truth with reason. While calculative enfram-
642  Heidegger 2012a, 95-97.
643  Heidegger 1991b, 37. 
644  Heidegger 2000, 6. 
645  Jaspers cited in Ward 2008, 76. 
646  Mbembe 2003, 13. 
647  Mbembe 2003, 13. 
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ing proposes makeability as the truth of being and abandons ‘truth’ to the 
realm of scientific research, economic calculation and practical experience, 
Heidegger refers to the Greek alētheia whereby truth means the disclosedness 
of beings. ‘Truth is the openness of beings’, Heidegger argues, and, ‘to know is 
accordingly to be able to stand in the openness of beings, to stand up to it.’648 
The truth of being is thus not a matter of determining what being ‘really is’.649 
It refers rather to ‘the unconcealment of beings as beings’,650 and the essence of 
the Being of beings is openness. Keeping watch over this disclosedness means 
not letting enframing reign in such a way that it is able to conceal its own 
being as a finite mode of revealing. This involves developing a relationship to 
truth because ‘only the true brings us into a free relationship with that which 
concerns us from its essence’, Heidegger explains.651 Thus, truth is a way of 
opening a relationship to the danger posed by enframing. 
Truth is also what binds Foucault to Heidegger.652 In the interview “Truth 
and Power”, Foucault explains the following:
By truth I do not mean ‘the ensemble of truths which are to be discovered and 
accepted,’ but rather ‘the ensemble of rules according to which the true and the 
false are separated and specific effects of power attached to the true.’653
Both Foucault and Heidegger reject commonplace notions of truth as sci-
entific knowledge, as the correspondence of matter to knowledge, or as the 
correctness of statements.654 Foucault suggests that truth should instead be 
648 Heidegger 2000, 23. 
649 Polt 2006, 46. 
650 Heidegger 2011e, 134.
651 Heidegger 2011a, 219. 
652 In a 1982 lecture, Foucault points out the following: ‘Let’s say that there have not been that many 
people who in the last years – I will say in the twentieth century – have posed the question of truth. 
Not that many people have posed the question: What is involved in the case of the subject and truth? 
And: What is the relationship of the subject to the truth? What is the subject of truth, what is the 
subject who speaks the truth, etcetera? As far as I’m concerned, I see only two. I see only Heidegger 
and Lacan. Personally, myself, you must have heard this, I have tried to reflect on all this from the 
side of Heidegger and starting from Heidegger.’ See Foucault 2005, 189. 
653 Foucault 1980d, 132. 
654 See Foucault 1980d and Heidegger 2011d. For a discussion of ‘truth’ in both Heidegger and Foucault, 
see Visker 2003. 
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understood as ‘a system of ordered procedures for the production, regula-
tion, distribution, circulation and operation of statements.’655 In other words, 
‘truth’ is the condition of possibility for something to appear as ‘true’. Politics, 
for Foucault, is a struggle for such ‘truth’. Yet, Foucault does not claim that 
truth should be emancipated from power. Instead, he argues that ‘the power 
of truth’ should be detached from the forms of social, economic and cultural 
hegemony that operate at present.656 Rudi Visker argues that whereas Foucault 
points out that orders of truth exist and those orders are always historical, 
Heidegger introduces a terminology that aims to think the order of truth 
out of its ordering.657 Truth as unconcealment occurs out of the essence of 
truth – the openness of Being. Heidegger is quite explicit when it comes to 
the importance that he assigns to overcoming metaphysics, understood as 
the inability to think the truth of Being: 
The still hidden truth of Being is withheld from metaphysical humanity. The 
labouring animal is left to the giddy whirl of its products so that it may tear itself 
to pieces and annihilate itself in empty nothingness.658 
It is thus not the openness of Being that leaves us in ‘empty nothingness’ but, 
on the contrary, the business-as-usual of modern enframing, which, with its 
‘giddy whirl’, hides both the truth of Being and the character of enframing as 
a finite mode of revealing. We can now read the Augenblick as the moment 
where the truth of Being is appropriated, as the event of revealing-concealing; 
where the givenness of the existing order is questioned out of the occurrence 
of the essence of truth. The Augenblick thus concerns the reappropriation of 
potentiality. But what does such appropriation of the essence of truth mean 
in the lives of the subjects of development?
655  Foucault 1980d, 133. 
656  Foucault 1980d, 133.  
657  Visker 2003, 306. 
658  Heidegger 2003, 87.
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Speaking Truth to Power: ‘Long Live Local Seeds!’
In January 2010, Haiti was shaken by an earthquake of catastrophic mag-
nitude. The international humanitarian community responded quickly. As 
part of the reconstruction efforts, USAID shipped to Haiti over 60 tons of 
hybrid maize and vegetable seeds, constituting a part of the up to 475 tons 
of seeds donated by the multinational corporation Monsanto. The shipment 
was called ‘food aid’ or ‘seed aid’, and Monsanto declared that it was proud 
to offer whatever it can to help Haiti get its agriculture sector ‘back on track’ 
in order to ensure food security.659 As a result of the earthquake, hundreds 
of thousands of people were forced to relocate from Port-au-Prince to the 
countryside, which put rural development at the centre of the reconstruction 
and development efforts.660 Yet, as in the case of India, the modified seeds 
donated by Monsanto cannot be re-used from year to year, and they require 
the use of large amounts of chemicals, making farmers dependent on corporate 
seed producers for the required pesticides (the same pesticides that Indian 
farmers ingest in order to end their lives). 
Despite the difficult post-disaster conditions in what is one of the poorest 
countries in the world, Monsanto’s gift was not well received. Highly critical 
of USAID, of Monsanto, as well as of the Haitian government, the Mouv-
man Peyizan Papay (MPP), the Peasant Movement of Papay, organised a 
demonstration where more than 10 000 Haitians took to the streets to protest 
against the ‘gift’.661 The rural farmers marched to the city of Hinche to receive 
the donated seeds, only to set them ablaze, chanting ‘Long live local seeds!’ 
and ‘Peasant seeds = Food sovereignty’.662 While Monsanto declared its be-
nevolence and willingness to help, the local farmers described its aid as ‘the 
next earthquake’.663 When asked about the reasons for burning the donated 
seeds, the leader of the MPP, Chavannes Jean-Baptiste said: 
659  Monsanto 2010. 
660  GRAIN 2010, 21. 
661  La Vía Campesina 2011b.
662  Mazzeo and Brenton 2013, 122; Stock 2011 and Bell 2010.
663  Zacune 2012, 16. 
186 | Suvi Alt: Beyond the Biopolitics of Development
It was, of course, a symbolic gesture. It was a way of saying a very firm ‘no’ to 
the company and the government. […] We have found that direct action works. 
Some years ago we burnt an American pig in front of the agriculture ministry to 
protest against the destruction of our creole [native] pigs. As a result, the authori-
ties consider us a violent organisation, which isn’t true. But it doesn’t matter. If 
the government decides to attack us, it will only mobilise people and make our 
movement stronger. We succeeded in getting the creole pigs back. That is what 
matters. It is our way of struggling.664 
Although the farmers were not able to burn all of the seeds – and more has 
been sent since as part of the USAID’s five-year agriculture development 
programme for Haiti – the action was quite remarkable. One farmer describes 
it thus: ‘They say they have a gift for you. It’s a gift to kill you. It’s a gift to 
destroy who you are. Because for us a seed is something sacred.’665
A recent USAID factsheet on Haiti notes that ‘for several decades, Haiti 
has faced significant food insecurity’ and, ‘although more than 50 percent of 
Haitians work in agriculture, up to half of Haiti’s food is imported.’666 However, 
the USAID fails to mention that up until the 1980s, Haitians grew enough 
rice, beans, sweet potato and maize to feed themselves.667 After the overthrow 
of the Duvalier dictatorship, the IMF and the World Bank introduced Haiti to 
structural adjustment and trade liberalisation. In the mid-1990s, the Clinton 
administration flooded the Haitian market with subsidised rice from Arkansas, 
effectively ending local rice production.668 As a consequence, Haiti is cited as 
the most devastating example of trade distortion due to agriculture subsidies 
in the United States.669 Following trade liberalisation, Haiti has experienced 
massive migration to urban areas, increased poverty, unemployment and an 
explosion of urban slums.670 However, the rural peasantry has remained strong, 
primarily through organisations such as the MPP which is closely linked to 
664  Jean-Baptiste cited in GRAIN 2010, 24. 
665  Seifert 2013. 
666  USAID 2015b. 
667  GRAIN 2010, 21. 
668  Stock 2011. 
669  O’Connor 2013. 
670  Holt Gimenez 2010. 
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the international movement La Vía Campesina. According to John Mazzeo 
and Barrett Brenton, the Haitian peasantry has a strong cultural identity of 
self-sufficiency and independent land cultivation dating back to the end of 
French colonialism in 1804 when the plantation system was destroyed and 
land was distributed to individual cultivators.671
In 1791, Dutty Boukman, one of the leaders of the slave rebellion that 
lead to Haiti’s independence, declared ‘La liberté ou la mort!’ binding the 
fight to either freedom or death, as is common in struggles for autonomy. In 
her discussion of the Haitian Revolution and human rights, Jessica Whyte 
argues that ‘in their willingness to die rather than remain enslaved, the slaves 
of San Domingue invented a form of political community that resisted the 
biopolitical management of a life reduced to survival.’672 More than two 
hundred years later, the MPP leader Jean-Baptiste says that ‘peasants – men 
and women – are well aware today that the neoliberal project spells death 
for the peasantry.’673 The struggle over seeds is thus a matter of life and death 
– a matter of the freedom to determine one’s own form of life. Differently 
from Maldonado-Torres, Mbembe emphasises the interweaving of death and 
freedom. Preferring death over continued servitude is freedom. Mbembe sees 
that in Heidegger’s being-toward-death, ‘one is free to live one’s own life only 
because one is free to die one’s own death.’674 Furthermore, following Georges 
Bataille, Mbembe formulates sovereignty as ‘the refusal to accept the limits 
that the fear of death would have the subject respect.’675 A sovereign world is 
one in which death as the limit of being is dispensed with. Mbembe contends 
that, in understanding sovereignty as the violation of prohibitions, Bataille 
manages to reopen the question of the political, which can thus no longer be 
considered in terms of the forward movement of reason.676 Sovereignty is to 
be rethought as something that is not the prerogative of the state but arises 
from the transgression of the limit of the fear of death. 
671  Mazzeo and Brenton 2013, 124. 
672  Whyte 2012, 253. 
673  Jean-Baptiste cited in GRAIN 2010, 24. 
674  Mbembe 2003, 38. 
675  Mbembe 2003, 16. 
676  Mbembe 2003, 16. 
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For Foucault, starting from the 1980 On the Government of the Living 
lectures at the Collège de France, the question of truth and the relationships 
between truth and government and truth and life become more and more 
important. This examination culminates in The Courage of Truth lectures in 
1984 which were to remain his last public lectures before he passed away in 
June of that year. In these lectures Foucault develops an account of parrhēsia, 
truth-telling, as the practice of an other, true life; ‘the practice of a combative-
ness on the horizon of which is an other world.’677 The Haitian peasants argue 
that their life is precisely such an other life, which is continuously enacting 
an other world as opposed to the death-world of neoliberal development. 
‘It was to change life, the seeds Monsanto sent us’, a farmer says.678 Instead 
of accepting the ordering of the potentiality of the seeds, and thus of their 
mode of being, the farmers are taking a stance against such ordering and in 
favour of a different horizon of possibility. While their actions in refusing 
the gift and destroying it could be framed as irrational, they become perfectly 
plausible when understood in the context of a different order of truth, which 
is not based solely on calculation and economic rationality. Whereas Whyte 
rightly notes that the post-earthquake Haiti represents ‘a paradigmatic case 
of Agamben’s critique of the complicity of humanitarian organisations with 
state power’,679 it also offers an example of a people’s attempt to reappropriate 
the potentiality of being in conditions where that being is reduced to mere 
survival. 
Foucault argues that, for there to be parrhēsia, the subject must be taking 
a risk in telling the truth. ‘Parrhēsia is not a skill; […] It is a stance, a way of 
being […] a mode of action’, Foucault explains.680 The MPP presents a thor-
oughgoing critique of the existing Haitian society and government and the 
international development agencies and corporations that control much of 
what happens in the country. As noted above, such critical questioning is a 
necessary condition for the coming of the Augenblick and the decision on what 
is to recur. But further than that, standing in the Augenblick requires that one 
677  Foucault 2011, 287; original emphasis.
678  Seifert 2013. 
679  Whyte 2012, 240. 
680  Foucault 2011, 14. 
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assumes a stance in the situation one is in. It requires both openness to a new 
situation – to a change in the happening of Being – but it also requires the 
ability to take a position. In the context of the biopolitics of development, 
the beyond constituted in the Augenblick is a disruption in the enframing of 
all beings as a standing-reserve available for ordering and exploitation. The 
Haitian peasants burned the seeds in the face of the risk that it may entail 
hardship. While refusing seed donations may contribute to subsistence dif-
ficulties on the short-term, the peasants believe that on the long-term their 
self-sufficiency is the best guarantee not only for sufficient food supply but 
also for their sovereignty over their own way of being. Due to their immediate 
relationship with the land, the peasants are uniquely positioned to manifest 
in their own life the truth that they speak. ‘We, the peasants of Haiti, are the 
guardians of the seeds of life’, Jean-Baptiste declares.681 Yet, he continues that 
what they see now is ‘the seeds of death invading our country.’ By burning 
the seeds of death – which in India have become the seeds of suicide – the 
peasants are speaking and living an other truth: the truth of the Augenblick.  
Trish Glazebrook and Matt Story point out that as soon as one refers 
to non-Western alternatives as ways of overcoming some of the problems 
of modernity, one faces accusations of idealising the peasant experience.682 
Therefore, it is in order to note that the purpose is not to suggest that non-
Western paradigms and movements are free of problems. Such paradigms 
and movements deserve neither romanticisation nor blatant dismissal for 
fear of romanticisation. The extent to which particular practices can func-
tion as resistance to development will always depend on the context at hand. 
The impossibility of providing a single interpretation of the situation of the 
subjects of development, or even of such particular subjects of development 
as peasants, will have become clear from the multiple meanings that death 
plays in their lives. This chapter has discussed, on the one hand, the way in 
which death is not necessarily an individualising factor for those (post)colo-
nial peoples for whom it is a part of everyday lived experience. On the other 
hand, the chapter has discussed the way in which the willingness to risk death 
681  Jean-Baptiste cited in Seifert 2013. 
682  Glazebrook and Story 2015, 137. 
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may be a necessary condition for a free, sovereign life. This chapter has also 
examined the event as the ontological happening of Being and its relationship 
to political action. It has argued that the truth spoken, for example, by the 
Haitian peasants is the appropriation of the essence of truth – the openness 
of Being. In countering the enframing of Being that the mode of development 
put forward by USAID and Monsanto entails, the farmers draw on and ap-
propriate the openness that maintains the possibility of other ways of being 
even in the face of the enframing that seemingly reaches everywhere. The next 
chapter further elaborates on the politics of the Augenblick by engaging with 
various notions of darkness. 
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7. Darkness, the Look and the Beyond
“Perhaps universal history is but the history of several metaphors.” Light is only 
one example of these “several” fundamental “metaphors,” but what an example!683 
The dualism between light and darkness is the founding metaphor of Western 
philosophy and metaphysics. Whether in ancient Greek thought, Chris-
tian imagery, or the ideals of the Enlightenment, light has been prioritised 
throughout the Western tradition, standing as a metaphor for truth, reason, 
purity and salvation.684 The history of colonialism is likewise thoroughly 
imbued with imaginaries of light and darkness. For Hegel, Africa is ‘the land 
of childhood, which, lying beyond the day of self-conscious history, is envel-
oped in the dark mantle of the night.’685 The characterisation of the other as 
darkness has a long-standing history in the Western tradition.686 Furthermore, 
Enrique Dussel speaks of the beginning of modernity as the ‘concealment’ of 
the non-European.687 The histories of ‘other’ peoples were rendered invisible, 
and forgotten. Yet, as the histories of non-European peoples were relegated to 
oblivion, development became a way of bringing light to places and popula-
tions that were yet to spring forth from the darkness of underdevelopment. 
Different kinds of eschatologies – ideas of the end of time, world or life – 
are often also articulated in the language of light and darkness. Eschatological 
683 Derrida 1978, 114.
684 Vasseleu 1998; Blumenberg 1993 and Derrida 1978.
685 Hegel 2011, 84. 
686 This characterisation is exemplified in Joseph Conrad’s 1902 novel Heart of Darkness. Chinua Achebe 
problematises Conrad’s novel in his 1975 lecture “An Image of Africa”. According to Achebe, Heart 
of Darkness, better than any other work, describes the Western desire to set Africa as a foil against 
which European civilisation and spiritual grace are manifested. Though Conrad wrote his novel in 
1902, ‘his heart of darkness plagues us still’, Achebe argues. See Achebe 2010, 2; 16. 
687 Dussel 1993, 66. 
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imagery generally associates this world with darkness and the beyond with 
light, envisioning a move from the former to the latter.688 This idea was typical 
particularly in those modern development discourses that believed in tele-
ological progress. But Heidegger too refers to the forgetting of the question 
of Being as ‘the darkening of the world’,689 and Arendt famously poses the 
question of the possibility of politics in ‘dark times’.690 With its emphasis on 
notions of vision and revelation, the concept of the Augenblick also appears 
to prioritise light over darkness. It seems that the Augenblick is the moment 
of vision where the truth of Being is brought to light.  
This chapter engages with the notions of darkness and light, visibility 
and invisibility in relation to the politics of development and the politics 
of a beyond. Countering modern Western conceptions of what constitutes 
‘darkness’, Walter D. Mignolo explains that the word ‘darker’ in the titles of 
his books The Darker Side of the Renaissance and The Darker Side of Western 
Modernity is used in contradistinction to conventional images of the ‘Dark 
Ages’ and the ‘Dark Continent’. For him it is part of the hypocrisies of the 
West that its enlightened men recognised the ‘darkness’ of the Middle Ages, 
while at the same time promoting slavery as a way of bringing ‘light’ to Africa. 
In this chapter, the use of the notion of darkness is meant, as in Mignolo, to 
contest received images of what has been labeled ‘dark’ in the modern Western 
imagination. While Mignolo nevertheless retains the negative valuation of the 
concept of darkness – for him, coloniality is the ‘dark side’ of Western mo-
dernity – I seek to contest the negativity of the notion of darkness altogether. 
Tim Edensor suggests that because conceptions of darkness are formed in 
spatial, historical, physical, sensual and epistemological encounters with dark 
space, addressing our experience of darkness requires an approach that draws 
on biology, phenomenology, geography and cultural history.691 This chapter 
adds to these forms of encounter an onto-poetic elaboration of the issue of 
darkness. Onto-poetics refers to a site of transformation that draws atten-
tion to the relations between poetics, life and the political. The onto-poetics 
688  Taubes 2009, 29. 
689  Heidegger 2000, 47. 
690  Arendt 1973. 
691  Edensor 2013, 451. 
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of a beyond draws attention to the poetic (as opposed to, for example, the 
strategic) emergence of the beyond. Poetics, then, is not merely ‘a strategy of 
living, an artful existence’, and onto-poetics, in turn, an approach that seeks 
to enhance ‘the poetical dimensions of our political, cultural, and economic 
being.’692 Rather, poetics in itself is a way in which Being happens, and this 
chapter suggests that the notion of darkness allows for an important avenue 
into a consideration of poetics and a beyond of the biopolitical. 
To this end, the chapter first discusses two ways of valuing darkness nega-
tively: as the disposable and as absence. The first refers to the colonial valuation 
of darkness and the second to the metaphysical valuation of darkness. Untying 
the negative understanding of darkness in each of these areas helps, I argue, 
to contest the negativity associated with darkness in general. The chapter 
contests the regimes of visuality of development where some are rendered 
invisible and disposable, whereas others are exposed to increased visibility: 
the developmental gaze. According to Nelson Maldonado-Torres, the damné 
of the earth are either invisible or excessively visible.693 Coloniality hides 
certain struggles and power relations, while highlighting developing peoples 
as a problem that needs to be brought into full visibility. Decoloniality must 
thus involve contestation of hegemonic production of invisibility or distorted 
visibility. This means not only understanding looking as a form of power, but 
also attention to the ways in which different ways of seeing are connected to 
different ways of being and knowing. The chapter thus pursues a reconcep-
tualisation of darkness, which contests the idea that darkness is the opposite 
of light, the opposite of presence, or that which can be rendered disposable. 
Furthermore, the chapter contests the kind of eschatology where the 
beyond is created by moving from ‘darkness’ to ‘light’, often as a result of the 
influence of a visionary individual. This critique is presented through a read-
ing of the importance of ‘darkness’ in the moment of vision, the Augenblick. 
I follow Agamben in discussing darkness as the colour of potentiality, as the 
irreducible that remains in each moment of actualisation. Attention to dark-
ness emphasises that action in the Augenblick is always only finite. Darkness 
692  See Soguk 2006, 381-382.
693  Maldonado-Torres 2007, 257. 
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as an ontological idea thus draws attention to the presence of the concealed 
in each moment of actualisation. Knowledges and practices of development 
reveal a particular world, while concealing others. In Heideggerian terms, 
the concealment of other forms of being is necessary for the revealing of a 
particular form of being. Yet, this concealment should not entail an oblivion of 
Being – the concealment of concealment. Darkness of the blink of an eye thus 
refers not to such oblivion of Being, but to the event of revealing-concealing 
(Ereignis) where the openness of Being is appropriated but not forgotten. 
Moreover, the chapter argues that the Augenblick ought not to be under-
stood as the moment of action of a visionary individual, but as the creation 
of a space where darkness invites nearness both to other beings and to Being 
itself. In order to argue this, I make use of Peter Sloterdijk’s elaboration of a 
poetics of space to highlight the way in which the beyond created in the Au-
genblick is both relational in itself and needs relations in order to come about. 
I thus discuss darkness in this chapter to varying degrees as an ontological, 
poetic and sensory concept, focusing on the ways in which an engagement 
with darkness can help give an account of the nature of action and relation 
in conceiving of a beyond. Such a notion of darkness does not fall back on 
colonial and racist perceptions that give rise to the biopolitics of development 
whereby some are let die and others are made to live in a way that conforms 
to the parameters of liberal developmentalism. I begin below by discussing 
the production of such disposable life; life that can be let die.  
Darkness, Invisibility and the Biopolitics of Disposability
Darkness is closely intertwined with disposability. Mignolo argues that the 
Scientific Revolution brought with it not only the emergence of modern sci-
ence but also the production of the dispensability of human life, and of life 
in general.694 The idea of the expendability of life was supported by the new 
type of economy (capitalism) that dispensed with human lives in order to 
produce value, while scientific knowledge was used to justify the inferiority, 
694  Mignolo 2011, 6. 
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and thus, dispensability, of particular lives.695 This disposability was often 
allocated according to what W.E.B. Du Bois called in 1903 the ‘colour-line’. 
Du Bois argued that ‘the problem of the twentieth century is the problem of 
the color-line, the relation of the darker to the lighter races of men in Asia 
and Africa, in America and the islands of the sea.’696 Du Bois’ prediction ap-
pears to have been well-founded. Furthermore, Slavoj Žižek argues that the 
production of disposable life is not an aberration in capitalism but rather its 
constitutive component.697 Zygmunt Bauman, in turn, connects the produc-
tion of disposable life primarily to two processes: economic progress and the 
creation of order. Both processes necessarily produce people who do not fit 
and become redundant.698 The biopolitics of disposability means that ‘the 
poor, especially people of color, not only have to fend for themselves in the 
face of life’s tragedies but are also supposed to do it without being seen by 
the dominant society.’699 Darkness is thereby produced as the invisible and, 
thus, disposable. 
The disposability allocated according to the colour-line is evident within 
many developed countries, such as in the United States where, according to the 
Black Lives Matter movement, every 28 hours a black person is murdered by 
police or vigilante law enforcement, not to mention the glaring racial wealth 
and health inequalities that effectively dispose of black lives.700 Yet, as Bauman 
points out, the production of disposable life has become a planetary issue, the 
implications of which can most readily be seen in responses to migration.701 
To put it bluntly: people are to be developed if they stay in their place. If they 
try to venture beyond their place, that is, beyond the Mediterranean or the 
US-Mexico border, they become disposable. The same David Cameron who 
co-chaired the UN High-Level Panel on the post-2015 development agenda 
speaks of a ‘swarm’ of people attempting to cross the Mediterranean in order 
695  Mignolo 2011, 6. 
696  Du Bois 2011, 8. 
697  Žižek 2014.
698  Bauman 2014. 
699  Giroux 2006, 175. 
700  Black Lives Matter 2015. 
701  Bauman 2014. 
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to get to the UK.702 Such dehumanising language that likens human beings to 
insects renders particular lives in biological terms, reminiscent of Agamben’s 
bare life. The abandoned, the damné and the disposable are all terms that cap-
ture the way in which some lives are evidently less worthy of living, and can be 
left to perish without it affecting the operation of the political and economic 
system. In the previous chapter, the farmer suicides in India were discussed 
as one such example. While some prefer to interpret the farmer suicides as a 
particular form of resistance to the state-led development policy that enables 
big corporations to have increasing control over agricultural production, it 
appears that the suicides also function as a way of disposing of a population 
that has become surplus, while also offering an avenue for claiming that the 
farmers need to be educated to manage risk and to cope with insecurity. 
Although ascribing to the Agambenite argument that the state of ex-
ception has become permanent, Henry Giroux points out the necessity of 
understanding the ways in which some populations are rendered disposable 
and others privileged in the permanent state of exception703 – something that 
Agamben does not address, and is not able to address through his conceptual 
framework. This point is also made by Ewa Płonowska Ziarek who argues 
that Agamben’s work misses the differentiation of bare life along racial, ethnic 
and gender lines.704 Differentiation in terms of race and gender leaves people 
vulnerable to different types of violence. One could add here the differentia-
tion in terms of one’s socio-economic status as it is clear that the poor run a 
greater risk of being reduced to disposable lives. Revisiting Du Bois’ concept 
of the colour-line, Paul Gilroy argues that racial hierarchy and the racialised 
constitution of political communities is currently entangled with ‘culture 
lines’ that delineate and subdivide humankind.705 Such culture lines often 
correspond but are not reducible to colour-lines. 
Whether bare life or disposable life, on a global scale its production reflects 
the colonial difference identified by Mignolo, Maldonado-Torres and others. 
Maldonado-Torres argues that the ontological colonial difference can most 
702  BBC 2015a; 2015b. 
703  Giroux 2006, 181. 
704  Ziarek 2008, 92. 
705  Gilroy 2000, 1. 
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readily be identified in places where certain lives are excluded from the realm 
of Being, and are negatively valued as dispensable.706 Such a reading, however, 
gives the impression that Being has a particular content and form and, perhaps, 
authenticity in the ordinary sense of the word, which one might be excluded 
from. This reading is similar to that of Campbell, discussed in the previous 
chapter, where those lacking a proper relation to Being are understood as 
falling victim to thanatopolitics. While the concept of colonial difference is 
useful in identifying the differential status that beings have within metaphysi-
cal modernity, it should be borne in mind that ontology is not something one 
can be included in or excluded from. Ontology concerns the way is which 
Being happens. Disposable peoples are not excluded from Being. Their dis-
posability reflects the enframing that marks Being in modernity and renders 
beings in general orderable, moldable, accessible and, ultimately, disposable. 
A colonial difference can nevertheless be identified in the ways in which the 
enframing of Being manifests itself in the being of particular populations. In 
the realm of development, the biopolitics of disposability is expressed, among 
other things, in Western governments concern with population growth ‘over 
there’, while seeking to increase fertility in their own societies. The relative 
lack of outrage concerning the hundreds of thousands of farmer suicides in 
India also shows the way in which the suffering of some is left invisible. Often 
such invisibility and disposability follow the global colour-line. Yet, the matter 
concerns also the extent to which particular forms of being conform to the 
order produced by capitalism and economic progress, as Bauman and Žižek 
suggest. Where inclusion into economic progress is possible, people are ren-
dered excessively visible through the developmental gaze, which I turn to next. 
Developmental Gaze and Excessive Visibility
Biopolitics in general and the biopolitics of development in particular makes 
certain lives live while letting others die. Whereas the latter are rendered 
invisible and disposable, the former become excessively visible. Arturo Es-
706  Maldonado-Torres 2007, 254. 
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cobar argues that with the onset of modern development ‘everything was 
subjected to the eye of the new experts: the poor dwellings of the rural masses, 
the vast agricultural fields, cities, households, factories, hospitals, schools, 
public offices, towns and regions, and, in the last instance, the world as a 
whole.’707 Development works by turning its gaze to ever new subject groups. 
Escobar shows how peasants were the first group of people that was en masse 
subjected to the economising and technologising gaze of development. As 
discussed in Chapter 3, from the 1970s onward, this gaze was directed at 
women, who were thereby brought to the space of visibility of development. 
In the 1980s, the gaze broadened to include nature as ‘environment’. Most 
recently, it is indigenous peoples that have been ‘discovered’ as the subjects 
of development. 
The developmental gaze is a way of bringing to light that which has thus 
far remained invisible and unimportant. Bringing people into the discourse 
of development thus simultaneously brings them into a particular field 
of vision. The developmental gaze is a way of including populations into 
something that they have been excluded from thus far. Yet, the objectifying 
regime of visuality of modernity also limits the ways in which the subject 
groups of development can be apprehended.708 Forms of being that do 
not conform to what the developmental gaze wants to see are rendered as 
signs of underdevelopment or, more recently, capability failure (as the term 
‘underdevelopment’ has fallen into disrepute). At the same time, the way in 
which visibility is framed always also leaves something out of view. Ananya 
Roy argues that although disposable lives might be brought into visibility 
through the frame of poverty, what is not as easily brought into visibility is 
global inequality.709 Seeing inequality is more difficult than seeing poverty as 
it requires perceiving oneself as part of a continuum where there is a relation-
ship between one’s privilege and the other’s deprivation. In seeing poverty, 
one can simply position the poor others as lives to be saved without having 
to question one’s own position. 
707  Escobar 2012, 41. 
708  Escobar 2012, 155. 
709  Roy 2015. 
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The sheer quantity of ‘eyes’ examining the subjects of development has 
increased exponentially in the past few decades. National governments, 
the World Bank and the IMF have been joined by increasing numbers of 
NGOs, multinational corporations and experts whose gaze is directed at 
the people in the South. Chandra Mohanty’s 1988 essay “Under Western 
Eyes” shows the way in which the ‘Third World Woman’ was produced as 
a singular monolithic subject in Western feminists’ texts in general, and in 
the Women in Development discourse in particular. The text problematises 
Western feminists’ view of Third World women as a more or less homogenous 
oppressed group. Revisiting the essay some sixteen years later, Mohanty notes 
that ‘perhaps it is no longer simply an issue of Western eyes, but rather how 
the West is inside and continually reconfiguring globally, racially, and in 
terms of gender.’710 The distinction between the North and the South, the 
developed and the underdeveloped is not as clearly geographically demarcated 
as it used to be. Due to the complex interweaving of cultural forms, ‘Third 
World’ people live not only under Western eyes but also within them.711 The 
so-called Third World people live now increasingly within Western eyes, 
but so also the Western way of looking exists increasingly within the South. 
This, Mohanty argues, necessitates recrafting the project of decolonisation. 
For both Mohanty and Escobar, decolonisation means shifting hegemonic 
visibilities. It means contesting the distribution of visibility whereby some are 
made the objects of the gaze of others. Nevertheless, the fact that the ‘Third 
World’ now increasingly lives also ‘within’ Western eyes does not necessarily 
change the mode of looking that developmentalism entails. 
Why is the question of looking and seeing so important? It is because of 
the primacy accorded to seeing as a way of gaining knowledge about being at 
least since Aristotle’s Metaphysics, which begins with the statement:
By nature, all men long to know. An indication is their delight in the senses. For 
these, quite apart from their utility, are intrinsically delightful, and that through 
the eyes more than the others. For it is not only with a view to action but also 
710  Mohanty 2003, 515. 
711  Mohanty 2003, 516. 
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when we have no intention to do anything that we choose, so to speak, sight rather 
than all the others. And the reason for this is that sight is the sense that especially 
produces cognition in us and reveals many distinguishing features of things.712 
In Being and Time, Heidegger translates the first sentence of the above quote 
as: ‘The care for seeing is essential to man’s Being’,713 emphasising the connec-
tion between seeing, knowing and being even further. In Aristotle, as in much 
of the Western philosophical tradition, seeing is considered so significant 
because it allows for understanding things as being present. The constancy 
of presence is guaranteed by vision. To know means to have seen. But just as 
there are different ways of knowing, so also there are different ways of seeing. 
Chapter 4 examined the centrality of potentiality in the modern enframing 
of Being, which in the context of development is reflected in the focus on 
capabilities. The presencing of such modern enframing does not concern 
merely the actuality of an object – the vision of that which is present – but 
also the orderability of the potential. Crucial to the mode of looking that 
creates knowledge in late modernity is thus the identification of potentiality. 
The developmental gaze seeks to pin down ever new groups of people and 
forms of existence that can be known and enframed as reserves of capabil-
ity for future development. Therefore, the regime of visuality entailed by 
contemporary development does not concern only the seeing of that which 
already exists but also attempting to bring to visibility that which might be. 
Thereby more and more groups of people and aspects of life are subjected to 
excessive visibility and ordering.  
Thus, as Foucault shows, looking involves a relation of power. While 
disciplinary power is most often associated with the panopticon, which was 
founded on the visibility of its subjects, Foucault considers the all-seeing gaze 
of surveillance as having originated in the Christian pastorate. Crucial to the 
inspecting gaze of the modern era, which Foucault partly draws from the 
practices of early Christianity, is that it becomes completely internalised.714 
712  Aristotle 2004, 4. 
713  Heidegger 1962, 215 [171]. 
714  Foucault 1980e, 155. 
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The operation of power is most effective when it does not even require an 
outside overseer. This also goes some way to explain the increased popular-
ity of ‘bottom-up’ approaches to development. The top-down execution of 
development policy can never be as efficient as the carrying out of policy 
by those who have internalised the developmental gaze. Sylvester argues 
that approaching the bare life problematic of development requires that ‘we 
must look at ourselves looking at and aiding others.’715 Such introspection 
is certainly needed from those who assume themselves to be helping others. 
However, the following parts of this chapter suggest taking some steps further 
into reshaping the mode of looking that the developmental gaze entails, and 
it considers the role played by ontological and sensory darkness in these dif-
ferent ways of looking. The next part begins by addressing the latter.  
Seeing the Darkness of the Age of Development
The disquieting anticipation of a world fully illuminated by the neon light of 
modern rationality motivates the search for the darker zones, where the special, 
the strange, the surprising live.716 
The negativity associated with darkness has never been universal but rather 
related to culturally and historically specific sensibilities as well as economic, 
practical and political interests related to, for example, the rise of capitalism 
and liberal governance.717 From the night as an environment of transgression 
to the metaphorical dark side of the human, ‘darkness’ – with its alternative 
sensualities, sociabilities, aesthetics and arts of resistance – also marks a history 
of opposition and alternative. Bryan Palmer argues in Cultures of Darkness 
that the history of darkness is effectively a history of alterity and otherness.718
Writing in 1933, the Japanese novelist Junichirō Tanizaki pointed out 
that whereas Western houses are built so as to expose the interior to as much 
715  Sylvester 2006, 72. 
716  Sachs 2010, 123. 
717  Palmer 2000, 13-20; 209-256.
718  Palmer 2000. 
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light as possible, people in the East ‘find beauty not in the thing itself but in 
the patterns of shadows, the light and the darkness, that one thing against 
another creates.’719 In a similar vein, yet in a very different context, Sloterdijk 
points out that Heidegger ‘incites us not only to see that which we find in the 
light, but also to reflect on the way in which the light and things encounter 
one another – in other terms: we must meditate on the clearing as such.’720 
Clearing (Lichtung) refers to an open space where one can encounter things 
that ‘show up in the light of our understanding of being.’721 The Augenblick 
is a kind of clearing where being is illuminated in a new way. While Hubert 
L. Dreyfus claims that the idea of clearing places Heidegger within the tradi-
tion that, from Plato to the Enlightenment and further, equates intelligibility 
with illumination,722 William McNeill argues that ‘clearing as such is neither 
dependent upon, nor to be thought starting from, visibility or light.’723 What 
is most proper to presence is not grasped beginning from its visibility. 
More recently, Agamben has sought to reclaim darkness as the ‘colour’ 
of potentiality. ‘When we do not see (that is, when our vision is potential), 
we nevertheless distinguish darkness from light; we see darkness’, Agamben 
explains.724 In darkness, vision is both potential and impossible, and that is 
why it marks the experience of pure potentiality. Although actuality is that 
which is visible, potentiality is not simply a lack of vision but the relation 
between vision and darkness, a capability to see darkness. In associating 
darkness with potentiality and light with actuality, Agamben appears to be 
doing nothing to challenge the dualisms that abound in the history of light 
and darkness. Yet, this is not the case because he emphasises that darkness, 
too, is a form of actualisation. 
By engaging with the concept of darkness, Agamben attempts to show 
that his ontology of potentiality does not refute action and lead to passivity, 
as is often suggested. Rather, seeing darkness is an active vision of the ‘that 
719 Tanizaki 2001, 46. 
720 Sloterdijk 2011b, 113. 
721 Dreyfus 1991, 163. On the etymological connection between Augenblick, Ereignis and Lichtung, 
see Sheehan 2001, 196-199. 
722 Dreyfus 1991, 163. 
723 McNeill 1999, 335. 
724 Agamben 1999, 180-181; original emphasis.
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which is not’ of the current order of things. This becomes clear in Agamben’s 
essay “What Is the Contemporary?” where he defines the contemporary, the 
poet, as the one ‘who firmly holds his gaze on his own time so as to perceive 
not its light, but rather its darkness.’725 The seeing involved is an activity and 
a singular ability: ‘To perceive this darkness is not a form of inertia or of 
passivity’, Agamben proclaims.726 Rather, contemporaries consider the dark-
ness of their time as something that ceaselessly concerns and engages them. 
Contemporaries are those who perceive and grasp their own time but who 
nevertheless (or perhaps because of this) refuse to adjust themselves to its 
demands.727 The contemporary attempts always to examine that which is left 
in the dark by people who are blinded by light. As such, the contemporary 
is ‘untimely’ in the Nietzschean sense of occupying a critical position in rela-
tion to the present. 
Agamben’s engagement with darkness helps to give a more nuanced ac-
count of the role we can ascribe to vision, light and action in the Augenblick. 
It highlights the idea, prominent in Heidegger’s later work, that each revela-
tion, each revealing of Being, is always also a concealing. Even if in Being 
and Time the Augenblick refers to Dasein’s ecstatic, authentic presence in 
the moment,728 the insistence on authentic presence should not be taken to 
mean that Heidegger was oblivious to the significance of absence. Rather, 
the presence of the Augenblick should be understood as ‘the presence of an 
absence’, as Agamben would say.729 Absence carries political relevance that 
goes far beyond the contestation of particular absence-presence relations and 
the social positions that they create. Absence, rather, is always already part of 
everything that is (seen), and recognition of such constitution of presence is 
the condition of possibility of the political in the first place. 
What is then the darkness of our time? It would appear that it must be 
poverty and hunger, disease and inequality, violence and war. Anyone can see 
(albeit many at a distance) the pain and suffering caused by these conditions. 
725  Agamben 2009b, 44. 
726  Agamben 2009b, 45. 
727  Agamben 2009b, 40. 
728  Heidegger 1962, 376 [328]; 387 [338].
729  Agamben 1999, 179. 
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Indeed, perceiving the suffering of others in a faraway place is the ‘quintes-
sential modern experience’.730 Is development then an expression of contem-
porariness in the sense that it is concerned with and engaged by the things 
that are atrocious in our time? This is hardly the case because in claiming to 
offer all-encompassing solutions to the problems people face in their lives, 
development fails to see that it in fact limits possible solutions. The need 
for development and its basic premises are not questioned in the dominant 
political discourse. Instead, development suggests that the major questions 
regarding life and politics have been settled. It is now only a matter of the 
actualisation of development in all parts of the world. Although attempting 
to bring light to our time, development falls back on the reproduction of an 
actuality where people are integrated into an economic system that perpetu-
ates inequality. Succeeding mainly in integrating people into the dominant 
political and economic system, development reproduces modern categories 
of darkness and light, absence and presence, potentiality and actuality. The 
darkness that mainstream development is incapable of seeing is the possibility 
and, indeed, the existence of other ways of being.  
Henri Michaux points out that ‘any progress, every new observation, every 
thought, every creation, seems to create (at the same time as light) a zone 
of darkness.’731 Instead of seeking to eradicate this darkness, we should aim 
to preserve it as best as we can. The darkness of the age of development is 
therefore all the other forms of being that are rendered invisible by the late-
modern enframing of all beings as a standing-reserve. What the ontological 
elaboration of darkness thus highlights, is that each vision, action and space 
beyond creates its own darkness: the realm of the concealed that exists as the 
suspended possibility of current actuality. This applies as much to the notion 
of the Augenblick as it does to development policy. Thus, the challenge, both 
to being and to thinking the political, is how to stand in the moment, to be the 
Augenblick, while at the same time not closing off permanently the underlying 
darkness that ultimately is that from which the moment emerges. Darkness, 
then, is neither a negation of being nor what Heidegger calls the oblivion of 
730  Sontag 2003, 16. 
731  Michaux 1994, 78. 
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Being. On the contrary, an onto-poetic attention to darkness is recognition 
of the presence of that which is not, but which could have been or may yet 
be. Nevertheless, there is an aspect of Agamben’s conceptualisation of the 
contemporary and darkness that requires closer scrutiny. Although arguing 
that darkness implies not passivity but a different kind of actualisation, Agam-
ben is nevertheless content with conceiving of the seeing of darkness as the 
singular activity of the poet. In the following part I use Heidegger’s engage-
ment with the concepts of the look and the Ungeheure, the extraordinary,732 
to bridge the problematisation of the poet’s singular ability to see darkness 
with a further discussion of an onto-poetics of space that allows for a relation 
both to other beings and to Being.  
The Look of the Augenblick
In both Agamben’s ‘contemporariness’ and Heidegger’s Augenblick, one is 
concerned with the acquisition of a genuine understanding of one’s time that 
is available, at least implicitly, only to the very few. Whether it is Agamben’s 
contemporary who sees darkness or Heidegger’s being of the Augenblick, the 
beyond seems to require the presence of an exceptional, visionary individual. 
Koral Ward argues that in Heidegger’s Augenblick ‘the eschatological moment 
which comes at the culmination point of a state of crisis must give way to 
change and the instigation of a new order, brought about by the right man in 
the right time.’733 Ward identifies aspects of the Augenblick in the ways in which 
artists have sought to express and see beyond the Zeitgeist of certain epochs. 
She argues that the task of artists is to be ‘the right “man” of the moment’ 
and to ‘seize the moment of change and respond to it in their works.’734 Yet, 
this is not the sense in which Heidegger understands art. For him, art hap-
732 Ungeheure is variably translated into English as ‘monstrous’, ‘daimonic’, ‘uncanny’, ‘enormous’, ‘im-
mense’, ‘colossal’, ‘tremendous’, ‘extraordinary’ or ‘infinite’. See translator’s note in Sloterdijk 2011a, 
663; Sloterdijk 2009, 29 and McNeill 1999, 306. 
733 Ward 2008, xii. 
734 Ward 2008, 177-178.
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pens whenever Being is carried into a different disposition of relations.735 The 
Augenblick – instead of being a subjective vision – is the site of the moment of 
transformation. Instead of conceiving of the Augenblick beginning from the 
extraordinariness of the being that experiences it, the ‘extraordinary’ in the 
Augenblick can be dislocated through a reading of Heidegger’s engagement 
with the concepts of the Ungeheure and the look. Such a dislocation overturns 
also the mode of looking, and thus of knowing, of the developmental gaze.
In the 1942 lectures on Parmenides, Heidegger points out that ‘we moderns, 
or, to speak more broadly, all post-Greek humanity, have for a long time been 
so deflected that we understand looking exclusively as man’s representational 
self-direction toward beings.’736 For modern people, looking is only under-
standable as an activity by which a subject perceives an object. Therefore, the 
look of the modern subject is also the look that advances by calculating.737 
Such a calculating look renders everything as an orderable object for the 
perceiving, conquering subject. As discussed above, the developmental gaze 
is an outgrowth of this modern way of looking. But is the calculating, con-
quering look able to see everything? Heidegger introduces the notion of the 
Ungeheure, the extraordinary, as something ‘ungraspable by the fangs of the 
will, withdrawing itself from all artifices of calculation, because it surpasses 
all planning.’738 The Ungeheure is something that cannot be grasped through 
objectification or calculation, nor can it be turned into a makeable and or-
derable standing-reserve. Having a relation to the Ungeheure, to that which 
cannot be calculated, thus requires a fundamentally different way of looking. 
Instead of understanding looking as a self-accomplished activity, Heidegger 
points out how in the Greek concept of thea, looking is not an activity of a 
‘subject’ but the emergence of the ‘object’ in its coming to our encounter.739 
As opposed to representational looking upon and looking at, Heidegger 
suggests that:
735  Heidegger 2011e, 131. 
736  Heidegger 1998, 103. 
737  Heidegger 1998, 108. 
738  Heidegger 1998, 101. 
739  Heidegger 1998, 103. 
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if instead man experiences the look, in unreflected letting-be encountered, as 
the looking at him of the person who is encountering him, then the look of the 
encountering person shows itself as that in which someone awaits the other as 
counter, i.e., appears to the other and is. The looking that awaits the other and 
the human look thus experienced disclose the encountering person himself in 
the ground of his essence.740
Looking, thus, is the awaiting of another, and it is only in such non-calculating 
awaiting and encountering that one is able to experience both the being of the 
encountered person and of one’s self. The Ungeheure is that which shows itself 
or looks at us from out of other beings. Following this, the Augenblick, too, 
should be understood as starting not from ‘the right man of the moment’ but 
from that which he or she encounters. What is ‘seen’ in the Augenblick is the 
Ungeheure: i.e., that which one cannot grasp as an object or order through the 
will. Entering the Augenblick opens one to the possibilities that are available 
to, yet not realised by, one’s being. Similarly, the present, for Agamben, is ‘an 
unlived element in everything that is lived’, and attention to this ‘unlived’ is 
the life of the contemporary.741 Action, then, refers to an ongoing responsive-
ness to the approach of the Ungeheure, and to that which may yet await us.742 
As opposed to the inclusion of more and more groups of people and forms of 
being into the field of vision of the developmental gaze, a non-calculating and 
non-possessive look would always also open to that which it is encountering. 
Heidegger argues that 
looking is self-showing and indeed that self-showing in which the essence of the 
encountering person has gathered itself and in which the encountering person 
‘emerges’ in the double sense that his essence is collected in the look, as the sum of 
his existence, and that this collectedness and simple totality of his essence opens 
itself to the look – opens itself at any rate in order to let come into presence in 
the unconcealed at the same time the concealment and the abyss of his essence.743
740  Heidegger 1998, 103. 
741  Agamben 2009b, 51. 
742  McNeill 1999, 313. 
743  Heidegger 1998, 103-104. 
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In other words, the look is the opening of a site where one encounters the 
concealment of being – darkness as the ‘that which is not’ of one’s being – as 
well as the abyss (Abgrund) of Being as ‘the Nothing from which all creation 
derives.’744 Such a look is not human as such but belongs to Being itself.745 
What would this kind of looking mean for development? It would mean 
the unraveling of the developmental gaze. It would mean the inability to ap-
proach others through planning and calculation that turn them into objects 
of scientific and expert knowledge. It would also mean openness to other 
beings and to that which is; not as a reserve for growth, but as the beings 
that they are. Decolonising the developmental gaze would mean rethinking 
seeing in a way that emphasises the emergence of and relation to the unintel-
ligible. For the thought of a beyond of the biopolitics of development such 
looking would mean that conceiving of a beyond is not the task of a visionary 
individual but the task of beings that are responsive to the moment and the 
possibilities entailed by it in being with others.
Augenblicke, Darkness, Nearness
In a world of chance is there a better and a worse? We yield to a stranger’s embrace 
or give ourselves to the waves; for the blink of an eyelid our vigilance relaxes; 
we are asleep; and when we awake we have lost the direction of our lives. What 
are these blinks of an eyelid, against which the only defence is an eternal and 
inhuman wakefulness? Might they not be cracks and chinks through which 
another voice, other voices, speak in our lives? By what right do we close our 
ears to them?746
The meaning of the Augenblick evolves throughout Heidegger’s thinking 
from the early Sophist lectures through Being and Time to his later engage-
ment with Nietzsche’s work, changing from being an ecstatic presencing of a 
744  Agamben 1999, 253. 
745  Heidegger 1998, 104. 
746  Coetzee 2010, 30. 
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situation to being a presencing in response to the call of a world. Yet even in 
his later work Heidegger follows Nietzsche’s formulation of the Augenblick 
as ‘the vision of the most solitary man’, where being becomes visible ‘in our 
loneliest loneliness’.747 Sloterdijk argues that Heidegger is ultimately left with 
‘a lonely and weak hysteric-heroic subject that always believes itself to be the 
first to die and that remains miserably ignorant concerning its embeddedness 
within relations of intimacy and solidarity.’748 For Sloterdijk, Heidegger is an 
expression of the kind of solitary heroism that characterises much of 20th 
century thinking. 
Although Sloterdijk’s critique disregards, perhaps willfully, the relational-
ity of Heideggerian ontology, his explicit emphasis on the nearness to other 
beings, alongside Heidegger’s focus on the nearness of Being, is nevertheless 
worth considering. Being-with (Mitsein) as an essential trait of Dasein has 
also been emphasised by others. Most notably, Jean-Luc Nancy argues that, 
in Heidegger’s wake, ‘it is necessary to refigure fundamental ontology (as well 
as the existential analytic, the history of Being, and the thinking of Ereignis 
that goes along with it) with a thorough resolve that starts from the plural 
singular origins, from being-with.’749 Although Heidegger notes that ‘because 
Dasein’s Being is Being-with, its understanding of Being already implies the 
understanding of Others’,750 Nancy argues that this is not sufficient. ‘The 
understanding of Being is nothing other than an understanding of others’, 
Nancy proclaims.751 Furthermore, George notes that Heidegger did not 
present a proper account of how the technological understanding changes 
and distorts the social dimension of the human being.752
For Sloterdijk, as for Nancy, human beings exist only in relation to other 
beings. Positive subjectification presupposes invasions by what Sloterdijk calls 
‘life-enriching intruders’.753 Yet, such passings-through are not something that 
comes from the outside as such. Subjects are always already created by and 
747  Heidegger 1991b, 37 and Nietzsche 1969, 176. 
748  Sloterdijk 2012a, 40. 
749  Nancy 2000, 26; original emphases. 
750  Heidegger 1962, 161 [123]. 
751  Nancy 2000, 27. 
752  George 2015, 80. 
753  Sloterdijk 2011a, 96. 
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involved in them. At the core of Sloterdijk’s ‘political poetics of space’ is the 
concept of a sphere as ‘a relational space with intimate tonality’.754 Humans 
come into the world never as individuals but always as parts of such spheres. 
Sloterdijk’s ideas concerning poetic space are indebted to Gaston Bachelard, 
who emphasises that even though ontologies are always also implicit geom-
etries, inhabited space transcends geometrical space. Whereas the geometri-
cian is interested in surfaces, leaving the sphere essentially empty, the poetic 
sphere is attached to impressions of immensity that are not subject to geo-
metrical delimitation.755 Such space in itself is poetry. Yet, while Bachelard’s 
theory is an ontology of human depth, he emphasises that the poetic space 
does not simply enclose us in affectivity – a discourse that has become popular 
in recent years. Rather, a poetic space concerns the expansion of Being.756 
Likewise, for Heidegger, it would be banal to conceive of the Ungeheure, the 
extraordinary, as something ‘impressive’ or ‘moving’ that brings about this 
or that affective or psychic state. What comes from the Ungeheure towards 
beings is Being itself.757
Sloterdijk’s political poetics, with its conception of the sphere as a relational 
space attached to impressions of immensity, echoes the way in which dark 
space is conceptualised in work on the phenomenologies of darkness. Various 
accounts of the sensory apprehension of darkness emphasise the ways in which 
darkness blurs the distinction between the inside and the outside, between the 
boundaries of the body and that which lies beyond it.758 Darkness sensitises 
one to the presence of the other, creating both a heightened awareness of that 
which is outside oneself and a difficulty in distinguishing oneself from the 
outside.759 However, as a consequence of urbanisation and ‘light pollution’, 
darkness is rapidly disappearing from the contemporary world. Those who 
are concerned about the way in which darkness is increasingly being banished 
from our immediate lived environments are often also, if not primarily, con-
754  Sloterdijk 2011b, 144. 
755  Bachelard 1994, 184; 235. 
756  Bachelard 1994, 201. 
757  Heidegger 1998, 106. 
758  See Edensor 2013; Morris 2011; Daniel 2008; Dean Moore 2008 and Vidler 1992, 175. 
759  Edensor 2013, 451. 
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cerned about the way in which the disappearance of darkness entails also a 
disappearance of a sense of mystery about being.760 
Tanizaki suggested already almost a hundred years ago that it is in the world 
of the arts that we must look to find the darkness and the shadows that have 
been banished from our immediate lived space.761 The poetics of darkness is 
a moment of encounter with Being. For contemporary people, immersed as 
we are in a sea of strategies and calculation enabled by all-penetrating light, 
such an encounter may be as painful as it is rare. Nevertheless, new worlds are 
produced neither by solitary beings with visions of the beyond nor by beings 
that are open to anything and everything all the time. They are produced 
by the interplay between blinking and intrusion, between the resoluteness 
of being and the excess of what that being cannot capture. The truth of the 
Augenblick emerges out of such encounters. To think of a better and a worse 
in a world of chance is the task of a being who is capable of taking a stance 
within the current order of things while simultaneously creating a different 
truth by taking a leap in the dark towards beings and Being that are different 
from one’s own. 
Instead of dismissing the concept of darkness as being irreparably tainted by 
centuries of metaphysical and colonial baggage, we might do well to ask why 
it is that people are drawn to dark spaces. Whereas in earlier times humans 
had before themselves both a terrestrial and a celestial globe, ‘the fact that 
today the terrestrial globe stands alone before us reveals something about the 
metaphysical crisis of the human site’, Sloterdijk argues.762 What is lamented 
by those who deplore the disappearance of the darkness of the night sky is 
the disappearance of a sense of mystery about being.763 For Palmer, looking 
into the darkness of the night is to see the making of a new world.764 Yet, as 
I have argued in this chapter, the onto-poetic elaboration of darkness may 
allow us to see darkness in unexpected places, whenever and wherever we are 
brought into the nearness of Being. 
760  See Bogard 2008. 
761  Tanizaki 2001, 63. 
762  Sloterdijk 2011b, 181. 
763  See Becknell 2008, 14-18; Daniel 2008, 21-30; Dean Moore 2008, 11-14 and Kutchins 2008, 35-45.
764  Palmer 2000, 453. 
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Thereby the dark or the invisible would not turn into the disposable and 
that which is seen would not become an object or a standing-reserve for more 
and more ordering. The problem of the colour-line is not erased by claim-
ing that ‘all lives matter’765 or by liberal assurances that ‘I don’t see colour’.766 
Instead of attempting to make the colour-line invisible, its effects are to be 
countered by questioning the colonial, racist and metaphysical renderings of 
darkness. The modern ‘concealment’ of the non-European that Dussel speaks 
of would not result in destruction and oblivion far away from view, but neither 
would it be turned into a revealing that brings its object into full visibility 
and accessibility. The distorted visibility of the biopolitics of development, 
which leaves some lives to perish in invisibility, while highlighting others as 
reserves of capability is overturned by a politics that sees the other in neither 
of these terms. Instead, the darkness of the Augenblick; the dwelling in the 
nearness of Being, provides for taking a stance in relation to the situation, 
while also recognising the limits of such a stance.  
The Augenblick is an eschatological concept, but eschatology is said in 
many ways. In apocalypticism life is often understood as a state of exile in the 
world, waiting for the homecoming that is to follow: ‘the beyond is beyond 
the world in its entirety.’767 But whereas religious apocalypticism in its various 
forms gives an account of the ‘homeland’ where the beyond awaits – envisag-
ing a move from darkness to light – for Heidegger, homecoming is the home. 
Homecoming, then, implies ‘dwelling in the sites of finitude’, whereby a being 
remains open to the abyss that dislocates it from dominant world disclosures 
and provides the ground for being otherwise without, however, determining 
any final ground.768 The beyond – rather than existing as some discernible 
telos – must be thought of in terms of nearness to Being, in terms of asking 
the question of the truth of Being.769 Instead of a move from darkness to 
light, such eschatology implies inhabiting the darkness of the blink of an eye. 
765  See Bry 2015. 
766  See Bergo and Nicholls 2015. 
767  Taubes 2009, 27; original emphasis.
768  Joronen 2011, 1147. 
769  Heidegger 2011c, 156; 164.
7. Darkness, the Look and the Beyond | 213
The beyond cannot, however, be willed into existence. But neither should 
recognition of the limits of human action be taken to renounce such ac-
tion altogether. Arendt identifies in Heidegger the danger of an ‘existential 
culpability’ inspired by Goethe’s ‘one who acts always becomes guilty’.770 In 
order not to fall prey to the potentially paralysing effects of such existential 
culpability, engagements with the idea of a beyond need to take action seri-
ously. In the site and moment of the Augenblick, action is the condition of 
possibility for the opening of a beyond. Yet, I have argued that action in the 
blink of an eye does not refer to the protection of a pre-existing truth but to 
assuming a stance in each finite situation. Through an onto-poetic elabora-
tion of darkness I have also sought to draw attention to the presence of the 
concealed in each moment of actualisation. Darkness reminds us that action 
in the Augenblick is always only finite. Such finitude, however, is not privation 
but the ontological condition of possibility for being otherwise and, indeed, 
the condition of possibility for the political. 
Whereas specific political struggles require the kind of strategic knowledge 
called for by Foucault and those working in his wake, a politics that aspires 
beyond cannot be limited to strategy. Instead it must attach itself to the poetic: 
to the possibility of a moment that surpasses all strategy. The Augenblick is 
one such moment. But what neither Heidegger’s Augenblick nor Agamben’s 
contemporariness sufficiently acknowledges is that an affirmative way of for-
mulating such a politics will need to recognise the central role of relationality 
in actualising the beyond. The problematic created by the onto-poetics of a 
beyond – and, therefore, the challenge of a politics of the Augenblick – is how 
to inhabit the site of the moment and to act according to its insight, while 
recognising that such a politics will always be finite, opening as it does onto 
another Being that can no longer be grasped within its order. In order not to 
become a hegemonic project itself, the beyond of the biopolitics of develop-
ment must therefore be thought in a way that remains open to its own other. 
That is, in a way that does not elevate itself to the position of the one and only 
true world. While politics that challenges the biopolitics of development and 
its biologising and economising zeal requires for example the sense of exigency 
770  Arendt 1978, 184. 
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of the Haitian farmers, in the last instance the emergence of that exigency is 
enabled by openness to the situation and the possibilities that it brings. At 
the same time, those possibilities exist only in relation to other beings and 
they can only be realised together with them. The next chapter addresses this 
problematic further in the context of ‘worlds’.   
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8. The Worlds of (De)colonial Being
Gathered in New York in September 2015, the UN General Assembly adopted 
the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, titled Transforming Our 
World. The new Sustainable Development Goals build on the Millennium 
Development Goals with the aim of completing the development work that 
was left unfinished in the previous agenda. Where the SDGs arguably go 
further than the MDGs, is in their focus on universality.771 The General As-
sembly emphasises that the SDGs ‘are universal goals and targets which involve 
the entire world.’772 Among other things, universality means ‘transforming all 
lives and protecting the planet.’773 While arguably ‘of unprecedented scope 
and significance’,774 the Agenda brings little that is genuinely new to the 
table. It does nevertheless raise once more questions about what universality 
means in the context of development and, furthermore, what the ‘world’ of 
development is. 
As the previous chapters show, the conception of life promoted in 
contemporary development discourse and practice is entirely compatible 
with the dominant form of political-economic organisation of the world. 
According to Sen and Nussbaum, human development is best realised in a 
liberal-democratic market economy that respects the individual’s freedom to 
choose his or her lifestyle.775 Political agency is desirable as long as it supports 
the stability of such a framework. Although they consider their approach to 
be ‘revolutionary’, its role in augmenting neoliberal power relations, forms 
of subjectification and enframing of the real make explicit the framework’s 
771  United Nations Environment Program 2015; Coonrod 2014 and Leong 2014. 
772  UN General Assembly 2015, 3. 
773  UN General Assembly 2014, 1. 
774  UN General Assembly 2015, 3. 
775  Nussbaum 2011 and Sen 1999. 
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inability to conceive of a radically different world. This chapter looks more 
closely at the notion of world in both development discourse and its biopoliti-
cal critique, arguing that the latter is often not able to address the limitations 
of the former when it comes to engaging with the ‘world’. The chapter suggests 
that more fruitful discussions of world can be found in both contemporary 
postcolonial and decolonial thought and in Heidegger’s work. 
The first part of the chapter discusses the centrality of the notion of ‘one 
world’ in development discourse. The universality of Enlightenment con-
ceptions of humanity has been questioned and the desirability of a world 
integrated through a common, free market is likewise challenged. Although 
neither of these visions of ‘one world’ has disappeared – far from it – the 
oneness of the world is increasingly articulated also in terms of ecology. The 
notion of sustainable development encompasses these ideas of one humanity, 
one economy and one planet. As the previous chapters discussed the govern-
ance entailed on the level of subjectivity by the ideas of liberal humanism and 
liberal economics, I will focus below on the ecological notion of one planet, 
arguing that such discourses of one world effectively disallow the existence of 
a multiplicity of real and existing worlds in favour of a supposed totality. The 
second part discusses the implications of the way in which biopolitical critique 
identifies the neoliberal turn inward: the focus on the individual and his or 
her capacities and capabilities as the centre of development. Development 
has become individualised and internalised to the extent that the ‘world’ has 
arguably disappeared. However, biopolitical critique rarely engages with a 
notion of world that would be beyond the reduction of world to an economic 
and ecological totality.
Thus, the chapter engages with the decolonial notion of ‘pluriverse’, which 
means ‘a world in which many worlds fit’. The idea of the pluriverse entails 
the coexistence of multiple worlds, which is arguably possible on account 
of the universal character of the pluriverse. I follow Mignolo, Escobar, 
Maldonado-Torres and others in highlighting the necessity of the pluriverse 
for a decolonial conception of being. Furthermore, I argue that the seem-
ingly paradoxical universality of the pluriverse becomes conceivable when 
understood through Heidegger’s conceptualisation of world as the openness 
of Being. Understanding ‘world’ in these ontological terms is the condition of 
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possibility for the pluriversal existence of multiple ontic worlds. In the latter 
parts of the chapter, I return to the concept of the Augenblick, where beings 
exist in a practical relationship with the worlds that call for their involvement 
and care. The Augenblick is the precencing of one’s worldly possibilities in 
being-with others. The chapter further engages with the concept of decolo-
nial being and the politics of the pluriverse through a juxtaposition between 
the notions of happiness and poetry which are promoted in contemporary 
development policy, and Andean conceptions of sumak kawsay or buen 
vivir – living well. While not applicable as a universal blueprint for politics, 
it is argued that these notions give a glimpse of a mode of being and world 
beyond contemporary biopolitics of development. Finally, the chapter engages 
with the ontological commonality between such notions of pluriverse, buen 
vivir and Heidegger’s conception of the poetic character of human existence, 
drawing out the implications of these notions for the concept and practice 
of development. 
One World of Development
In the middle of the 20th century, we saw our planet from space for the first time. 
Historians may eventually find that this vision had a greater impact on thought 
than did the Copernican revolution of the 16th century, which upset the human 
self-image by revealing that the earth is not the center of the universe. From space, 
we saw a small and fragile ball dominated not by human activity and edifice, but 
by a pattern of clouds, oceans, greenery, and soils. Humanity’s inability to fit its 
doings into that pattern is changing planetary systems, fundamentally. Many 
such changes are accompanied by life-threatening hazards. This new reality, from 
which there is no escape, must be recognised – and managed.776
‘Global problems’ found their way onto the development agenda in the 1970s 
in an unprecedented way. The reports drafted by the Club of Rome, especially 
the 1972 report Limits to Growth, popularised the idea that the world is one 
776  World Commission on Environment and Development 1987. 
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big interdepended system, the survival of which will be at stake in the com-
ing decades. In the same year, the first photograph taken from outer space 
picturing the earth in its complete form was published. The above quote 
from the 1987 report Our Common Future by the World Commission on 
Environment and Development considers the impact of that photograph. The 
2006 documentary film An Inconvenient Truth begins and ends with the same 
1972 picture of the earth photographed for the first time in its complete form 
from outer space. The film’s protagonist, former US Vice President Al Gore 
argues that ‘that one picture exploded in the consciousness of humankind. 
It led to dramatic changes. Within 18 months of that picture, the modern 
environmental movement had begun.’777 Arguably, seeing the world from 
space enabled understanding it as an interconnected whole where nature, 
not human activity, is dominant. Yet, seeing the earth as a whole from the 
outside was hardly a revolution. The vision from space reflects the paradigm 
of the scientific gaze of the nineteenth-century clinician.778 Instead of leading 
to recognition of the superiority of nature over human artefact, the picture 
increased calls for bringing the entire world under human management. 
However, the vision from outer space and the responses to the picture 
created by that vision reflect not only the gaze of the nineteenth century 
clinician but a more broadly modern relationship to that which is. As Hei-
degger notes, ‘the fundamental event of the modern age is the conquest of 
the world as picture.’779 The setting up of the world as picture turns the world 
into an object for the subject. While in late modernity the human itself has 
increasingly become part of the orderable standing-reserve, the vision from 
space still allows for imagining the planet as something that the human is in 
a position to order and manage. This picturing also has its colonial history. 
Through an examination of texts by Middle Eastern writers who visited 
Europe in the nineteenth century, Timothy Mitchell shows that what the 
Arabic writers found most peculiar about Europeans was their tendency 
to order the world before themselves as an endless exhibition; as a thing to 
777  Gore 2006. 
778  Escobar 2012, 192. 
779  Heidegger 1977, 134. 
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be viewed.780 Arguably characteristic of the Europeans’ way of life was their 
continuous preoccupation with ‘the organisation of the view’.781 Conversely, 
among the European writers who visited the Middle East in the nineteenth 
century, Mitchell finds descriptions of the desire and the difficulty to set up 
the East as a picture.782 Assuming a position set apart from the object-world 
is ‘the characteristic cognitive maneuver of the modern subject’.783 The view 
from space and the calls to manage the globe that it depicted is a continuation 
of such modern desire to set the world up as a picture.  
The world picture does not, however, mean simply a picture of the world 
but conceiving that which is as brought before, enframed and set in place 
before the subject. Heidegger argues that whenever something becomes an 
object in this way, there occurs ‘a loss of Being’, which is compensated for 
by assigning value to the object.784 The project of sustainable development, 
which arguably emerged following the 1972 ‘Blue Marble’ picture, has im-
parted value on the planet in an unprecedented way. However, critics argue 
that this valuation has predominantly meant the co-optation of the planet in 
‘the naturalised hegemony of a certain economic conception of the world.’785 
Already in 1990 the UNDP put it succinctly:
The concept of sustainable development is much broader than the protection of 
natural re-sources and the physical environment. After all, it is people, not trees, 
whose future choices have to be protected. Sustainable development therefore 
must also include the protection of future economic growth and future human 
development.786
From the perspective of mainstream development, the question of Chris-
topher Stone’s classic text Should Trees Have Standing?, meaning whether 
780  Mitchell 1989, 221. 
781  Mitchell 1989, 221
782  Mitchell 1989, 228. 
783  Mitchell 1989, 232. 
784  Heidegger 1977, 142. 
785  Escobar 2012, xii. 
786  UNDP 1990, 7. 
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natural objects should have legal rights,787 would thus need to be answered in 
the negative, at least if those rights were to hinder economic growth, which 
arguably best guarantees people’s future choices. 
At the same time as economic growth undoubtedly stands at the centre of 
sustainable development, the economic and the ecological are intertwined 
through the idea of one, universal world. Majid Rahnema argues that ‘the 
proposed “one world” seeks to substitute the thousands of real and living 
worlds with a single non-world, a totally acultural and amoral economic 
corporation whose only purpose is to serve the interests of its shareholders.’788 
Nevertheless, the significance of the discourse of one planet cannot be en-
tirely reduced to economic imperatives. Wolfgang Sachs points out that ‘the 
unity of mankind is no longer an Enlightenment fancy or a commercial act 
but a biophysical fact.’789 The idea of ‘one world’ that animates development 
practice combines the notions of one humanity, one market and one planet, 
but it is increasingly articulated in terms of the latter. Yet, the idea that we 
are all in the same boat (or spaceship) conceals the differential status that the 
people on board have:
Amidst the wailing sirens of the rescue operations undertaken in the name of some 
lifeboat ethics, the pressure on peoples and countries to conform to an emergency 
discipline will be high. As soon as worldwide strategies are launched to prevent 
the boat from capsizing, things like political autonomy or cultural diversity will 
appear as the luxuries of yesteryear. In the face of the overriding imperative to 
‘secure the survival of the planet,’ autonomy easily becomes an anti-social value, 
and diversity turns into an obstacle to collective action.790 
In the quest to secure the survival of the planet, methods such as curtailing 
the fertility of the poor (discussed in Chapter 3) and adaptation (discussed 
in Chapter 4) are arguably required. The development strategies examined 
throughout this book express the biopolitical intertwinement of economy 
787  Stone 2010. 
788  Rahnema 2010, 186.
789  Sachs 2010, 117. 
790  Sachs 2010, 118.
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and biology, which is further reflected in the economic and ecological no-
tions of ‘one world’. Such globalist projects are necessarily based on a unitary 
ontology and reflect colonial epistemologies which assume that the world 
is knowable, and thus manageable and governable, on a global scale.791 Yet, 
if biopolitical critique is increasingly directed at the governance entailed by 
the internalisation and individualisation of development, it is relevant to ask 
what role the notion of world plays in biopolitics. 
The Worldlessness of Biopolitics
The concept of biopolitics is useful in identifying the ways in which the poor 
and the ‘underdeveloped’ are turned into numbers and statistics, and the ways 
in which the life of the poor is measured in terms of the extent to which the 
requirements of their biological existence are met, and how they ought to 
be turned into economic subjects so that those requirements could be met 
better. Critiques of neoliberal biopolitics show the extent to which political 
questions have turned into questions about individuals and their lives, and 
how those questions have in the process been thoroughly depoliticised. Ap-
plications of the Foucauldian conceptual toolbox thus examine the subjec-
tivities produced by power. The focus is on ‘liberal subjectivity’, ‘neoliberal 
subjectivity’, ‘biopolitical subjectivity’, and so on. Especially the biopolitical 
critiques that examine the neoliberalisation of life often point out the ways 
in which neoliberalism internalises political questions, making something 
that might be called ‘world’ disappear. For a large part, this is also the course 
of argument pursued in the previous chapters. 
Such critiques follow Foucault’s genealogy of the modern subject, the pur-
pose of which is to problematise the subject and to show that this particular 
form of subjectivity is not necessary; that subjectivity could be otherwise. 
However, there may be a danger that in pursuing the critique of the biopoliti-
cal subject, one ends up seeing nothing but the subject, and thus, one is no 
longer dismantling but rather reifying what one set out to problematise. As a 
791  Conway and Singh 2011, 701. 
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result, the critique may turn into a consideration on what a ‘post-biopolitical’ 
or some other ‘non-biopolitical’ subject would be like. This, in turn, can 
perpetuate the thinking that subjectivity is the only realm where political 
struggles occur, and we are left with a consideration of the characteristics of 
such a post-biopolitical subject (confident rather than vulnerable; courageous 
rather than resilient, and so on). What could be the alternative? Should we 
somehow seek to revive attention to the institutions, structures and political 
processes that exist ‘outside’ the biopolitical subject? In order to avoid the 
turn inward that contemporary neoliberal biopolitics exhibits, should we turn 
towards the ‘world’ understood as that which is outside us, and try to effect 
political change by influencing the ‘outside’? This is the solution proposed 
by David Chandler. 
In his critique of Sen’s ‘development as freedom’ approach, Chandler mo-
bilises Foucault’s thought to argue that human development internalises both 
development and freedom, thereby creating a depoliticised subject who can 
merely work on his or her ‘inner life’ but who cannot conceive of changing 
the ‘outside’ world.792 Similarly to Chandler, I argued in Chapters 4 and 6 that 
human development needs to be addressed by problematising its foreground-
ing of ‘choice’ and ‘capability’ as the key markers of both development and 
freedom. However, the reasons for the depoliticisation caused by neoliberal 
development go deeper than Chandler’s problematisation assumes. Likewise, 
his proposal to change the ‘outside’ world instead of focusing on the ‘inner 
life’ of the human also requires further thought. Chandler equates the ‘world’ 
with power relations, in the light of which it is peculiar that he also calls the 
world ‘external’ when his whole argument is that governance has become 
internal. If it is true, as Chandler argues, that contemporary power operates 
exclusively through the inner life of the human, to the point that the world 
has disappeared, does this not precisely make the kind of engagement with 
the world that he envisages – public reason, contracts and the like – com-
pletely futile? Chandler’s separation of the human and the world expresses 
ontological dualism, which understands reality in terms of two ontologically 
separate categories. The disconnect between the human and the world that 
792  Chandler 2013a. 
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Chandler presumes is precisely what also makes the solution he is suggesting 
ultimately untenable. 
In searching for a way beyond the depoliticising effects of neoliberalism, 
Chandler makes a clear distinction between the traditional liberal discourses 
in international relations that conceived of the limits of liberalism in the 
spatio-temporal terms of international hierarchy and the contemporary 
neoliberal development policy that demands that we locate these limits 
rather in the inner life of the subject.793 However, although neoliberalism 
has exacerbated and multiplied the ways in which global development func-
tions through subjectivities, the limits of liberalism existed also on the level 
of subjectivity already before neoliberalism. Development has always been 
concerned with changing not only the political and economic structures of 
developing countries (so as to make them conform to the liberal model), but 
also with changing their populations.794 Likewise, the liberal conception of 
freedom has always been predicated on a developmental understanding of 
both individuals and populations.795 Hence, it does not seem plausible that the 
‘return’ to modern liberal conceptions of the human and freedom advocated 
by Chandler would be a solution to the depoliticisation caused by contempo-
rary neoliberal development. Even if such a rehabilitation somehow managed 
to avoid the worst forms of violence that liberal distinctions between inside 
and outside, freedom and unfreedom, have historically produced – especially 
when it comes to development – it would hardly be able to challenge the 
biopolitical will to develop life that has always been so central to liberalism. 
Instead of longing for the security of modern categories and liberal binaries, 
a political challenge to neoliberalism ought to recognise that there cannot be 
any easy distinctions between ‘inside’ and ‘outside’. In the following parts of this 
chapter I suggest an engagement with the concept of ‘world’ that goes beyond 
the contemporary development framework’s inability to conceive of a radically 
different world as well as beyond Chandler’s call to engage the ‘outside’ world 
instead of working on the ‘inner life’ of the subject. The latter solution is not 
793  Chandler 2013a, 5. 
794  See Escobar 2012 and Duffield 2007. 
795  Hindess 2001, 95. 
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viable, firstly, because of the implausibility of a clear-cut ontological distinc-
tion between the subject and the world, and, secondly, because it thoroughly 
misses the way in which governance operates.796 Whereas human development 
internalises development and freedom, leaving behind nothing but the subject’s 
work on itself, the injunction to change the ‘external’ world instead of changing 
oneself merely reproduces the ontological presuppositions that guide modern 
distinctions between the subject and the world. The former denies the subject 
its outside and the latter denies the world its existence as anything other than 
the object of the subject’s actions. When Cartesian philosophy subjectifies the 
human and objectifies the world, the result is a loss of worldliness because the 
human is deprived of its being of the world. Worldlessness then refers to the 
way in which the modern subject becomes separated from the world, which 
turns into a mere object for the subject’s manipulation – the world viewed 
from space. Yet, in a critique of neoliberal biopolitics, this problematisation 
has to be taken even further as it appears that the late-modern neoliberal 
subject is mainly interested in itself rather than being interested in what is 
happening ‘around’ it and, furthermore, both the subject and the object of 
modern rationality become part of the same standing-reserve of potentiality. 
In The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics, Heidegger defines the 
worldlessness of a being as ‘its having no access to those beings (as beings) 
amongst which this particular being with this specific manner of being is.’797 
796 A strict distinction between ‘inner life’ and ‘outside world’ is no more plausible from a Foucauldian 
than from a Heideggerian perspective. In his final lecture course, Foucault emphasises that forms of 
knowledge, relations of power and practices of the self are always constitutive of each other, so much 
so that there cannot be ‘an other world’ without ‘an other life’. See Foucault 2011, 340.
797 Heidegger 1995, 197; original emphasis. However, Heidegger’s characterisation of the animal as 
being ‘poor in world’ has been the object of much more debate than the stone’s worldlessness. For 
examinations of the lecture course, see Derrida 2008, 141-160 and Agamben 2004, 49-80. When 
it comes not to the animal itself but to the animality of Dasein, Derrida notes that this is a question 
that was left in suspense in Heidegger’s thought throughout his life. Agamben reads animality into 
Heidegger’s thinking on revealing and concealing, suggesting that ‘the irresolvable struggle between 
unconcealedness and concealedness, between disconcealment and concealment, which defines the 
human world, is the internal struggle between man and animal.’ Biopolitical humanity has taken upon 
itself the total management of its animality, thereby seeking to open up and to secure the concealed 
in every domain. While this path results in the technologisation of biological, animal life, Agamben 
notes that also another option is possible for Heidegger: ‘man, the shepherd of being, appropriates 
his own concealedness, his own animality, which neither remains hidden nor is made an object of 
mastery, but is thought as such.’ See Derrida 2008, 155 and Agamben 2004, 69; 77; 80.
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Heidegger’s famous example of such worldlessness is the stone, for which 
everything around it remains essentially inaccessible. While worldlessness in 
the case of the stone is constitutive of the stone’s being, and should thus not 
be understood as a deprivation, elsewhere in Heidegger’s works worldlessness 
appears in a more negative sense. For my purposes here, worldlessness can 
be understood as the inability to approach other beings – humans, animals, 
nature – as the beings that they are, and instead approaching them as objects 
or as part of a standing-reserve that can be used and exploited. Understand-
ing life in economic and biological terms, the subjects of biopolitics come to 
consider also other beings in these terms, thus being, essentially, worldless. The 
worldlessness of biopolitics is therefore a necessary consequence of the calcu-
lative enframing of Being that sustains biologised and economised notions 
of life. Yet, the lexicon of biopolitics does not offer means for pursuing this 
problem further. The attempt to reinstate the modern subject which orders 
and controls its ‘outside’ only falls back on a different kind of worldlessness. 
Interestingly, in postcolonial, decolonial and postdevelopment texts the 
object of critique is often very much the same as it is in biopolitical critiques 
of development: the neoliberalisation of life; the governing of life through 
contemporary development. But what appears somewhat different is that the 
decolonial and postdevelopment critiques often start from, and centre on, no-
tions of world rather than notions of subjectivity. The critique is framed in the 
language of worlds rather than in the language of subjects. While my intention 
here is not to create an opposition between the two – indeed, quite the contrary 
– I suggest that attention to this different emphasis may be fruitful for conceiv-
ing of a mode of being beyond the biopolitical. To this end, the next part of 
this chapter turns to the notion of pluriverse: a world in which many worlds fit. 
From Universe to Pluriverse: The Worlds of the Augenblick 
The notion of ‘a world in which many worlds fit’ arguably derives from the 
Zapatista insurrection in Mexico, initiated in 1994.798 The concept of the 
798  On the transformation of Zapatismo from the early 1990s to the present, see Reyes 2015. 
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pluriverse, in turn, was made known in 1995 by Raimon Panikkar, who 
suggests that the cosmos should be understood as a pluriverse, rather than 
a universe. Panikkar proposes that we seek ‘ways of communion instead of 
coercion, paths which might lead us to overstep our provincialisms without 
tossing us all into a single sack, into a single cult, into the monotony of a single 
culture.’799 The idea of a world in which many worlds fit has been subsequently 
taken up by a number of decolonial thinkers who conceptualise such a world 
as a ‘pluriverse’.800 The notion is meant to counter the universalism of neolib-
eral globalisation, which is the contemporary face of modernisation in the 
developing world. As opposed to the disciplining and homogenising unity of 
a ‘global village’, the pluriverse entails the coexistence of multiple worlds.801 
While mainstream discourses of globalisation and development promote 
the idea of ‘one world’, Escobar argues that the pluriverse becomes visible to 
us if we direct our attention to ontological conflicts: the conflicts that ‘arise 
from the unequal encounter between worlds’.802 Such conflicts also show that 
the pluriverse is not a future utopia but an existing reality which, however, 
tends to be concealed by the universalising rationalities of development. 
Perspectives that focus mainly, or even only, on the unity of an evolving 
totality, are in danger of missing the unequal nature and the violence of the 
encounter between different worlds. The Haitian peasants’ struggle over their 
indigenous seeds is again an example of such an encounter between worlds and 
the violence it can entail. The pluriverse thus refers not only to the existence 
of a multiplicity of worlds which are grounded in their local places, but also 
to the understanding that particular worlds are possibilities among many.803
Janet Conway and Jakeet Singh distinguish such a decolonial notion of 
pluriverse from the same concept put forward by Chantal Mouffe. Her ap-
799  Panikkar 1995, 55. Interestingly, Panikkar’s hermeneutical approach draws heavily on Heidegger and 
he is known to have addressed Heidegger with the question of the possibility that a postmetaphysical 
strand of thought could be found in other cultural contexts, such as in classical Indian thought. 
In their conversation, Heidegger was open to such a possibility but qualified his openness by the 
admission of relative unfamiliarity. See Dallmayr 1996, 61.  
800  See Escobar 2012; Mignolo 2011 and Blaser 2010.
801  Martin and Glesne 2002, 218. 
802  Escobar 2012, xxviii. 
803  Conway and Singh 2011, 702. 
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proach retains an ontological statism where pluralism refers to the existence 
of a number of regional poles, while the individual political regimes are 
considered internally relatively homogenous.804 Conway and Singh propose, 
countering Mouffe, that pluriversality exists within and across the frame-
work of states: ‘diversity simply is’.805 The idea of the pluriverse is arguably 
also articulated in the notion of ‘One No and Many Yeses’, the ‘no’ directed 
at neoliberal capitalism, the ‘many yeses’ indicating the plurality of already 
existing and possible alternatives.806 The underlying purpose of such a simul-
taneous rejection and affirmation is to refuse that which is so totalising that 
it subsumes diversity, while embracing a multiplicity of modes of being and 
forms of organisation as alternatives to such a totality. In Mignolo’s words, the 
pluriverse cannot mean a multicultural cosmopolitanism where ‘the G7 will 
govern and the rest will dance and eat ethnic food.’807 This means that the very 
fundamental basis of order has to change, if the pluriverse is to exist in a way 
that does not result in various forms of violence when different worlds meet. 
What is then the character of a world in which many worlds fit? Perhaps 
paradoxically, pluriversality is posited by its proponents as a universal option. 
While Mignolo and Escobar do not pursue very far the ontological condi-
tions of possibility of this argument, I suggest that the kind of universality 
at stake here is the universality of the abyssal ground (Abgrund). Whereas 
postcolonial and decolonial thinkers show the existence of a multiplicity 
of worlds and the violence involved in the unequal relations between those 
worlds, the ontological condition for those worlds’ existence is the abyss. 
On a more general level, a similar argument is made by Sergei Prozorov, who 
puts forward the concept of ‘void universalism’, which approaches ‘the world 
itself as the void, in which an infinite plurality of particular worlds emerge 
with no possibility of their totalization.’808 Prozorov argues that ‘besides 
and beyond the infinite plurality of particular worlds that we inhabit there 
804  Conway and Singh 2011, 694. 
805  Conway and Singh 2011, 698. 
806  See Conant 2010 and Kingsnorth 2004. 
807  Mignolo 2011, 273. 
808  Prozorov 2014a, xviii. 
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is the immediate and non-totalizable universality of the World as void.’809 It 
is this non-totalisable universality of the void – or what I discuss below as 
the openness of Being – that enables the existence of the pluriverse. This idea 
can be elaborated further by engaging with the different notions of world in 
Heidegger’s work.   
The world in the existential sense does not refer simply to our physical 
environment. In Being and Time, the world connotes the meaningful rela-
tions in which Dasein exists. Heidegger calls the fundamental ontological 
structure of Dasein ‘being-in-the-world’ (In-der-Welt-sein), which refers to 
the ontological condition on the basis of which everything is understandable 
to us. The world is the ontological horizon within which entities appear to 
Dasein. As such, Dasein always has a world. Without a world, there is no 
Dasein. Furthermore, our understanding of the world exists in an immanent 
relationship with the practical involvement that discloses the world to us in 
the first place.810 For Heidegger, our access to the world is through our own 
existence. As discussed in Chapter 5, that existence is always beyond biological 
categorisations of life. Heidegger takes ‘world’ as the basic category through 
which we can begin to understand ‘life’. The relatedness of life and world is 
not one of self-subsistent objects – it is not like the relationship of a chair to 
the table – but world names what is lived.811 
In his later work, such as in the 1947 text “Letter on Humanism”, Heidegger 
considers a somewhat different understanding of the relationship between 
beings and ‘world’:
‘World’ does not at all signify beings or any realm of beings but the openness of 
Being. […] Thought in terms of ek-sistence, ‘world’ is in a certain sense precisely 
‘the beyond’ within existence and for it. Man is never first and foremost a man on 
the hither side of the world, as a ‘subject’ […] Rather, before all this, man in his 
essence is ek-sistent into the openness of Being, into the open region that clears 
the ‘between’ within which a ‘relation’ of subject to object can ‘be.’812
809  Prozorov 2014a, xix. 
810  Nichols 2014, 62. 
811  Heidegger 2001, 65. 
812  Heidegger 2011c, 171-172. 
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Chapter 6 discussed the decision (Entscheidung) as that which creates an 
open realm where Being can reveal itself differently. As can be discerned 
from the above quote, this open realm is ‘world’. In revealing the open-
ness of Being, the decision opens up the world. The world, then, is what 
Heidegger calls the ‘abyssal ground’ (Abgrund). It is the staying away of the 
ground, the fullness of what is yet undecided.813 As such, the Abgrund is 
the condition of possibility for the constitution of all ontologies.814 In the 
same vein, Prozorov shows how the Heideggerian conception of ‘world’ 
functions as the condition of possibility for the constitution of all positive 
worlds, entailing a politics that ‘consists in coming to terms with the radi-
cal contingency of the infinity of worlds that we inhabit, which enables the 
contestation and transformation of their orders.’815 Furthermore, in terms of 
development, this means that the self-certainty with which its conception 
of ‘one world’ is promoted is questioned. ‘World’, then, no longer refers to 
a limited entity within which humans create capabilities and make choices, 
or to the ecological world which is to be managed so that growth can be 
sustained well into the future. It is rather to be conceived of as the openness 
underlying any particular order. The universality of the pluriverse can thus 
be understood as the openness of Being, which enables the existence of a 
multiplicity of particular worlds.      
Returning to the notion of the Augenblick, we can interpret it as the site 
and the moment where a being becomes open to its worldly possibilities. The 
Augenblick reintegrates the phenomenon of ‘world’ with originary praxis.816 
It is the moment where the world as the openness of Being enters the realm 
of a particular positive world and reveals a new horizon of possibility. In 
The Basic Problems of Phenomenology, Heidegger explains the relationship 
between the Augenblick and ‘world’ thus: 
813 Heidegger 2012a, 209-302. 
814 Joronen 2013a, 364. 
815 Prozorov 2013, 117. While this conception of ‘world’ brings about a rethinking of the relations 
between the subject and the world, it also entails a reconceptualisation of ‘world’ in International 
Relations theory. See Prozorov 2014a. 
816 McNeill 1999, 131. 
230 | Suvi Alt: Beyond the Biopolitics of Development
In the instant as an ecstasis the existent Dasein is carried away, as resolved, into 
the current factically determined possibilities, circumstances, contingencies of 
the situation of its action. The instant [the Augenblick, the twinkling of an eye] 
is that which, arising from resoluteness, has an eye first of all and solely for what 
constitutes the situation of action. It is the mode of resolute existence in which 
the Dasein, as being-in-the-world, holds and keeps its world in view.817
In these 1927 lectures, the world is disclosed to Dasein in the Augenblick as 
the situation of resolute action. As noted in the previous chapter, Heidegger’s 
later work is more hesitant in embracing the concept of action. The Augenblick, 
nevertheless, remains the site and the moment in which a being experiences 
the coming into being of a world. These particular worlds and modes of being 
are possible on account of conceiving of the world as the openness of Being, 
as Heidegger does in the “Letter on Humanism”.
Yet, even if the openness of ‘world’ is the condition of possibility for beings 
to become what they are, no beings can dwell in sheer openness. But from 
the openness, all beings come forth. This raises the question of the role of the 
beings themselves in that becoming. Due to Heidegger’s reluctance to put 
forward a subject that wills, Chandler credits him as having given the con-
temporary post-humanists the conception that ‘it is being which does all the 
work with no need for subjects at all.’818 Yet, in his 1966 Der Spiegel interview, 
famously titled “Only a God Can Save Us Now”, Heidegger points out that:
Being is not Being without humans being needed for its revelation, protection, 
and structuring. […] the experience that humans are structured [gestellt] by 
some-thing that they are not themselves and that they cannot control themselves 
is precisely the experience that may show them the possibility of the insight that 
humans are needed by Being.819 
817  Heidegger 1982, 287. 
818  Chandler 2013b, 530; original emphasis.
819  Heidegger 1966. 
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Heidegger’s rejection of the idea of the Cartesian subject does not mean 
that he does not allow humans any agency at all. On the contrary, ‘the world 
cannot be what and how it is through human beings, but neither can it be 
so without human beings.’820 Furthermore, Chandler equates the Heideg-
gerian being-in-the-world with the contemporary demand for humans to 
adapt to the conditions of the world instead of seeking to transcend them.821 
Chandler’s reading of being-in-the-world is understandable in the light 
of his implicit commitment to ontological dualism, which translates into 
the subject/object dichotomy. Heidegger, however, explicitly rejects un-
derstanding being-in-the-world in terms of the separation between subject 
and object. Being-in-the-world is the existential a priori that enables things 
to be intelligible and meaningful to us. For Heidegger, being-in-the-world 
is ontologically prior to any specific ways of being in the world,822 and it is 
therefore wholly irreducible to the kind of ‘external’ demand for adaptation 
that Chandler is concerned with. 
Chandler appears to argue that there can only be either the classical liberal 
subject guiding processes of external transformation or the succumbing of 
humans to blind necessity, thereby stripping them of all meaningful agency. 
This form of reasoning is itself indicative of the limits of binary thinking. 
Recognising that beings are embedded in a world not entirely of their own 
making and that their being is disclosed in a framework that directs their 
becoming does not mean succumbing to the need to merely adapt to external 
necessities. Rather, a critique of development that recognises that the being of 
beings is ontologically enframed can bring to light the underlying openness 
of the world. Whereas freedom in the human development framework is 
basically the freedom to modify oneself indefinitely, the freedom provided by 
the decision is engagement in the world as the open realm. In the Augenblick, 
thus, a being becomes ‘free for its world’.
Heidegger distinguishes thereby the essence of freedom from the kind of 
freedom that expresses itself as freedom from constraint or the freedom to 
820  Heidegger 1966. 
821  Chandler 2013b, 526. 
822  For a further explication of this point, see Dreyfus 1991, 106-107. 
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choose this or that. Prior to all this, ‘freedom is engagement in the disclosure of 
beings as such.’823 Keeping watch over this disclosure means not letting enfram-
ing reign in such a way that it is able to conceal its own being as a finite mode 
of revealing. Heidegger warns that enframing implies the greatest danger, yet 
he continues with the often cited poem by Hölderlin: ‘But where danger is, 
grows the saving power also.’824 Sloterdijk, however, inverts the dictum to say: 
‘But where the saviours are, grows equally the danger’, arguing that only when 
these two ideas are in balance, have we learnt something.825 What Sloterdijk 
is suggesting is that we need to both become engaged in the ways in which 
our situation may allow a way beyond contemporary conditions and remain 
aware of the fact that each way brings its own dangers with it. 
The worlds of the Augenblick are thus worlds where beings are encountered 
by the contingency of dominant world disclosures – by the openness of Be-
ing – not for the sake of being left in empty nothingness, but for the sake of 
drawing on that openness in order to make their worlds into other worlds. 
The existence of the pluriverse is possible on account of the interplay of the 
openness of Being and the Augenblick, which allows for beings to challenge 
any world disclosure that is subsuming all worlds into a totality. Despite claims 
to the contrary, contemporary mainstream development does not enable con-
ceiving of a radically different world. On the contrary, development policies 
depoliticise the world both because they internalise and individualise devel-
opment through their foregrounding of capability and choice and because 
they deny the metaphysical character of their commitment to these ideas. At 
the same time, sustainable development, too, entails depoliticisation because 
it subjects the ecological world to human management through economic 
and instrumental rationalities, and because its call to secure the survival of 
our common planet disguises the unequal demands placed on the so-called 
developed and developing peoples. Relating to the world rather as the open-
ness of Being which, nevertheless, requires involvement by beings in order 
for them to overcome the limitations that even supposedly emancipatory 
823  Heidegger 2011d, 73.
824  Heidegger 2011a, 232. 
825  Sloterdijk 2008. 
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projects may (re)produce is an infinitely more radical effort than helping 
those projects, no matter how benevolent, consolidate the existing order of 
things. In order to flesh out the implications of pluriversal politics, the final 
part of this chapter turns to notions of happiness and living well. 
Living Well in the World: Beyond the Happiness Economy
The pursuit of happiness is serious business.826
In 2012 the United Nations proclaimed March 20th as the International Hap-
piness Day. According to the UN General Assembly, ‘the pursuit of happiness 
is a fundamental human goal.’827 As noted above by the Secretary-General 
Ban Ki-moon, it is also ‘serious business’. According to Ki-moon, ‘gross global 
happiness’ is defined by the factors of sustainable development.828 World 
Happiness Report 2013, in turn, emphasises that happy people live healthier 
and longer lives, are more productive, more innovative and more capable of 
cooperation in the workplace.829 Happy people are also more likely to be better 
neighbours, better citizens, wear seatbelts, earn more money and engage in 
charitable behaviour.830 No wonder, then, that the former UK Prime Minister 
David Cameron has been one of the foremost proponents of happiness as a 
policy goal.831 Perhaps even less surprising is that the way in which happiness, 
well-being and positive psychology are being used is increasingly critiqued for 
functioning as a ‘coercive strategy’ in ‘formulating, gaining consent for and 
delivering neoliberal welfare reform.’832 Although the deployment of such 
‘psycho-policy’ is further in countries such as the UK, it is arguably becom-
826 Ki-moon 2015. 
827 UN General Assembly 2012. 
828 Ki-moon 2015. 
829 De Neve et al. 2013, 61-62. 
830 However, studies also find that ‘extremely high happiness is not a recipe for extremely effective 
functioning, and in fact, moderate happiness can be more helpful.’ Those who are only ‘moderately 
happy’ tend to achieve more than those who are ‘intensely happy’. See De Neve et al. 2013, 65-68.
831 See Cameron 2010b.  
832 Friedli and Stearn 2015, 40. See also Davies 2015. 
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ing more central also in development policy. It is no longer only the health 
and vitality of populations that is framed as a development policy goal, but 
also their happiness. 
Furthermore, International Happiness Day is immediately followed on 
March 21st by World Poetry Day, which is meant to promote the role of poetry 
in society. In the words of the UNESCO Director-General Irina Bokova:
This is the power of poetry: It is the power of imagination to brighten reality, 
to inspire our thoughts with something more inventive than dismay. […] There 
may be nothing more delicate than a poem and, yet, it expresses all of the power 
of the human mind, and so there is nothing more resilient.833  
It appears that the primary function of poetry is to strengthen the resilience 
of the mind amidst a dismal reality. The second function that Bokova assigns 
to poetry is that of ‘enriching the dialogue that catalyses all human progress, 
weaving cultures together and reminding all people of the destiny they hold 
in common […] in the constant affirmation of humanity as a single family.’834 
While reinforcing our mental resilience, poetry also arguably serves to remind 
us that we are all in this together. Reading Bokova’s statement, it appears as if po-
etry has essentially always been directed at the same aims as the contemporary 
development framework: resilience, progress, and ‘one world’. But if happiness 
and poetry have been incorporated into the same development framework that 
creates economic subjects and treats the world as a resource to be managed, 
what alternative ways of understanding well-being are there that could be 
more in keeping with the accounts of worlds and politics discussed thus far? 
The Andean indigenous concept of sumak kawsay or suma kamaña (bet-
ter known by its Spanish translation buen vivir) gained popular exposure in 
the English-speaking world after it was incorporated into the new constitu-
tions of Ecuador in 2008 and Bolivia in 2009. In these constitutions the 
concept refers among other things to the right to nutrition, water, health 
and education, but indigenous critics have pointed out that the notion 
833  Bokova 2015. 
834  Bokova 2015. 
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cannot be limited to what are generally recognised as economic, social and 
cultural rights. Sumak kawsay should rather be understood as a much more 
thoroughgoing critique of modern and Western conceptions of reality. The 
concept itself can be translated as ‘living in fullness, living in plenitude’.835 
Mignolo notes that the translation buen vivir, ‘to live well’, has the advantage 
of being understood by speakers not familiar with the indigenous Aymara and 
Quechua languages, yet it has the disadvantage of being easily appropriated 
by the ‘happiness economy’ in general and by development organisations 
in particular.836 Despite attempts at appropriation by the UN and Western 
NGOs, Mignolo considers sumak kawsay to be radically different from the 
Western idea of development, and offering a radical decolonial option to it. 
Fernando Huanacuni Mamami puts it thus:
From the perspective of living well, we, the original indigenous peoples are 
questioning the term development and all that it implies; as for our peoples, 
development has meant the destruction of nature and our communities. The 
term development is tied to exploitation, marginalisation, depredation and 
dependency; as in the logic of the West, development involves winning at the 
expense of the other.837 
Buen vivir is also to be distinguished from individual good life – it is im-
aginable only in relation with other beings and nature.838 For Gustavo Soto 
Santiesteban, buen vivir is aimed at:
making visible and expressible aspects of reality that are ignored by the dominant 
paradigm. It is a proposal from a radical and spiritual perspective of ecology, and 
[it] is logically incompatible with development and industrialization. It speaks of 
the possibility of living in common, for which the very concept “development” 
is not only insufficient but mistaken.839 
835  Mignolo 2011, 306.   
836  Mignolo 2011, 307. 
837  Huanacuni Mamami cited in Garcia 2012. 
838  Fatheuer 2011. 
839  Soto Santiesteban 2016; original emphases. 
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The concept should not only be distinguished from development, but it 
should also be approached in terms of the plurality of the communities that 
ascribe to it, and this plurality should be understood as constitutive of the 
concept, not as its disadvantage. Crucially, sumak kawsay does not distinguish 
between living and living better, as a capitalist economy does.840 According to 
Mónica Chuji, sumak kawsay refers to ‘living well but not better’.841 
According to Gudynas and Chuji, understandings of buen vivir or sumak 
kawsay have existed for centuries, but this does not mean that it is a static 
concept involving a return to a distant, pre-colonial past.842 Rather, the idea 
of buen vivir is continuously re-created. Contemporary Andean intellectuals 
mix traditional ideas of buen vivir with, for example, the philosophies of Ernst 
Bloch and Walter Benjamin.843 In any case, at the core of the concept is an 
understanding of the balance between material and spiritual being within a 
community that is at once social and ecological.844 Marcelo Fernández Osco 
points out that:
indigenous protests and mobilisations are not merely about opposition or resist-
ance to specific policies or political leaders. Rather, they express an indigenous 
episteme, a system of understanding the world that has a completely different basis 
for thinking about socio-political relations and practices, based on a model of 
horizontal solidarity that extends not only to all humans but also to non-humans 
in the natural and cosmological world.845
According to Edgardo Lander, the notion entails a radical questioning of the 
separations that liberalism has constructed between nature and society.846 
The idea of sumak kawsay thus goes back to the inseparability of zoē and bios 
discussed in Chapter 5. Likewise, it expresses an ethos similar to Heidegger’s, 
who argues that the human experiences the spiritual in being in relation with 
840  Mignolo 2011, 307.
841  Chuji 2009. 
842  Gudynas 2011, 443 and Chuji 2009. 
843  See, for example, Rivera Cusicanqui 2012. 
844  Gudynas 2011, 444.
845  Fernández Osco, no year. 
846  Lander 2011. 
8. The Worlds of (De)colonial Being | 237
that which surrounds him or her. Instead of the modern subject/object rela-
tionship, sumak kawsay entails a mode of being where beings exist in relation 
to the happening of Being. David Choquehuanca Céspedes explains that ‘we 
must return to being, because colonisation has made us into “wanting to be.” 
Many of us want to be, but as of yet, we are not. We now want to return to our 
own path to our being.’847 Does this mean embracing being over becoming? 
The static over the dynamic? This is not the case because, as Quijano explains: 
outside the “West,” virtually in all known cultures, every cosmic vision, every 
image, all systematic production of knowledge is associated with a perspective of 
totality. But in those cultures, the perspective of totality in knowledge includes 
the acknowledgement of the heterogeneity of all reality; of the irreducible, con-
tradictory character of the latter; of the legitimacy, i.e., the desirability, of the 
diverse character of the components of all reality – and therefore, of the social.848 
The totality that Quijano refers to is not the homogenising totality of a ‘global 
village’. It is rather the heterogeneous, and even paradoxical, universality of 
the pluriverse.   
Returning to the way in which Heidegger frames his critique of the Car-
tesian subject in relation to the problem of poverty, discussed in Chapter 3, 
we are now in a better position to understand his argument, if we consider 
it in relation to the notion of sumak kawsay. The ‘living in fullness, living in 
plenitude’ associated with sumak kawsay is remarkably similar to Heidegger’s 
conception of the overflowing and abundance of Being. Neither of them is 
limited to a material notion of well-being, but neither do they disregard the 
importance of material subsistence. Buen vivir is informed by the need to 
think in economic terms that are sufficient for life. Yet, what particularly 
distinguishes the concept from so-called third generation human rights is 
the idea that the totality of being can never be captured by current actuality. 
In Javier Medina’s words:
847  Céspedes cited in Fatheuer 2011.  
848  Quijano 2007, 177. 
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There is always more in reality than one can experience or express at any given 
moment. A greater sensitivity to the latent potential of situations, assumed as 
a sort of broader social paradigm, may encourage us to think about things not 
only as they are […] but also in terms of where they are heading, what they 
may become.849
Although reflecting very different realities, Heidegger’s work shares onto-
logical commonality with these notions of being. Gudynas argues that buen 
vivir is an opportunity to make visible, understand and promote alternative 
ontologies.850 According to him, buen vivir offers a space for ontologies 
that question the foundations of modernity. It is precisely this ontological 
plurality – the pluriverse – that the Heideggerian critique pursued in this 
dissertation seeks to preserve. 
Thomas Fatheuer explicitly notes that the purpose of buen vivir is not to 
contribute to the booming happiness industry.851 It is not a straightforward 
roadmap to a happy future, nor should it become a new dogma or a propaganda 
slogan adopted by development organisations and NGOs. Its content and 
deployment by the Bolivian and Ecuadorian states is also vigorously debated. 
Silvia Rivera Cusicanqui, for example, critiques the contemporary Bolivian elites 
as well as North American academia for adopting an essentially depoliticised 
version of multiculturalism under the banner of buen vivir.852 She warns that 
‘a discussion of these [indigenous] communities situated in the “origin” denies 
the contemporaneity of these populations and excludes them from the struggles 
of modernity. They are given a residual status that, in fact, converts them into 
minorities, ensnaring them in indigenist stereotypes of the noble savage and as 
guardians of nature.’853 While only offering a very superficial discussion of buen 
vivir here, the purpose of the concept within my argument is to give an example 
of a notion that challenges the biopolitical economisation and biologisation 
849 Medina cited in Soto Santiesteban 2016. 
850 Gudynas 2011, 447. 
851 Fatheuer 2011. 
852 Rivera Cusicanqui 2012. 
853 Rivera Cusicanqui 2012, 99. For a problematisation of indigenousness as a close relationship with 
nature, see Lindroth and Sinevaara-Niskanen 2013, 285-287. 
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of life, and the reduction of ‘world’ to a store of resources to be managed; a 
notion that also captures the ontological plurality put forward in Heidegger’s 
critique of the metaphysics of modernity. As already noted in Chapter 6, the 
purpose is not to suggest that non-Western paradigms are free of problems. If it 
is easy to turn indigenous peoples into the latest objects of the developmental 
gaze, it is equally easy to romanticise them and other non-Western peoples as 
the protectors of nature and of genuine relationships to other beings. Yet, the 
recognition that also such alternatives have their own problems and are not 
generalisable should not keep us from exploring them at all. 
In explaining the notion of buen vivir, Medina refers to the words of 
Hölderlin, so often quoted also by Heidegger: ‘… poetically man dwells on this 
earth….’854 Neither to Medina nor to Heidegger does poetry mean aesthetic 
literature, the purpose of which is to uplift and brighten reality. The poetic 
is, rather, the basic character of human existence. The poetic is the realm 
where beings are addressed in such a way that the revealing of Being becomes 
visible, thereby opening up other possibilities of revealing (and, therefore, of 
being).855 What does such a poetic character of existence mean? Heidegger 
foresees a likely critique:
The phrase, “man dwells poetically,” comes indeed from a mere poet, and in fact 
one who, we are told, could not cope with life. It is the way of the poets to shut 
their eyes to actuality. Instead of acting, they dream. What they make is merely 
imagined. The things of imagination are merely made. Making is, in Greek, poiesis. 
And man’s dwelling is supposed to be poetry and poetic? This can be assumed, 
surely, only by someone who stands aside from actuality and does not want to 
see the existent conditions of man’s historical-social life today.856
Yet, Heidegger argues that this kind of a blunt pronouncement would be 
a misunderstanding of the character of poetry. It is precisely this supposed 
 
854  Hölderlin cited in Medina 2011 and in Heidegger 1971a. 
855  Heidegger 2011a, 232. 
856  Heidegger 1971a, 212. 
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incompatibility of the poetic and the concern with the actual historical and 
social conditions of existence that Heidegger wants to contest: 
Poetry does not fly above and surmount the earth in order to escape it and hover 
over it. Poetry is what first brings man onto the earth, making him belong to it, 
and thus brings him into dwelling.857
Poetry essentially means the coming into being (poiēsis) of a world. The poetic 
is the basic character of human existence because human beings are capable 
of worlds. McNeill explains that the Augenblick requires that a being is open 
to the possibility of presencing a world.858 Such presencing is not discon-
nected from the historical, political and social conditions in which beings 
find themselves. Instead, as Medina also notes in regard to buen vivir, it is 
one’s careful attention to the current situation that enables also an openness 
to that which might still come.  
Where does this leave development? According to Conway and Singh, an 
embrace of the pluriverse entails ‘an orientation to coexistence with others 
whose deep differences arise from their living in and commitment to other 
life worlds, as well as an ethos of non-interference coupled with hospitality 
and co-operation.’859 A world in which many worlds fit thus requires an ethos 
of coexistence that does not attempt to subsume the different into the same. 
In the words of Christine Helliwell and Barry Hindess: 
Any solution to the problem posed by the modern experience of cultural diver-
sity must involve significantly more than a recognition and accommodation of 
difference; it must also involve a reform of attitudes towards, and practices for 
dealing with, the commonplace view that certain types of person and ways of 
life are caught in the past.860
857  Heidegger 1971a, 216. 
858  McNeill 1999, 233. 
859  Conway and Singh 2011, 702. 
860  Helliwell and Hindess 2005, 417; original emphasis.  
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Conceptions of developing peoples belonging to a time that somehow re-
sembles or corresponds to the past of the West always also come with the 
idea that those peoples are not quite fit to govern themselves. As opposed to 
such inevitably colonial ideas of developing countries and peoples ‘catching 
up’ with the West, a fundamentally different relation between them must be 
sought in another way. In Communitas, Esposito asks:
What does it mean to “help” others? Heidegger’s response is that with regard to 
the other only a noninvasive mode of helping others is to decide to “let the other 
be” in its alterity from itself […] This means that there is no positive, affirmative, 
“political,” or “ethical” mode of relating to others that doesn’t co-open [co-aprirli] 
to them, a co-opening of oneself to the common responsibility for one’s own 
proper care (ours and theirs, inextricably linked).861
If development policies wish to contribute to a politics that does not repro-
duce both ontological and ontic forms of violence, they would need to start 
by recognising that even seemingly emancipatory ideas such as capability, 
choice and happiness shape and limit human lives in ways that are not neces-
sarily deemed positive by those in the receiving end of those policies. Whereas 
postcolonial critique previously drew attention, among other things, to the 
modern state being an alien construct in most parts of the world, and thus 
directed its energies at undermining the state as a colonial construct, con-
temporary development policy is not primarily interested in building state 
institutions. Therefore, challenging the manifestations of contemporary 
colonial practices requires contesting the ways in which (under)development 
is conceptualised as a specifically human and worldly category, beyond the 
state apparatus. According to Maldonado-Torres, one of the fundamental 
characteristics of a decolonial mode of being-in-the-world is gift-giving.862 
Coloniality lacks recognition of the damné as givers, which generates and 
legitimises dynamics of possession rather than generous reception and ex-
861  Esposito 2010, 97. 
862  Maldonado-Torres 2007, 258. 
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change.863 Decolonisation, in turn, ought to be defined by generosity and 
receptivity: the logic of the gift, Maldonado-Torres argues. Yet, hospitality 
and gift-giving, too, need to be approached as political problematics to be 
continuously renegotiated.864 
While a Foucauldian framework of analysis focuses on the formation of 
subjects, it does not preclude the idea that alongside the subject transform-
ing itself, the world needs to be transformed also. Yet, to the extent that 
contemporary colonising practices are neoliberal, biopolitical practices, 
politics has to involve challenging the limited ways in which these practices 
allow subjectivity and social existence to find their expression. In Foucault’s 
final The Courage of Truth lectures, it is clear that, for him, discovering a new 
life requires transforming our worlds. The only way to discover a new life is 
to transform our world, to make of this world another world. Whether the 
problem is approached from the perspective of Heidegger or Foucault, world 
and human existence cannot be thought separately. In discussing the subject, 
Foucault discusses the world, even though it is rarely so named. And in dis-
cussing the world, Heidegger discusses the subject, even though he generally 
refuses to use the term. 
In Chapter 3, I examined the speeches that the US President Truman and 
Heidegger gave in 1945, and the very different accounts of the problems facing 
humanity at the time that those speeches put forward. In the following year, 
Heidegger was equally concerned with the state of the world:
Perhaps the world’s time is now becoming the completely destitute time. But 
also perhaps not, not yet, not even yet, despite the immeasurable need, despite 
all suffering, despite nameless sorrow, despite the growing and spreading peace-
lessness, despite the mounting confusion. Long is the time because even terror, 
taken by itself as a ground for turning, is powerless as long as there is no turn 
with mortal men.865 
863 Maldonado-Torres 2007, 259. 
864 Addressing the notion of hospitality is beyond the scope of this dissertation. See Höckert 2015, for 
hospitality in development and Baker 2011, for hospitality in International Relations. Both of them 
draw on Derridean notions of hospitality. See Derrida 2005, for a brief explication of the concept.  
865 Heidegger 1971b, 91. 
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It is clear that Heidegger harboured an eschatological ethos whereby the 
highest point of deprivation and destitution is also the moment of possibil-
ity of change – a sensibility that is expressed perhaps even more strongly in 
Agamben’s work. Yet, as Heidegger notes above, even the worst terror alone 
cannot bring about a change in Being if there is no ‘turn’ among the beings 
themselves. Beings must thus be responsive to the possibilities that a practical 
engagement with the situation opens up before then. In a somewhat different 
register, considering Frantz Fanon’s legacy for contemporary times, Lewis 
Gordon reminds us that: 
Each epoch is a living reality. This is so because they are functions of living human 
communities, which, too, are functions of the social world. As living realities, they 
come into being and will go out of being. What this means is that societies go 
through processes of birth and decay. An erroneous feature of most civilisations 
that achieve imperial status is the silly belief that such an achievement would 
assure their immortality. But we know that no living community lasts forever, 
save, perhaps, through historical memory of other communities. Decay comes. 
The task faced by each subordinated community, however, is how prepared it is 
for the moment in which conditions for its liberation are ripe. When the people 
are ready, the crucial question will be of how many ideas are available for the 
reorganization of social life. The ideas, many of which will unfold through years 
of engaged political work, need not be perfect, for in the end, it will be the hard, 
creative work of the communities that take them on. That work is the concrete 
manifestation of political imagination.866
The silly belief in immortality is surely characteristic of liberal developmen-
talism and its current neoliberal iteration. When the United Nations calls 
its new development agenda Transforming Our World, we need to ask what 
world is it that needs to be transformed. Is it not, most of all, the totalising 
idea of a one world, which conceals its own character as just a particular 
revealing of Being, that needs to be transformed? And thus, a beyond of the 
biopolitics of development is to be located in the rejection of the reduction 
866  Gordon 2004, 82. 
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of life to economic and biological categories; in the rejection of the separa-
tion of material life from spiritual being; in the rejection of the production 
of disposable life along the global colour-line; in the rejection of the idea that 
politics requires most of all a new and improved subject over and above the 
biopolitical subject; and in the rejection of the idea that the world stands 
outside human beings as a store of resources to be exploited. Underneath 
all these lies the coloniality of Being – the missing complementary half of 
biopolitics. And beyond their rejection lies the affirmation of a plurality of 
worlds; the affirmation of forms of being that cannot be reduced to economic 
and biological categories but must be understood in terms of their poetic 
character; in terms of such poetic dwelling that creates worlds from out of 
the openness of Being. 
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9. Conclusion: Being, Politics and Worlds
Let us also in the days ahead remain as wanderers on the way into the neighbor-
hood of Being.867 
The title of this dissertation suggests that the beyond of the biopolitics of 
development is to be located in being, politics and worlds. Yet, there is no 
inherent meaning to any of these notions that would necessarily bring about 
a mode of existence different from that which contemporary neoliberal 
development aims to actualise. What, then, does it mean to argue that a 
beyond of the biopolitics of development might be thought in terms of Be-
ing? And what does such a claim mean for the people who are the subject 
and objects – or the standing-reserve – of development? In the context of 
development debates it has become commonplace that, whether the idea 
being discussed is liberal democracy or Marxist theory, it is easily met with 
the derisory question ‘Can you eat it?’868 The question supposedly goes to 
show that abstract concepts are of little value when it comes to the hard, 
living reality of ‘developing’ peoples. Undoubtedly we then need to face the 
question: Can you eat Being? And yet, the answer can only be unsatisfactory 
to anyone who would pose such a question in the first place, for the answer 
goes to problematise that which must be taken for granted for the question 
to make sense: the dichotomy between the material and the ideational, and 
the subsequent devaluing of the latter. 
The question of Being is profoundly misconceived if it is taken to be solely a 
theoretical one. Being is revealed in all those moments that determine whether 
what will be eaten is the plant that grows from the corporate-patented hybrid 
867  Heidegger 2011c, 168. 
868  See World Economic Forum 2010 and Whitaker 1992, 29. 
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seed or the one that springs from the indigenous seed that sustains an entire 
life-world. Being is also revealed in those places where poor women of colour 
are sterilised so that the planet could cope a little longer with the current 
level of consumption in ‘developed’ countries. And it is also revealed in the 
moment when a farmer decides to ingest pesticides in order to end his life 
because that is the only end to current conditions that appears to be available. 
Being reveals itself in all these sites, and in others. It is that which makes things 
make sense to us in a certain way. A particular revealing of Being makes it 
rational for you to approach other beings and all that exists as a reserve to be 
exploited, while not realising that you are just as much a part of that reserve, 
if not more so, for failing to recognise the degradation that such an approach 
affects. But Being is also that which calls on you to let go of such calculative 
rationality and to open to that which cannot be grasped by it. 
Being, thus, is revealed in many ways, and I have argued in the course of 
this dissertation that those ways are thoroughly political. I have not, however, 
put forward any single definition of politics. Nevertheless, it will have become 
clear from the discussion that politics as understood in this dissertation is 
profoundly ontological. This does not mean that it is tied to a single transcen-
dental truth, or that it is not practiced on the level of human beings, by human 
beings. Ontology is political because it concerns the fundamental conditions 
of existence. As defined in the Introduction, ontology is not concerned with 
what Being is. It is concerned with how Being happens. More specifically, I 
have called an engagement with the essential categories through which be-
ing is understood ‘ontological politics’. Yet, it is important to note that such 
ontological politics has nothing to do with having theoretical knowledge of 
ontology.869 Ontological politics does not take place as a consequence of hu-
man beings gaining information about ontological categories. It takes place 
whenever beings are involved in practices that influence the conditions of 
possibility within which they exist. Such politics may be strategic – that is, 
involving analysis of the specificity of the relations of power that subjects are 
embedded in, and targeted action that aims to change those power relations. 
But it may also be poetic – meaning that it engages that which is not intel-
869  See also Prozorov 2014a, 75. 
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ligible within the current frame of understanding, and thus requires openness 
to a different happening of Being. Just as ontological politics does not require 
knowledge of ontology, neither has poetic being anything to do with ‘under-
standing’ this or that type of poetry. In existing poetically, beings dwell in 
worlds together with other beings, letting them be and co-opening to them, 
as well as to the coming of the unforeseen. Worlds are thus the meaningful 
relations in which beings exist, but underlying all those particular worlds and 
sustaining them is the world as the openness of Being. A politics concerned 
with the transformation of particular worlds is thus an appropriation of that 
openness. Such appropriation comes about through concernful engagement 
with the situation one is in. What matters, then, is that worlds matter to us. 
By way of an engagement with these ideas, I have posed the question of 
the revealing of Being alongside Foucault’s question of the constitution of the 
subject. Thereby the dissertation has argued for moving from an engagement 
with the life of biopolitics to an engagement with the ontology of biopolitics. 
This means that instead of examining biopolitics on its own terms – based 
on biological or biologised notions such as species-life – the dissertation has 
drawn attention to the ontological enframing of Being, which enables the 
reduction of life to biological and economic categories. Following from this 
engagement, I have suggested that politics in the face of neoliberal biopolitics 
should not try to resist it on its own terms, that is, through grounding politics 
on biological or vitalist conceptions of life. Instead, a beyond of contemporary 
biopolitics ought to be sought on a different plane. To this end, I have also 
sought to discuss a beyond of biopolitics in a way that is not limited to the 
commonplace dichotomies between Foucauldian and Agambenite responses. 
Throughout the dissertation, I have examined this problematic in the 
context of the idea and practice of development. With the recent introduc-
tion of the Sustainable Development Goals, the idea of development has 
once again been reinvigorated, and we are called on to take part in the trans-
formation of all lives and the world by the year 2030. Yet, this thesis started 
with the contention that contemporary practices of development are part 
of a neoliberal biopolitics, and they need to be examined as techniques for 
governing life. Another provocation for this thesis was the sense that one has 
to look further than Foucault and Agamben to get a grasp of the governing 
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of modes of being in late modernity in general, and in development policies 
in particular. To this end, I have developed a reading of the biopolitical not 
only in Foucault and Agamben but also in Heidegger. While for Foucault 
biopolitics refers to the optimisation and management of life, which operates 
by influencing the field of possibility which is available for active subjects, 
Agamben offers a more sinister reading of the biopolitical. According to him, 
the biopolitical machine produces life which is excluded from the realm of the 
political, yet abandoned to the violence of the sovereign. However, preced-
ing Foucault’s and Agamben’s engagements with the notion of biopolitics is 
Heidegger’s contention that biologised ways of thinking are a consequence 
of a machinational interpretation of Being; an interpretation that renders 
beings as perfectly accessible and disposable. In the more specifically modern 
enframing of Being, such an interpretation is absolutised as the predominant 
horizon of disclosure. From a Heideggerian perspective, the Foucauldian bi-
opolitical analytic overlooks the ontological constitution of Being, which is 
closely related but nevertheless irreducible to the constitution of biopolitical 
subjects. I have thus argued that enframing forms the ontological conditions 
of possibility for the production of the kinds of biopolitical subjectivities 
that Foucault’s work is concerned with. Yet, although over the course of the 
six decades of his career, Heidegger’s primary concern was the forgetting of 
Being in the Western metaphysical tradition, his own work was marked by 
another forgetting, which has characterised much of 20th century thinking: 
the forgetting of colonialism. I have therefore sought to highlight the role of 
colonialism in the constitution of modernity, and specifically the coloniality 
of Being that grounds enframing and the production of disposable beings. 
The colonial problematic was taken up in the short genealogy of modern 
development presented in Chapter 3, after which I considered the biopolitics 
of development from two different perspectives – the first informed by Fou-
cault’s focus on the population, the second drawing on Agamben’s concepts of 
bare life and the camp. In keeping with the Foucauldian notion of biopolitics, 
the contemporary development framework, as exhibited by the Millennium 
Development Goals and the Sustainable Development Goals, is focused on 
the health, productivity and fertility of populations – even if the concept of 
‘population’ itself has fallen into disrepute. Aiming to increase and enhance 
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those elements of life which are considered desirable, while minimising and 
disallowing that which is undesirable, development functions as a biopolitical 
security apparatus. Furthermore, Agamben’s terminology captures the way 
in which some subjects of development policy are abandoned to sovereign 
violence, as exhibited by the case of forced sterilisation. 
Nevertheless, I have also suggested that a more explicit engagement with 
the ontological underpinnings of the idea of development is needed in or-
der to better capture its depoliticising tendencies. I have made the case that 
mainstream development is depoliticising for three reasons: The first two 
reasons concern the biologisation and economisation of life that form the 
core of contemporary biopolitics of development. The third reason is the 
ontological monopolisation of Being that sustains them. The biologisation 
and economisation of life become understandable through considering the 
development paradigm’s relationship to liberalism. Deeply embedded in the 
Western liberal tradition, the notion of development and the conception of 
life that lies at its centre have also transformed as a result of the shift from 
liberalism to neoliberalism. Through an examination of the role of resilience, 
adaptation and human capital in contemporary development policy, I have 
highlighted the centrality of the ideas of contingency and potentiality to 
the ways is which ‘life’ is currently conceived of. Crucially, development is 
no longer considered to be the more or less inevitable march forward on the 
road of progress, but a distinctly fragile process that needs to be cultivated 
through resilience and adaptation in a world of risk and uncertainty. Yet, 
the biologised and economised notions of life that ground policies such as 
resilience and adaptation are an outgrowth of the enframing of Being. More 
specifically, the enframing of capability in human development manages be-
ings and their potentiality as a mouldable standing-reserve always ready to be 
taken up, transformed and improved, while at the same time reproducing the 
liberal-individualist conception of the human that reduces development to 
the choices made by the individual. Not only his critique of modern subjectiv-
ism, but even more importantly the concept of the standing-reserve thereby 
shows the critical import that Heidegger’s thought can have for neoliberal 
times such as ours. Furthermore, I have argued that human development not 
only produces biopoliticised, depoliticised subjectivities but also reflects and 
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reproduces a particular enframing of the real that normalises the contingency 
of life while concealing the contingency of the framework within which 
humans are supposed to manage their lives. 
With the aim of pursuing the notion of ontological politics as outlined 
above, I have also sought to consider politically more enabling ways of un-
derstanding contingency and potentiality. While ideas of life’s potential and 
contingent character are ubiquitous in both biopolitical discourses and in 
the work of those wishing to challenge biopolitical governance, I have argued 
that merely reaffirming the indeterminacy of life is not sufficient as a way of 
countering the depoliticising effects of neoliberalism. Instead, what needs to 
be revealed is the contingency of the real that discloses beings as infinitely 
indeterminate. Such ontological politics is different from those strands of af-
firmative biopolitics that seek to ground the affirmative political potential of 
(human) beings on the properties of life that make those beings vulnerable to 
biopolitical governance in the first place. Instead, we can think of a mode of 
being beyond biopolitics as a form of existence that is capable of transcending 
the separation between zoē and bios. Neither by elevating zoē to the principle 
of politics, nor by imagining a form of politics that disregards the very real 
material concerns that people in postcolonial societies have. This idea was 
examined through a juxtaposition of the notions of food security and food 
sovereignty. While the notion of food security is concerned with securing the 
biological life of the world population by ensuring that people have enough 
to eat to lead an active life, food sovereignty seeks to enable also the exist-
ence of diverse forms of being. As seed monopolies are an extreme form of 
the metaphysical absolutisation of a horizon of disclosure, in their struggle 
over seeds and the potentiality that they contain, peasant organisations are 
engaged in the kind of ontological politics that challenges modern enframing. 
In order to pursue the idea of a beyond of the biopolitical further, I have 
drawn attention to the notion of the Augenblick. This consideration has 
been premised on the contention that Heidegger’s work can help not only 
in understanding the roots of contemporary notions of biopolitics but also 
in conceiving of a different plane from which to consider a beyond of the 
biopolitical. A beyond, then, is something that is constituted by a disruption 
in the happening of Being – in this case a disruption in the enframing of all 
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beings as a standing-reserve available for ordering and exploitation. Prob-
lematising the limitedness of the idea of choice in human development and 
further juxtaposing this neoliberal conception of choice with an ontological 
notion of ‘decision’, I have argued that choosing always only concerns some-
thing that has already been given, while the decision entails recognition of 
the finitude of the prevailing mode of being and cuts open a space for Being 
to happen differently. 
The action of the Augenblick thus occurs as the decision. Yet, it does not 
happen in a fleeting moment but is rather an ongoing responsiveness to the 
situation one is in. In order to examine different meanings of the encountering 
of finitude in a developmental, postcolonial context, I considered the Indian 
farmer suicides as effectively disposing of a population that has become sur-
plus, while at the same time functioning to further legitimate biopolitical calls 
to educate those who remain on how to cope, manage risk and live properly. 
On the other hand, the Haitian peasants’ struggle to keep their indigenous 
seeds was argued to exhibit the farmers taking a stance against the enfram-
ing of potentiality and in favour of a different horizon of possibility. Thus, 
death is not necessarily an individualising factor for (post)colonial peoples, 
but sometimes the willingness to risk death may be a necessary condition for 
a free, sovereign life. The Augenblick was thereby read as the moment where 
the givenness of the existing order is questioned out of the occurrence of the 
essence of truth – the openness of Being. 
Furthermore, I have sought to explore the concepts of darkness and vi-
sion in relation to both the biopolitics of development and the thought of a 
beyond. Contesting the regimes of visuality of development where some are 
rendered invisible and disposable while others are exposed to the excessive 
visibility of the developmental gaze, I have argued that the biopolitics of 
disposability in part follows the global colour-line and in part is premised on 
the question of whether particular peoples and forms of life can be included 
in economic progress. Where the latter is the case, people become the objects 
of the developmental gaze and its technologising regime of visuality. Yet, the 
presencing of modern enframing does not concern simply the actuality of an 
object – the vision of that which is present – but also, and even more impor-
tantly, the orderability of potentiality. Thus crucial to the mode of looking 
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that creates knowledge in late modernity is the identification of potentiality. 
In order to unravel the developmental gaze, I have suggested a reformulation 
of looking as openness to other beings and to that which is; not as a reserve 
for growth, but as the beings that they are. Decolonising the developmental 
gaze would mean rethinking seeing in a way that emphasises the emergence of 
and relation to the unintelligible. Similarly, I have aimed to rethink the idea 
of a beyond not as something that comes about by moving from darkness to 
light as a result of the influence of a visionary individual, but as an ongoing 
responsiveness to the situation one is in, together with others. The concept 
of darkness thus functioned as a focal point through which the problematics 
of both the biopolitics of development and the politics of a beyond could 
be considered. 
Finally, I have sought to look more closely at the notion of world in both 
development discourse and its biopolitical critique, arguing that the latter 
is often not able to address the limitations of the former when it comes to 
engaging with the ‘world’. The idea of ‘one world’ that animates development 
practice combines the notions of one humanity, one market and one planet, 
but it is increasingly articulated in terms of the latter. Yet, this has not meant 
a recognition of the superiority of nature, but it has rather resulted in calls 
to bring the entire planet under human management. Biopolitical critiques, 
in turn, have highlighted well the way in which biopolitical governance in 
neoliberalism has become individualised and internalised to the extent that 
the ‘world’ has effectively disappeared. However, biopolitical critique rarely 
explicitly engages with a notion of world that would be beyond the reduc-
tion of world to an economic and ecological totality. Instead, more fruitful 
discussions of ‘world’ can be found in both contemporary decolonial thought 
and in Heidegger’s work. 
To this end, I have discussed the notion of ‘pluriverse’, entailing the coexist-
ence of multiple worlds, which is arguably possible on account of the universal 
character of the pluriverse. While this universality has not been extensively 
theorised by those using the concept of the pluriverse, I have argued that the 
seemingly paradoxical universality of the pluriverse becomes conceivable 
when understood through Heidegger’s conceptualisation of ‘world’ as the 
openness of Being. Understanding ‘world’ in these ontological terms is the 
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condition of possibility for the pluriversal existence of multiple ontic worlds. 
The Augenblick, furthermore, is the presencing of one’s worldly possibilities 
in being-with others. It is the moment where the world as the openness of 
Being enters the realm of a particular positive world and reveals a new horizon 
of possibility. Finally, I discussed the notion of sumak kawsay/buen vivir as 
an example of a mode of being that cannot be captured by or reduced to the 
life of neoliberal biopolitics of development. Sumak kawsay is a notion that 
challenges the biopolitical economisation and biologisation of life, and the 
reduction of the world to a store of resources to be managed. I also suggested 
that the concept captures the ontological plurality espoused in Heidegger’s 
critique of the metaphysics of modernity, and the sense that the poetic is the 
basic character of human existence in the world. 
The poetic is so important because it captures the necessity of understand-
ing being in a way that is at once both spiritual and material, both in the 
world in the sense of historical time and social conditions, and beyond those 
conditions in the sense of an openness to a different happening of Being. 
Poetic being is thus beyond the frame of understanding of biopolitics, which 
is concerned with the classification of ‘developing’ peoples and the establish-
ment of categories for the purpose of making those peoples intelligible and 
governable. Once a population has been duly categorised, it can become the 
subject and object of development. Yet, such categorisation cannot capture 
the multiplicity of the life-worlds of the poor, for example. Hence, when ap-
proaching the question of development, it is necessary to think in material 
terms that are sufficient for life, but it is equally necessary to recognise that 
human beings can only dwell on this earth if their being is not reduced to 
biologically and economically determined categories. In order for that not to 
happen, it must be recognised that other worlds are possible. And not only 
are they possible, but they simply are. They are (possible) because, despite its 
ubiquitousness in the contemporary political imagination, development is 
only an expression of one particular revealing of Being. Beyond the enfram-
ing that allows development to appear as the only true world, there is the 
openness of Being from out of which human beings, in their engagement 
with their worlds, may appropriate forms of being and practices of politics 
that are beyond the biopolitics of development.  
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I would like to end this dissertation with a short reflection on the ‘be-
yondness’ of the beyond. I have pointed out that the character of a beyond 
necessarily depends on that which one is aiming to transcend. Furthermore, I 
have also noted that there is a necessary ambiguity in the notion of a beyond: 
if one knew to begin with what the beyond exactly is, it would no longer be 
a beyond. Yet, I have also pointed towards a beyond of the biopolitics of 
development as being located in entirely ‘worldly’ practices such as the Hai-
tian peasants struggle to keep their native seeds, or the Andean indigenous 
peoples’ attempt to live out an alternative ontology where the human rela-
tionship to everything that is, and could be, cannot be understood through 
a modern political frame of interpretation. In order to address this relation-
ship between the radical otherness and the ‘worldliness’ of the beyond, I will 
briefly discuss Heidegger’s engagement with the notion of transcendence in 
The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic. In this text Heidegger identifies two 
prominent meanings of the term ‘transcendent’: the transcendent in contrast 
to the immanent and the transcendent in contrast to the contingent. In the 
first sense, the transcendent is that which lies outside the subject, who is ‘a sort 
of a box with an interior’, and the problem of transcendence is the problem 
of the way in which a relationship between the interior and the exterior is 
maintained.870 In the second sense, the contingent is understood as that which 
‘touches us, what pertains to us, that with which we are on the same footing, 
that which belongs to our kind and sort’, while the transcendent is that which 
‘is beyond all this as that which conditions it, as the unconditioned, but at 
the same time as the really unattainable, what exceeds us.’871 The first sense 
refers to epistemological transcendence: the relation between the subject and 
the object of knowledge. In the second, theological notion of transcendence, 
the ‘being-beyond’ expresses a difference in the degree of being between the 
transcendent and the contingent, such as the difference between the creator 
and the created in Christianity.872 
870  Heidegger 1984, 160-161. 
871  Heidegger 1984, 161. 
872  Heidegger 1984, 162. 
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It should be clear that the ‘being-beyond’, which is contained in the argu-
ment of this dissertation, refers to neither of these senses of transcendence. 
Likewise, it may be useful to note once again that even though we might say 
that Being is the site of the beyond, Being is not a transcendent in any such 
epistemological or theological sense of the term. Rather, a being-beyond is 
to be found in the human being’s being-in-the-world.873 This is the sense of 
transcendence that Heidegger finally turns to in his discussion. The pos-
sibility of going beyond is a basic character of Dasein, and this possibility is 
thoroughly intertwined with the problematics of world and finitude already 
discussed in this thesis. Without repeating those discussions here, it suffices 
to say that the possibility of ‘beyondness’, of ‘leaping over’ factical conditions, 
is based on the temporal and worldly character of Dasein. ‘The surpassing of 
factic beings that is peculiar to the world as such, and thereby to transcend-
ence and freedom corresponds to the epekeina [beyond]. In other words, the 
world itself is surpassive’, Heidegger explains.874 Hence, it is possible to think 
the beyond both in terms of a radical surpassing and in terms of its emergence 
in the factical life of human beings. Radical changes in the dominant reveal-
ing of Being happen, but they do not happen at the snap of fingers. They are 
constituted by the incremental living out of alternative ontologies, that is: by 
the transcendent character of being-in-the-world.  
There is also another, perhaps more mundane sense in which the beyond 
of the biopolitics of development might be considered, which concerns its 
place within the discipline of International Relations. While much of main-
stream IR undoubtedly still remains ‘the dutiful child of modernity’ and 
‘part of the rearguard of the old formations of knowledge’,875 by now there 
is also a large body of critical, Foucault-inspired work that has increasingly 
moved from the margins to the mainstream. In the light of this, I suggested 
in the Introduction that the ‘toolbox’ usage of Foucauldian concepts has 
become too much of a beaten track in IR. This should not be taken to mean 
that we need to move beyond Foucault in the sense of no longer engaging 
873  Heidegger 1984, 166. 
874  Heidegger 1984, 193. 
875  Darby and Paolini 1994, 389; 392. 
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with his work at all. In fact, it is an unfortunate feature of disciplines such as 
International Relations that the work of particular philosophers or political 
theorists may quickly rise to fame but is also swiftly cast aside when it has 
supposedly been ‘done’ in the discipline. Agamben’s brief popularity during 
the heyday of the ‘war on terror’ serves as an example of this. At the same 
time, one can hope that International Relations would be a discipline where 
it is possible to engage with the work of thinkers such as Heidegger without 
‘the relentless quibbling over the right sense of the German terminological 
apparatus, and the war of words concerning the neologisms’, instead seeking 
‘to understand him as a thinker dedicated to capture the essence of his time 
in thought.’876 This is not an invitation to haphazard applications of complex 
theoretical frameworks, but a call to approach those frameworks from the 
perspective of the primary aim of understanding the problems of one’s time. 
The beyond of biopolitics in International Relations should thus not mean 
casting biopolitics aside, but extracting its insights and attempting to think 
the happening of life and being in the neoliberal late-modernity from out of 
those insights. This dissertation has been a limited effort towards opening up 
the space for that. For the purpose of a beyond is also to free thought from the 
framework within which it has been captured. Each particular beyond will 
provide its own ground for thought, opening up new problem spaces and sites 
of contention. Yet, thinking the beyond as such is groundless. Therefore, the 
thought of beyond is a wandering, as Heidegger says, in the neighbourhood 
of Being. The beyond of the biopolitics of development – when understood 
as an immediately practical and political question – depends on the multi-
plication of such spaces where the centrality of development to the global 
expansion of modern calculative metaphysics is recognised and questioned. 
Those spaces exist both in the global north and in the global south, and their 
multiplicity and diversity is a testament to the openness of Being and hu-
man beings’ creativity in appropriating that openness for being on the earth 
in ways that challenge the neoliberal biopolitics of development, thereby 
constituting a beyond. 
 
876  George 2015, ix. 
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